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In today’s world the common picture of screening is that there’s no harm in trying. The 
leading concept in society is that screening is the best way to identify serious health 
threats at its most treatable stage. In some ways that is correct, but it is only half the 
truth. Screening involves not only opportunities and benefits but also serious health 
threats, risks and costs. 
With the aim to promote health, the Netherlands – like many other European countries 
- introduced national programmes for neonatal screening, breast cancer screening 
and several others. These programmes were introduced after having decided that the 
benefits of screening outweigh the health risks and costs. 
The worldwide highly respected principles of Wilson and Jungner are used as an 
instrument to assess the justification of screening programmes.1 This ground breaking 
principles determine whether a condition potentially warrants screening efforts are 
also incorporated in the Dutch Act on population screening (in Dutch: ‘Wet op het 
bevolkingsonderzoek’ (WBO)).2 This Act is the most important tool of the Dutch State 
to regulate screening which is classified as population screening. 
Since the genetic background of many diseases has been partially elucidated, people 
are very eager to learn more about their genetic make-up. The provision of genetic 
screening directly to consumers via internet is a lucrative growth market for business. 
People believe genetic screening to be beneficial. They deem that genetic information 
contained in their DNA profile helps them to control their health and to live longer. 
In the Netherlands – as in the rest of Europe - there is growing concern about the 
supply of a wide range of ‘unregulated’ genetic screening directly to consumers outside 
hospital care or the population screening programmes.3 There seems to be a tendency 
to introduce new forms of screening like health checks, kits for ‘self-testing’ and direct-
to-consumer (DTC) genetic tests, before they have been properly researched.4 
With a DTC genetic test, which is an application of genetic screening, healthy individuals 
can acquire information concerning the presence of genetic risks and hereditary 
diseases. The DTC genetic tests, available via internet, have been criticised for their 
limited predictive value, the absence of medical supervision and the lack of adequate 
information regarding the characteristics of these tests.5 Legal warrants similar to 
1 Wilson & Jungner 1968. Wilson and Jungner have developed 10 criteria for judging screening. Screening 
programmes should meet these criteria before they are introduced to the public. 
2 Stb. 1992, 611.
3 GR 2008; RVZ 2008; Brower 2010, p. 1611; See also A Common Framework of Principles for direct-to-
consumer genetic testing services from the UK Human Genetic Commission. www.hgc.gov.UK; Report on 
the Workshop Legal regulation for genetic testing, ESHG-Conference in Gothenburg, June 14th 2010. The 
report can be find on the Internet:https://www.eshg.org/fileadmin/www.eshg.org/documents/Europe/
LegalWS/ReportESHG-LegalWorkshop2010.pdf
4 GR 2008, p. 21.




national population screening programmes falling under the realm of the WBO are, at 
least in the Netherlands, often absent from the access to and the supply of DTC genetic 
tests.
The Dutch State is struggling to square the circle when it comes to the almost 
unrestricted availability of such forms of screening. On the one hand, States bound 
to human rights law have the duty to promote health and to protect citizens against 
serious health threats from unsound genetic screening. On the other hand it can be 
argued that the availability of DTC genetic screening without hurdles strengthens 
the individual’s self-determination; one of the cornerstone of Dutch patients’ rights 
legislation. Furthermore, free access to DTC genetic screening without barriers fits into 
a market-driven healthcare system. In such healthcare systems the concepts of own 
responsibility, self-management and freedom of choice are leading principles. 
In other words, there is a need and an obligation for the Dutch State to find a proper 
balance between the duty to promote health and to protect individuals against health 
hazards and the obligation of the Dutch State to guarantee that their citizens can enjoy 
individual self-determination as recognised in national and international law.
This thesis focuses on the following central question: ‘what are the normative criteria 
for the access to and supply of genetic screening from constitutional and European 
law perspectives?’ As a corollary, I will explore what this means for the Dutch legal 
framework regulating genetic screening, particularly DTC genetic tests. 
Finding a proper balance between self-determination of individuals and health 
protection is important since DTC genetic screening also affects the rights and freedoms 
of others. DTC genetic screenings have the capacity to reveal information about 
relatives and (potential) offspring. They have fundamental rights and freedoms too. 
1.2. AIM AND SCOPE OF THE STUDY
The aim of this study is to define normative criteria that should govern the access to 
large scale applications of genetics (the study of heredity) and genomics (the study of 
genes and their function)6 in the field of predictive medicine, notably DTC genetic tests. 
In doing so, the study primarily focuses on the Netherlands. In this thesis I will examine 
the role and the responsibilities of the Dutch State regarding the regulation of genetic 
screening and formulate normative criteria that should govern access to and supply 
of genetic screening, with DTC genetic tests as a case study. Formulating normative 
criteria according to genetic screening requires, first of all, the clarification of the 
responsibility of the State with respect to self-determination and health protection. In 
identifying the relevant normative criteria, the focus is not only confined to the existing 




Dutch legal framework but attention is also paid to human rights and fundamental 
principles, European law (both legal instruments stemming from the Council of Europe 
and of the European Union) and legislation in other European countries. 
In order to answer the central question, ‘what are the normative criteria for the access 
to and supply of genetic screening from constitutional and European law perspectives’, 
the following questions will be addressed:
1.2.1 Research questions: 
1. What are, from a constitutional law perspective, the obligations of the Dutch State 
with respect to the access to and supply of genetic screening, particularly DTC 
genetic tests? 
2. What normative criteria should, from a constitutional and European law perspective, 
apply to genetic population screening (programmes) in the Netherlands and, more 
specifically, to DTC genetic screening, particularly DTC genetic tests, with respect to 
self-determination of individuals? 
3. What is the legal framework regarding the access to and supply of genetic screening 
in the Netherlands?
4. Is the Dutch legal framework regarding genetic screening in accordance with the 
legalisation of the Europe Union and the Council of Europe?
1.3. METHODS
This study thus encompasses four key research questions, subdivided into more specific 
questions which will be answered in the chapters of this thesis. The chapters have been 
published in several national and international, mostly legal journals. The method used 
is a review of the international literature to examine and to define the (legal) concept 
of self-determination and health protection, as well as the right to freedom of speech. 
I analysed Dutch law (legislation and case law) regarding genomics and genetics and 
issues related to screening, like patient’s rights and confidentially. Furthermore, I 
examined the relevant law of the European Union (henceforth: EU) and the Council of 
Europe as well as the case law of the Court of Justice of the EU (henceforth: ECJ) and 
the European Court of Human Rights (henceforth: ECtHR) regulating genetic screening 
and thus DTC genetic tests. With respect to the ECtHR, the research is focused on the 
following provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (ECHR): Article 2 ECHR on the right to live, Article 3 ECHR on the prohibition 
of torture, Article 8 ECHR on the right to respect for private and family life and Article 
10 ECHR on the freedom of expression. With respect to the ECJ the study is focused on 





This study devotes great attention to the legal documents of the Council of Europe and 
the EU that apply to or are otherwise relevant to the access to and supply of genetic 
screening. The Council of Europe (box 1) and the EU (box 2) influence, both in their 
own specific ways, the freedom of the Netherlands to regulate access to and supply 
of genetic screening. The ECHR and the legislation of the EU are very important for 
the legal system of the Netherlands due to the fact that according to Articles 93 and 
94 of the Dutch Constitution, legislation of both organisations in case of a conflict 
precede over Dutch law. Furthermore, Article 120 of the Dutch Constitution forbids 
national judges to consider the constitutionality of domestic laws. It also entails that 
our domestic law can be tested against (European) treaty norms and obligations before 
the national courts, and, secondly, before the ECtHR and the ECJ.
Box 1      Box 2 








47 States Parties & 5 Observer States and the 
Vatican
Aim: 
Create a common democratic and legal 
area throughout the whole of the European 
Union, ensuring respect of human rights, 
democracy and the rule of law
How: 
Member States cooperate on the basis of 
shared values and common political decisions
Decision making body:
Committee of Ministers
Most important achievement: 
Adoption of the Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(Adopted 1950, came in to force 1954)
Legal instruments: 
Conventions, protocols & recommendations
Interpretation of the Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamen-
tal Freedoms: 










Focus on economic integration and created 
an Internal Market between the Member 
States
How:
Member States delegate sovereignty by 
handing over some powers to the Union for 
the benefit of the economic integration
Decision making body:
European Council & European Parliament
Operates on the basis of:
The Treaty on the European Union & the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union 
Legal instruments:
Regulations (binding as soon as it is passed) 
& Directives (have to be implemented in the 
national legislation
Interpretation of the treaties establishing 
the European Union:




Finally, I make some explanatory remarks with respect to the way in which I describe 
the law of the EU in the following chapters. The EU has developed and adopted 
specific legislation to harmonize the laws of its Member States in order to promote 
economic integration and achieve some other aims. The EU has not yet adopted a 
specific ‘directive’ or ‘regulation’ which covers primarily the access to or the supply of 
(DTC) genetic screening. This does not alter the fact that some directives also can or do 
apply to some aspects of genetic screening, depending on how people are invited to 
participate in a screening and in which way the screening is performed and supplied. 
The E-Commerce Directive (Directive 2000/31/EC) and the Distance Selling Directive 
(Directive 97/7/EC) for example cover only the access to and the supply of genetic 
screening through internet.
According to the Tedeschi principle7 the first question with the respect to the applicable 
EU law is whether there is specific secondary law on a particular issues, in this case 
genetic screening. Only if there is no specific applicable secondary law, the question 
emerges whether there are relevant general rules of primary law of the EU, the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) provisions on the free movement 
of people, goods, service and capital, apply to genetic screening. In the light of the 
Tedeschi principle it may be argued that we might have described in the separate 
chapters (published articles) consequently first the secondary law which covers genetic 
screening and secondly the primary law. We decided differently. However this does not 
affect the (final) conclusions of the thesis or the remarks in the last chapter. 
1.4. LIMITATIONS AND EXTENSIONS
1.4.1. Study
This study focuses on the vertical relations between States and citizens and the 
legally binding instruments on national and European level which apply to genetic 
screening, like DTC genetic tests. Only limited attention is paid towards self-regulation 
instruments from professional groups and associations which set up quality criteria for 
the access to and supply of DTC genetic tests. The study is confined mostly to the Dutch 
and European legal framework regarding genetic screening but its outcomes may be 
considered relevant for the regulation of health services in general within Europe and 
genetic screening outside Europe. 
Furthermore the study is largely confined to examining the legal framework applicable 
to genetic screening, more precisely genetic screening that is classified as health 
service, according to the present Dutch and EU legislation and case law. The regulation 
of health related goods in and outside the Netherlands is not a main subject of this 
thesis. 





This thesis consists of seven published articles published in different scientific (mostly 
legal) journals with different focus and primary target groups. Therefore the contents 
of the chapters are circumscribed by the main questions and the aims of the various 
articles. As a consequence the degree of accuracy and the opportunity of nuance vary 
from chapter to chapter. So certain subjects, matters and (legal) aspects of genetic 
screening have been tabled and described in more detail in one chapter than in another 
chapter(s). 
1.5. OUTLINE OF THE THESIS
Part A of this thesis includes a study of the duties and responsibilities of the State 
regarding genetic screening, particularly towards screening initiatives, that emerge 
outside the healthcare sector as well as national population screening programmes. 
In this part I address the question to what extent the State is obliged to curtail this 
‘unregulated’ access to genetic screening to protect individuals against serious health 
threats and to protect the rights and freedoms of others. The legislation in seven 
European countries and the laws from the EU and the Council of Europe regarding 
DTC genetic tests are the main subject of part B. In this part I formulate the normative 
criteria which should, from a constitutional and European law perspective, apply to 
genetic screening. The last chapter contains the most important findings of part A 








                            CHAPTER2
FREEDOM, EQUALS HAPPINESS? THE REGULATION OF DNA 
DIAGNOSTICS IN HEALTH CARE FROM A HUMAN RIGHTS 
PERSPECTIVE
Abstract: It is impossible to imagine our society without DNA tests. They play a large role 
as part of the evidence against those accused of criminal offences, in determining family 
relationships and in the fight against terrorism. DNA tests also feature prominently 
within healthcare. The (quality)guarantees that Dutch legislation and regulations aim 
to provide, not least to protect patients(rights), can however, be side-stepped relatively 
easily. There are numerous possibilities, via the internet and in other ways, to have 
one’s own genetic material mapped. Thereby information is also provided which gives 
access to the hereditary traits of blood relatives. How must the greater availability of 
DNA tests and, in the future, of ‘do-it-yourself tests’ (DNA self-tests) be assessed from 
a human rights perspective: is it in line with the human right of self-determination or 
should the Dutch State take protective – read: restrictive – measures, also regarding the 
rights and freedoms of others? 
R.E. van Hellemondt, A.C. Hendriks & M.H. Breuning, ‘Vrijheid, blijheid? Het reguleren 
van DNA-diagnostiek in de zorg vanuit mensenrechtelijk perspectief’, Nederlands 





Thanks to the revolutionary developments in the field of human genetics and genomics 
it is known that many diseases and disorders have an inherited component. Via genetic 
testing, more specifically DNA testing,8 it can be determined if someone is a carrier of 
a genetic mutation which predisposes to a particular disease or is associated with an 
increased risk of future (damage to) health problems. 
Due to the specialised nature of DNA testing and the legal, ethical and social implications 
related to the provision of such testing, strict legally entrenched requirements apply. 
Contrary to these conditions individuals can at present, quite easily purchase DNA 
(self)tests via the internet or undergo genetic testing in our neighbouring countries, 
without any specific (quality)guarantees.9 
The person concerned (the consumer), for reasons of his own, takes the initiative 
for testing. With these DNA tests all sorts of information concerning the consumer’s 
(future) health can come to light. The quality, safety, reliability and user-friendliness of 
these forms of predictive testing can be called into question.10 Furthermore, there are 
concerns about the way in which providers inform the (potential) consumers regarding 
the benefits and risks of these tests and also about the way in which the results are 
communicated.11
The increased possibilities of undergoing DNA testing affect the rights and freedoms 
of others. The results of DNA tests also often provide information about the genetic 
constitution of the blood relatives of the person concerned. Blood relatives could in 
such situations, without any counselling or giving consent, be confronted with (future) 
health information that they were unaware of – and that they perhaps also would have 
liked to remain.
The fact that people resort to the internet and other ‘alternative’ providers of DNA 
testing, has led in 2008 to advisory reports12 from the Dutch Health Council13 and the 
Dutch Council for Public Health and Care.14 These advisory councils examined the role 
and the responsibility of the Dutch State in relation to preventive testing. In the same 
year also the Healthcare Inspectorate15 published a report about health checks, medical 
check-ups, total body scans and other forms of undirected preventive medical testing.16 
The question, which arises – also as a result of these publications – is: (to what extent) 
8 DNA represents Deoxyribonucleic acid. 
9 For example http://www.quoak.nl; http://www.verilabs.nl/; http//www.store.genelex.com; htpp//www.
delphitesv.com/content/GeneticAnalysis/html; http//www.23andme.com/; http://www.prescan.nl/
10 Wasson 2008, p. 16-18.
11 Bunnik et al. 2009, p.23-25; Timmermans 2009.
12 GR 2008 & RVZ 2008.
13 De Gezondheidsraad.
14 Raad voor de Volksgezondheid. 





is the State obliged to curtail this ‘unregulated’ access to and supply of DNA (self)tests, 
in which the initiative originates from the consumer, to prevent individual damage to 
health and to protect the rights and freedoms of others? The answer to this question 
partly depends on the value that is accorded to autonomy and protection, important 
human rights and health law principles.
For a clear understanding of the matter, this contribution opens with an explanation 
of the way in which DNA (self)diagnostics can play a part in the identification of 
carriership or (latent) present diseases which can benefit the people concerned (2.2). 
This is followed by a description of the values(s) of the principles of autonomy and 
protection in the academic literature (2.3.1), in the Convention for the protection on 
Human Rights and fundamental freedoms (henceforth: ECHR) and the case law of the 
European Court of Human Rights (henceforth: ECtHR) (section 2.3.2). Then, we provide 
an overview of the relevant legislation in the Netherlands and the consequences of 
this for DNA (self)tests (section 2.4). Lastly we formulate an answer on the question: 
‘whether, from the human rights point of view, the access to and supply of DNA (self)
tests should (not) or must be regulated’ (section 2.5) followed by conclusions (section 
2.6). 
2.2. DNA (SELF)DIAGNOSTICS
2.2.1. Genetics and DNA (self)diagnostics
The human body consists of more than 10.000 billion cells. The genome is the total 
genetic material of a body cell. A body cell consists of 46 chromosomes. The genetic 
material in the chromosomes is called DNA. Apart from identical twins, the composition 
of the DNA between individuals is different in a great many places. On average one in 
1000 nucleotides, the building blocks of DNA, has a variant. Most of these variants 
have no effect on the health of the person concerned. However, some variants do.
DNA diagnostics provides knowledge about variants that have an influence on (the 
chance of) developing a particular disease or disorder. By typing these variants it is 
possible to identify if someone has a higher or lower risk for a disease. In this respect 
it is important to make a distinction between presymptomatic diagnostic genetic tests 
and susceptibility genetic tests. Presymptomatic diagnostic genetic tests are mostly 
aimed at discovering a monogenetic disease. Monogenetic diseases are caused by 
mutations in one gene. Examples of this are familial hypercholesterolemia (genetically 
determined high cholesterol) and Huntington’s disease (hereditary brain disorder in 
which the nerve cells in certain parts of the brain gradually die off). In monogenetic 
hereditary disease and disorders, which incidentally are relatively rare, symptoms of 
the disease nearly always appear after a period of time, when the mutation in question 
is identified. Hence via DNA diagnostics it can be determined to a very high degree 




Multifactorial genetic diseases are associated with the effects of multiple genes 
in combination with the environment and the lifestyle. The influence of one or 
more genes, the environment and the lifestyle play a role in the development of a 
multifactorial genetic disease. Most multifactorial genetic diseases manifest themselves 
later in life, such as various types of cancer, neurodegenerative disorders (dementia) 
and cardiovascular diseases. The moment and the way that the disease manifests 
itself is partly dependent on other factors than the genetic constitution of the person 
concerned. 
Some genetic mutations are associated with an increased risk of a disease and other 
DNA variants reduce the risk of developing a disorder. Most people have a combination 
of favourable and unfavourable variants, so that they come out at an average. DNA 
diagnostics for multifactorial diseases – which are increasingly available17 – give the 
person concerned much less certainty about future health than testing for monogenetic 
disorders. DNA diagnostics only gives information about the risk of a particular disorder. 
If it actually manifests also dependents on factors such as ‘favourable’ DNA variants, 
lifestyle and environmental factors.18
2.2.2. DNA (self)tests: advantages and disadvantages
Rapid technological developments have made it possible at a relatively low cost to 
identify large numbers of DNA variants via blood samples, saliva or other body 
material. The business world sees an interesting market for DNA (self)tests, in other 
words diagnostic testing on body material.19
DNA diagnostics offers opportunities, such as detecting the presence of latent diseases 
at an early stage. Through preventive measures/treatment and adjustment of lifestyle 
and environmental factors, it is sometimes possible to reduce the risk of expression of 
the disease, such as the preventive amputation of the breast(s) by hereditary forms of 
breast cancer. The results of DNA diagnostics can also play a role in reproductive choices. 
Thus DNA diagnostics, including DNA (self)tests, provide individuals possibilities of 
better organising their life as they see fit (autonomy). 
The possibility of (self)testing also has drawbacks. The risk of false positive or false 
negative results, and therefore of unjustified reassurance or concern is present. This 
risk is probably larger when the consumer, ‘unhampered by any knowledge’, interprets 
the test results himself. For the average consumer it is not easy to put the results – 
mostly given in percentages – about the risk of getting multifactorial genetic disease 
into the right perspective. As Timmermans aptly stated in her inaugural lecture, for 
many patients the concept ‘15%-chance is less clear than when you say ‘of every 
17 Calsbeek et al. 2009, p. 493.
18 Van de Pol 2003; Hendriks & Gevers 2004, p.1114-1130.




hundred people there are fifteen who become ill’.20 The reliability of the test results 
depends furthermore on the number of individuals which are tested and the number 
of mutations which are found. It is highly debatable if the consumers realise the limited 
value of a DNA (self)test at the moment that they give their consent.
The psychological consequences of testing for the risk of certain forms of cancer, unlike 
the testing for monogenetic hereditary diseases – such as Huntington’s disease – are 
less well known.21 However, it is evident from research addressing the effect of DNA 
diagnostics on the quality of life of women from breast cancer families that after the 
diagnostics, regardless of the results of the test, the feelings of anxiety lessen. Untested 
women appeared to be more depressed than tested women.22 In DNA diagnostics, 
positive test results (i.e. the risk factor is present) of hereditary, untreatable diseases 
can have social and psychological implications. Research shows that individuals who 
test positive to Huntington’s disease have a higher risk of getting depressed and 
committing suicide. Also people who test negative to this disease (i.e. the risk factor 
is not present) have a higher risk of psychological complaints as a consequence of 
the stress of testing.23 For these reasons, informed consent before testing and good 
counselling during the testing process is of great importance. Furthermore, DNA 
diagnostics can lead to misuse, such as discrimination on the labour and insurance 
market.24 The consumer will need to be duly aware of these risks.
The possibility of DNA (self)tests can not only lead to avoidable health damage to the 
consumer, but can also cause unwanted side effects for society and affect the interests 
of others. Health costs can increase through the demand for reappraisal of test results 
in the ‘mainstream circuit’ and through follow-up tests and overtreatment as a result 
of this.
Furthermore, DNA testing differs from a ‘conventional medical examination’, in that 
the test results also provide information of the genetic constitution of blood relatives. 
This implies that the application of DNA diagnostics within and outside healthcare 
raises human rights questions as well. A positive test result for Huntington’s disease 
entails that not only the person concerned is affected, but that also (at least) one of the 
parents of the tested carries the same genetic mutation. For a child who tests positive 
for Cystic Fibrosis it means that both parents and at least two of the grandparents are 
carriers of this disease. There is a strong possibility that the parents and grandparents 
are unaware of this, and that they would also actually prefer to remain so. Thereby the 
availability of the results of DNA (self)tests leads to tough normative questions about 
dealing with this with regard to blood relatives.
20 Timmermans 2009.
21 Calsbeek et al. 2009, p. 493.
22 Grann & Jacobson 2002, p. 346.
23 Asscher & Koops 2009, p. 27-35.




For the time being the possible benefits of DNA (self)tests do not seem to outweigh the 
cost. This raises the question whether or not we need to offer protection, by restricting 
free access to DNA (self)tests. We will cover this in more depth in section 2.3.
2.3. AUTONOMY AND PROTECTION
2.3.1. Academic literature
Autonomy and protection are important human rights and health law principles.25 There 
is a lively debate amongst scholars and society in general about the exact meaning of 
these principles, also in connection with each other.26
In our society, which is strongly oriented toward individuality, independency and 
freedom of choice, the principle of protection is not always viewed in a favourable 
light. Protection evokes memories of paternalism and other types of (external) 
intervention and dependence.27 However, the principle of protection reflects that we 
must try to prevent injury to ourselves and others as much as possible. The provision of 
such protection is also recognised as a precondition for individual self-determination. 
Autonomy, considered in this way, is closely linked with the principle of protection.
In the literature there is a difference of opinion about the exact meaning of autonomy.28 
Autonomy is traditionally associated with individual self-determination.29 Individual 
self-determination is above all associated with negative freedom: the right to organise 
one’s own life without intervention by others. At the same time this implies positive 
freedom, the possibility to shape life to our own wishes.30
Following on from this, criticism of the individualistic autonomy concept is possible. 
Autonomy can after all also be regarded as a relational concept, in which individuals – 
as social beings – in interaction with others, experience their life as their own. The role 
of the other is important in this, because an individual in contact with others discovers 
who he is and what he wants.31 The guarantee of positive freedom, such as through the 
principle of protection, clashes with the view that autonomy especially or exclusively 
includes a right to be left alone, because that indicates that ‘negative freedom’ without 
‘positive freedom’ is possible.32 
The fact that we are by no means finished with discussing the meaning of the concept 
autonomy and protection, or their importance and of their mutual relationship is well 
25 Hendriks 2006.
26 Sinding Aasen et al. 2009.
27 Jonkers 2006, p. 57-67; Schmitz & Reinacher 2006, p. 497-498.
28 McGregor 2008, p. 9-10; Buijsen 2004, p. 425-429.
29 Leenen et al. 2007, p. 37-40.
30 Bauduin 2000, p. 40-52.
31 More detailed Hendriks et al. 2008, p. 4-6.




illustrated by the lively discussion at and as a result of the Dutch Lawyers Association33 
members meeting 2009. The theme of this meeting was human biotechnology and 
rights. The meaning of the right to autonomy and the role and the responsibility of the 
State regarding the use of human biotechnological applications was addressed as the 
central question in the pre-advisory report.34 Pre-advisor Van Beers took the standpoint 
that the right to autonomy does not by definition provide us with a free pass ‘to reap 
the fruits’ of the possibilities within genetics. The restriction of autonomy is justified by 
‘the poisonous fruits’ that can cause harm.35 In contrast pre-advisor Bovenberg, with 
a call for autonomy, made a strong appeal for the recognition of the right to gather 
knowledge about our own health.36 At the voting on the statements on this matter 
there was likewise a great difference of opinion.
It can be concluded that in the academic literature no communis opinion exists about 
the intrinsic meaning of autonomy and protection, nor about the relationship between 
both principles. The intrinsic meaning of the concept autonomy defines the scope of 
the principle of protection. It is necessary to objectify the mutual relationship between 
both principles to answer the question, whether the Dutch State is obliged to regulate 
the access to and supply of DNA (self)tests.
2.3.2. Autonomy and protection in the case law of the ECtHR
It is not surprising that the principle of protection, especially in relation to health, 
takes an important place within human rights charters. Article 11 of the European 
Social Charter (ESC) requires States Parties to take appropriate steps to warrant ‘the 
right to health protection’. This right is also firmly embedded in other human rights 
instruments and our Constitution (Article 22 (1) Dutch Constitution). That the ECHR 
lacks a counterpart does not mean that the principle of protection in this convention 
is of secondary importance. The title of this convention immediately makes this clear: 
‘The Convention for the protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms’. 
Partly in view of this, the ECHR-provisions include, according to established case law 
of the ECtHR, both negative as positive obligations for contracted States of the ECHR. 
State authorities for example have the negative obligation in principle not to make use 
of a medical treatment in order to get criminal evidence.37 The positive duty of States 
Parties includes, for instance, taking effective measures to prevent disease.38
Seemingly in contrast with the solid legal basis of the principle of protection is the 
recent recognition by the ECtHR of the right to autonomy39 (remarkably this happened 
33 Nederlandse Juristen-Vereniging (NJV).
34 Somsen et al. 2009.
35 Somsen et al. 2009, p. 103.
36 Somsen et al. 2009, p. 96.
37 ECtHR 11 July 2006, Jalloh/ Germany (GC) no. 54810/00, para. 71.
38 ECtHR 26 November 2002, E. et al./ the UK, no. 33218/96.




after the ECtHR a short time before explicitly rejected the existence of a ‘right to 
self-determination’).40 Also the rights which are protected by the Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities 41 are based not just on ‘protection’, but also on 
‘personal autonomy’. Nevertheless, this recognition of the independent importance 
of autonomy is not as clearly visible in all conventions. In the ESC there is not any 
reference to autonomy, just like in various other international conventions. 
In the case law of the ECtHR, the mutual relationship between the principle of 
protection and the principle of autonomy is often central to this. According to the 
case law of the ECtHR, States Parties have a requirement to make due effort to protect 
individuals who live on their territory from (health)damage.42 This ‘duty to protect’ 
– which is potentially also of importance for the regulation of DNA (self)tests – has 
manifested itself in the case law of the ECtHR, in particular in law cases in relation to 
Article 2 (Right to life), Article 3 (Prohibition of torture) and Article 8 (Right to respect 
private and family life). 
The right to life, according to the ECtHR covers, among other things, the State’s (positive) 
obligation to protect life,43 including the life of people who receive or need (health)care. 
The State must in principle ensure the quality and safety of goods and services offered.44 
This obligation extends to preventive healthcare.45 In the Pretty case the ECtHR noted 
that this duty forms a justification for the restriction of personal autonomy.46 The State 
must also make every effort to prevent individuals from taking their own life because of 
their disease or because of the pressure from others.47 Also in other ways States Parties 
have the obligation to prevent individuals dying prematurely?48 From the admissibility 
decision in the Bône case it is evident that the right to life does not guarantee an 
absolute level of safety to every person. Risks are a part of life. The extent to which the 
person himself creates risks plays a part in the assessment.49
Just as the right to life, the ban on torture provides States with (positive) obligations to 
protect, including the duty to offer medical care.50 The judicial review of both norms 
is identical: ‘Nonetheless, where allegations are made under Articles 2 and 3 of the 
40 ECtHR 29 April 2002, Pretty/ the UK, no. 2346/02, para. 61.
41 Trb. 2007, 169 (Verdrag inzake de rechten van personen met een handicap).
42 ECtHR 14 November 2002, Mouisel/ France, no. 67263/01; ECtHR 27 January 2009, Tatar/ Romania, no. 
67021/01.
43 ECtHR 9 June 1998, L.C.B./ the UK, no. 23413/94, para. 36; ECtHR 28 October 1998, Osman/ the UK (GC), 
no. 23452/94, para. 115.
44 ECtHR 1 December 2009, G.N. et al./ Italy, no. 43134/05; ECtHR 15 December 2009, Kalender/ Turkey, no. 
4314/02.
45 ECtHR 22 September 2005, Gheorghe/ Romania, (admissibility decision), no. 19215/04.
46 ECtHR 29 April 2002, Pretty/ the UK, no. 2346/02, para. 39.
47 ECtHR 3 April 2001, Keenan/ the UK, no. 27229/95; ECtHR 15 December 2009, Abdulhadi Yildrim/ Turkey, 
no. 13694/04.
48 ECtHR 5 April 2005, Nevmerzhitsky/ Ukraine, no. 54825/00; ECtHR 23 May 2006, Taïs/ France (GC), no. 
39922/03.
49 ECtHR 1 March 2005, Bône/ France, no. 69869/01.




Convention, the ECtHR must apply a particularly thorough scrutiny.’51 When applying 
Article 3 ECHR the ECtHR takes into consideration all the circumstances of the case.52 
In some cases, it takes into account the importance of gender, age and health status of 
the victim.53
Medical care should also preclude any inhuman or humiliating treatment – namely 
physical or mental suffering (Article 3 ECHR).54 The basic assumption is that the person 
concerned voluntarily gives consent to the offered care, based on sufficient and 
understandable information.55 Informed consent is a condition of the right to personal 
autonomy.56
It is however a misconception to think that only care – and hence protection – may be 
provided after the person concerned has agreed to it. If a protective measure meets the 
requirement of ‘therapeutic necessity from the point of view of established principles 
of medicine’ there is, according to established case law of the ECtHR, in principle no 
question of inhuman and humiliating treatment.57 In situations like these the provision 
of protection prevails over the (negative) autonomy, also for mentally competent 
people. Individuals can under Article 8 ECHR likewise derive a proviso claim to remain 
free of damage to health, and the right to (an effective and accessible procedure to 
obtain access to) information in the event of possible health risks.58 Also in relation to 
this right, a medically necessary treatment, imposed without informed consent of the 
person concerned, does not automatically result in a violation of autonomy and thereby 
the right to private life.59 The protection of the health of the individual concerned or 
the rights and freedoms of others can be a justification for treatment without informed 
consent. 
The under Article 8 underlying right to (negative) autonomy is thus not absolute. The 
way in which individuals give direction to their life is not just restricted by the rights 
and freedoms of others, but must also be compatible with the dignity of the people 
concerned. In according to the ECtHR decisions about the sadomasochistic activities of 
a group of English men and a Belgian couple, mutual consent to harmful behaviour that 
affect the dignity of the people concerned, does not alter this fact.60
51 ECtHR 26 july 2005, Şimşek et al./ Turkey, no. 35072/97 & 37194/97, para. 102.
52 ECtHR 15 January 2004, Matencio/ France, no. 58749/00.
53 ECtHR 18 January1978, Ireland/ the UK, no. 5310/71, para.162.
54 ECtHR 27 June 2000, Ilhan/ Turkey (GC), no. 22277/93, para. 87.
55 ECtHR 9 March 2004, Glass/ the UK, no. 61827/00; ECtHR 2 June 2009, Codarcea/ Romania, no. 31675/04.
56 ECtHR 20 March 2007, Tysiąc/ Poland, no. 5410/03, para. 107; ECtHR 10 April 2007, Evans/ the UK (GC), 
no. 6339/05, para.71.
57 ECtHR 24 September 1992, Herczegfalvy/ Austria, no. 10533/83, para. 82; ECtHR 10 February 2004, 
Gennadi Naoumenko/ Ukraine, no. 42023/98, para. 112; ECtHR 7 October 2008, Bogumil/ Portugal, no. 
35228/03.
58 ECtHR 9 December 1994, López Ostra/ Spain, no. 16798/90.
59 ECtHR7 October 2008, Bogumil/ Portugal, no. 35228/03.




The ECtHR examines alleged violations of positive obligation inherent in Article 8 via the 
so-called fair balance-test, which is a weighing up between the conflicting interests.61 
The aspect of private life concerned in the infringement and all the other circumstances 
determine the extent of the margin of appreciation of States Parties. 
Generally, the less consensus there exists between States Parties about a certain subject, 
the greater the freedom for policy making, for example in relation to individuals’ access 
to the data on the identity of their biological parents.62 The more this data affects the 
identity of the person concerned, the smaller the margin of appreciation of the State.
Although the ECHR at first sight is primarily directed to the guarantees of personal 
autonomy in the sense of ‘freedom of’, it is apparent from the case law outline above 
that this image needs some adjustment. The provision of protection against the breach 
of dignity of individuals as well as infringements of the rights and freedoms of others is 
according to the ECtHR an integral part of the norms and values inherent in the ECHR. 
This duty to protect can, because of the ‘freedom to shape life to our own wishes’, 
make it necessary to restrict the ‘freedom to be left alone’ including the autonomy to 
undergo certain activities.
2.3.3. Normative criteria of DNA (self)tests
Because of the autonomy of individuals, the State is obliged to respect the integrity 
and identity of individuals as much as possible.63 This also implies the duty to respect 
the person’s ability to make decisions that can, in principle, be damaging to the welfare 
and health of the person concerned. So as long as a person decides to do this based on 
adequate information, he may decide to have his DNA tested by means of a (self)test 
of which the benefits, the quality and the user-friendliness are questionable. This is 
different when no informed consent is obtained, a norm which creates an obligation for 
the other party than the consumer.64 Accordingly we must ask ourselves, in making use 
of DNA (self)tests outside the regulated access, if there is a question of legally obtained 
valid consent. As mentioned before, many consumers will have great difficulty with 
the interpretation of the test results, the reliability of which is often questionable. In 
the most favourable case, the consumer often remains with unanswered questions. 
From the protection principle, which is included in all ECHR-rights, there are thus good 
reasons for the State to bind strict rules to the access to and use of such (self)tests. 
As stated in section 2.3.2 information about the own health and identity is at the heart 
of private life protected by Article 8 ECHR.65 This also applies to fingerprints, DNA 
61 Barkhuysen 2004, p. 40-41.
62 ECtHR 13 February 2003, Odièvre/ France (GC), no. 42326/98, para. 42-47; ECtHR 7 February 2002, 
Mikulić/ Croatia, no. 53176/99, para. 53-54 & 64.
63 ECtHR 13 February 2003, Odièvre/ France (GC), no. 42326/98, para.42-47.
64 ECtHR 2 June 2009, Codarcea/ Romania, no. 31675/04.
65 ECtHR 25 February 1997, Z./ Finland, no. 22009/93, para. 95; ECtHR 10 October 2006, L.L./ France, no. 




profiles and tissue material.66 In accordance to the ECtHR case law the State should 
ensure that individuals can have access to the recorded data about them.67 
The question of whether a right to self diagnostics exists must be answered in the 
negative in the light of the current case law of the ECtHR. The right to autonomy, 
interpreted as self-determination, offers no claim to access to DNA (self)tests. Via DNA 
(self)tests information is also gained about blood relatives. They too have the right to 
protection of their privacy. But can others perhaps be obliged to agree to cooperate 
with DNA testing? It is apparent from case law regarding the determining of the identity 
of biological parents that in certain situations that can be so.68 There is nevertheless 
a fair balance-test beforehand, in which particular importance is accorded to the 
interests of the child and all this in the knowledge that the information goes no further 
than to ascertain or disprove parenthood. DNA diagnostics directed to ascertain if the 
predisposition or the carriership of a hereditary disease nevertheless make (even) 
greater interference into the privacy of others. It is not plausible that ‘the right to be 
left alone’ of ‘the other’ must yield to the ‘claim right’ of the consumer. Also this argues 
in favour of regulation of the access to DNA (self) tests to prevent the undermining of 
the other’s right to protection.
2.3.4. Preliminary conclusion
Where is the border between autonomy and protection, between unrestricted access 
to DNA (self)tests and regulation? The case law (and academic literature) provides no 
clear grip on this. The same is true of the concept ‘human dignity’ that in the DNA era 
creates obligations for the State for both not interfering (negative obligation) as well as 
taking measures (positive obligation).69
It must be concluded that, in both the academic literature and the case law of the 
ECtHR, autonomy and the duty to protect against (health)damage play a central role. 
Neither of these values have an absolute meaning. The restriction of autonomy in the 
interests of the principle of protection and the rights and freedoms of others is under 
conditions permissible and sometimes required. This need seems to be present in 
DNA (self)tests, because in many situations informed consent seems to be absent and 
the test results can also have far-reaching implications for the rights and freedoms of 
others.
 
66 ECtHR 4 December 2008, S. & Marper/ the UK (GC), no. 30562/04 & 30566/04.
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The principles of autonomy and protection play an important role in the legislation and 
regulations pertaining to the use of DNA diagnostics. This is reflected in the laws (1) to 
promote health and to prevent diseases (prevention) and (2) to safeguard the rights of 
the patient (incl. autonomy) and to prevent damage to the patient as a result of the 
(poor) quality of professional practice, provision of services or goods. We discuss both 
elements separately below.
2.4.2. Prevention
Under the previously mentioned right to health, the State has a great responsibility to 
promote health and to protect against diseases, which is clearly expressed via the laws 
in the field of preventive health. The most important of these – also for the subject 
of this chapter– are the ‘Act on Public Health’, 70 the ‘Act on population screening’ 
(henceforth: WBO), the National Programme Population Screening71 (henceforth: 
NPPS) and the National Immunisation Programme.72
With the exception of the WBO these (public law) legislation assume an offer of or 
on behalf of the State. Genetic screening, meaning: ‘the systematic early detection 
or exclusion of a hereditary disease, the hereditary predisposition for a disorder or 
the carriership of a hereditary disease (which in the offspring can lead to a hereditary 
disease)’,73 is part of the programmes that are carried out within the framework of 
these laws. Screenings can not only be offered by or on behalf of the State, but also by 
private organisations and companies.
The WBO regulates the access to and supply of screenings in the Netherlands, which 
are classified as ‘population screening’. The WBO defines this term as ‘a medical 
examination which is carried out to an offer made to the entire population or to a 
section thereof and to detect of diseases of a certain kind or certain risk indicators, 
either wholly or partly for the benefit of the persons examined’. The WBO seeks to 
protect individuals against screenings that in terms of execution can be harmful to the 
physical and mental health of the people being screened. The means used to accomplish 
this is a licensing system.74 At present three categories of population screenings require 
a licence: screening which uses ionising radiation, such as a CT-scan, screening for 
(risk-indicators for) cancer and screening for (risk-indicators for) untreatable diseases 
75(Article 2 WBO). The Minister of Health Welfare and Sports under Article 7 (1) WBO 
70 Stb. 2008, 460 (Wet publieke gezondheid).
71 Nationaal Programma Bevolkingsonderzoek.
72 Het Rijksvaccinatieprogramma.
73 Bijlsma et al. 2005, p. 375.
74 Van der Maas et al. 2000, p. 7.




does not issue a licence if the screening is scientifically unsound or the screening is 
not in accordance with the professional medical practice standard of if the expected 
benefits do not offset the risks. The basic assumption is that screening can only be 
responsibly offered if it is established that the advantages for the participants outweigh 
the disadvantages.76
2.4.3. Quality safeguards and patient rights
Quality legislation applies to DNA diagnostics carried out by a healthcare professional 
or in a care institution. According to these laws, healthcare professionals and care 
institutions are obliged to provide ‘good care’ (Article 40 Individual Healthcare 
Professions Act77 and Article 3 Act on Quality78). The Health Care Inspectorate oversees 
the compliance of these norms; the Minister of Health, Welfare and Sports and the 
(disciplinary)judge can enforce them when appropriate.
Furthermore, a health care worker always needs informed consent of the patient 
in order to perform DNA diagnostics (Article 7:448 BW79 in conjunction with Article 
7:450 BW). The self-determined patient can also decide that he wishes to be spared 
certain information or the results (Article 7:449 BW). Patient legislation thereby, on 
the one side, safeguards the autonomy of the patient (whether or not to have DNA 
testing, whether or not to know) and offers at the same time protection (adequate 
information; moreover a health care worker must act as a ‘good health care worker’ 
(Article. 7:453 BW). 
The WBO sets up – as already stated – quality guarantees for DNA screening, as far as 
the screening can be defined as population screening. In experimental and medical-
scientific screening research, the provider will have to satisfy the requirements of 
Medical Research Involving Human Subjects Act.80 This act, unlike the WBO, is not 
based on a licensing system but an approval of the research protocol by a Medical 
Research Ethics Committee before the research concerned is carried out. This 
committee evaluates risks and objections of the testing for the human subjects and the 
scientific soundness. Administrative appeal is open against a negative decision of such 
a committee.
The Act Exceptional Medical Procedures regulates, for effectiveness and quality 
reasons, the supply of ‘exceptional medical procedures’. The Minister can, for social, 
legal or ethical aspects, (completely) forbid such procedures or, for important interests, 
subject them to a licensing system. This last regime applies to individual DNA testing 
in the framework of treatment. The Clinical genetics departments of the University 
76 GR 2008, p. 15.
77 Stb. 1993, 655 (Wet op de Beroepen Individuele Gezondheidszorg).
78 Stb. 1996, 80 (Kwaliteitswet zorginstellingen).
79 Medical Treatment Contracts Act as part of the Dutch Civil Code.




Medical Centres have licences based on the Act Exceptional Medical Procedures and 
its accompanying ‘Decree identified medical procedures 2007’81 for giving genetic 
inheritance advice and for performing genome analysis. The clinical genetic advice 
practice extends to nearly all the branches of medicine. 
For quality reasons there are also quality requirements in the Netherlands for ‘do-it-
yourself-tests’ in which body material can be examined, for instance the pregnancy 
test. These tests come under the scope of the Directive regarding in vitro diagnostics 
(98/79/EC), implemented in The Netherlands via the Decree in vitro diagnostics. 
These tests are not bound to a licensing system, but are freely available if provided 
with the so-called CE marking. Incidentally, such a marking as a quality requirement 
has little meaning, because aspects such as diagnostic value and clinical utility are not 
evaluated.82
2.4.4. Significance for DNA (self)tests
That DNA diagnostics, for quality reasons, can best be performed by medical specialists 
(clinical geneticists) is generally accepted in the Netherlands. This is for example 
expressed in the way in which the Dutch State has regulated the access to and supply 
of screening and individual genetic diagnostics. This legislation barely covers DNA 
(self)tests, that is to say DNA diagnostics which are carried out on the initiative of a 
‘consumer’ and which are not incorporated in a (regular) screening programme or take 
place on the basis of a medical indication. This loophole is current, now that companies 
via websites, magazines and newspapers call on individuals to have their DNA tested, 
without intervention of a doctor associated with a Clinical Genetics Department. The 
one time it is a case of directed testing (on one or more genetic risk factors indicated 
beforehand), the other time there is undirected testing (the outcome is uncertain, 
dependent on what the researchers ‘come across’). In the framework of such testing 
it can be that the consumer, the person who is tested, must check in with a (health) 
professional or laboratory, or that the provider sends a toolkit to the address of the 
person concerned. In the last situation the consumer takes a sample (saliva, hair or 
blood) and sends it back to the test provider for a risk analysis. DNA self-tests are at 
present not yet available; samples of blood, saliva or tissue will always have to be 
analysed by another. For these reason the meaning of the existing legislation and 
regulations as regulatory instruments for DNA diagnostics as a service is the most 
pressing.
According to the Health Care Inspectorate the concept ‘offer’ should be broadly 
interpreted in the WBO.83 ‘Offering’ is not just actively inviting, but also the passive 
‘seduction’ of individuals via adverts on websites, in magazines and newspapers 
81 Stb. 2007, 238.
82 Leenen et al. 2008, p. 168-170.




for DNA (self)testing. According to the WBO a licence is required for offering DNA 
diagnostics for some forms of cancer, because it is screening - ‘population screening’- 
(Article 2 (1)). In ‘unaimed’ DNA diagnostics it is not clear what diseases the screening 
is focused on and if a licence is required.84 From the standpoint of patient legislation 
it is not clear if there is informed consent because it is groping in the dark about the 
possible outcomes and implications of the testing.
The WBO is difficult to enforce because a license is required for offering and performing 
population screening (Article 1). However the Act only prohibits performing of 
population screening without a licence and makes it punishable (Article 3 (1) juncto 
Article 13). It seems that providers are not always affected by this. In practice a provider 
can freely offer DNA diagnostics in the Netherlands if the analysis of the DNA sample 
(‘the performing’) takes place outside the Netherlands.85 
A Dutch provider or performer of DNA (self)tests obtains a licence, after advice of the 
Dutch Health Council, from the Minister of Health, Welfare and Sports if the testing 
services meets the requirements of scientific soundness, the testing is in accordance 
with the professional medical practice standard and the benefits of the tests outweigh 
the risks. So far as we know the Minister has yet not issued a licence to a (private) 
company that provides DNA (self)tests. It is not (very) likely that the Minister will issue 
a licence to a company to put DNA (self)tests on the Dutch market because of the strict 
legislation regarding the access to DNA (self)tests and the criticism of the reliability and 
the benefits of these tests. 
Dutch consumers who want to have their DNA mapped outside regular healthcare have 
to turn to internet providers from the United States and the United Kingdom because 
of the strict requirements in the Netherlands.86 The Netherlands has no jurisdiction 
over foreign internet providers that offer their DNA (self)tests in the Netherlands. 
Consequently, the protection and quality guarantees from the current legislation are 
not applicable. At the moment two companies offer DNA (self)tests in the Netherlands.87 
These companies make use of the lack of clarity and the enforcement problems of the 
WBO. These companies for example invite (potential) consumers via websites to make 
up their genetic profile and perform DNA (self)tests without a licence abroad.88
2.4.5. Preliminary conclusion
In the Netherlands there are strict rules for the access to and supply of DNA diagnostics 
within the framework of healthcare. The emphasis of them is on the protection of 
participants of such testing against the possible risks and dangers, including the 
84 GR 2009, p. 13.
85 IGZ 2008, p. 6.






inadequacy of the testing and the consequences of an ‘unfavourable’ result. Such 
restrictions are in line with the rights of the patient. This protective regime can relatively 
easily be circumvented by consumers who, whether or not they fall for promising 
invitations from/via businesses operating abroad, decide to have their DNA tested. 
From the protection perspective, this ‘profit’ for personal autonomy raises concerns 
and reservations.
2.5. IS THE STATE OBLIGED TO REGULATE THE ACCESS AND SUPPLY OF 
DNA (SELF)TESTS?
The current legislation and regulations, clearly based on the provision of protection with 
respect for the autonomy of the patient/consumer, have shortcomings. The guarantees 
for responsible prevention activities, good quality and patient rights can thus be 
circumvented by both providers and patients/consumers. It can be argued that these 
shortcomings imply a strengthening of the right to autonomy, in the sense of individual 
self-determination; DNA (self)tests are, in an indirect way, quite freely available. It is 
evident from section 2.2 that the use of DNA (self)tests also has a downside and that, 
for the time being, the benefits do not offset the cost.
As we pointed out in section 2.3.1 autonomy implies alongside negative freedom 
also positive freedom, the possibility to organise life to our own wishes. It is generally 
acknowledged that the State can take restrictive measures to protect individuals and 
their dignity (2.3.2). The provision of protection against (health)damage is part of this 
duty.89 Freedom restricting measures to prevent damage to health are, under strict 
conditions, accepted to prevent damage to others and the person concerned.90 This 
calls for measures for the sake of positive freedom and thus to safeguard autonomy.
Assuming that DNA (self)tests can cause damage, an obligation to protect rests on 
State Parties, according to the case law of the ECtHR. Moreover, attaching conditions 
to DNA diagnostics for health reasons is in agreement with the Protocol on ‘genetic 
testing for health purposes’ (2008) in the Biomedicine Convention.91 For the sake of 
everyone’s ‘dignity, identity, integrity and other rights and freedoms’ (Article 1) this 
protocol stipulates that:
‘Parties shall take the necessary measures to ensure that genetic services are of 
appropriate quality. In particular, they shall see to it that:
a genetic tests meet generally accepted criteria of scientific validity and clinical 
validity; 
89 Boom & Giessen 2001, p. 1676.
90 Brug et al. 2005, p. 116.




b a quality assurance programme is implemented in each laboratory and that 
laboratories are subject to regular monitoring;
c persons providing genetic services have appropriate qualifications to enable them 
to perform their role in accordance with professional obligations and standards.’ 
(Article 5)
Given that the ECtHR has explicitly been assigned a role in the clarification and 
application of this convention, the Biomedicine Convention and the accompanying 
protocols are also of significance for the Netherlands and other countries that have 
not yet ratified the Convention.92 Consequently the obligation rests on the State to 
take the necessary measures that guarantee the quality, reliability, validity, safety and 
the benefits of DNA (self)tests. Furthermore the State should promote that prior to 
DNA diagnostics individuals give well-informed consent, that the right not-to-know 
is respected, that misuse of health information is counteracted and that the privacy 
of others than the patient/consumer does not come under pressure through DNA 
diagnostics.
As pointed out before, it is evident from the Biomedicine Convention and the 
accompanying protocols and case law of the ECtHR that the State has freedom of 
policy in the choice of a regulatory and enforcement system, on the condition that 
the measures offer effective and appropriate protection to the rights and freedoms in 
question. The latter seem to be under disproportionate pressure from the increased 
possibilities of DNA diagnostics outside the ‘normal’ supply. All in all, there is no 
obligation to implement legislation; however, it should be noted that in self-regulation 
the State remains fully accountable for violations of fundamental rights and freedoms.
Given the fact that many advantages and disadvantages are not specific to the DNA 
(self)tests but also apply to screening, population screening and individual diagnostics, 
for the time being it is hard to see why in practice different quality requirements and 
patient rights apply, depending on the type of testing and the person who takes the 
initiative to do this. From the standpoint of autonomy, protection and the judicial 
system there are good arguments for advocating specific quality requirements for 
screenings, both population screening, and individual diagnostics.
It requires further investigation which form of regulation offers the most appropriate 
and effective protection against damage to health and safeguards the quality and 
patient rights. One can think in terms of, for instance, streamlining existing legislation 
and regulations and/or stimulating self-regulation. Whichever form is chosen, it is 
important that the regulator takes various factors into account. It is not entirely clear 
for some diseases and disorders whether they are treatable or untreatable) for instance 
HIV, familial hypercholesterolemia and certain types of cancer).93 Yet the criterion of 





‘treatability’ for the licence obligation for the offering and performing of DNA testing 
for untreatable disorders, according to the current legislation and regulations, is an 
important distinction. First and foremost, from the standpoint of the protection of 
privacy and the fight against discrimination, the ‘sensitivity’ of the information must 
be considered; the greater the risk of misuse and discrimination, the more quality 
guarantees should be considered.
Consideration of the benefits and risks of DNA diagnostics, can call into question if a 
balancing of interests should take place between the risk and the public benefits or 
between the risks and the individual benefits. DNA diagnostics that do not directly 
have public benefits can have a considerable number of personal benefits which justify 
its acceptance.94
The risk of developing damage to health relates to the disorders and diseases for 
which the testing is or can be done. For example, the likelihood of damage to health 
(psychological and social problems) is greater in testing for Huntington’s disease than 
for Alzheimer’s disease and hereditary forms of breast cancer (section 2.2).
The arguments mentioned above plead in favour of regulating DNA diagnostics, making 
a distinction between the intrusiveness from the quality requirements at the one 
hand, and the seriousness and risk of resulting health damage and the implications 
of unfavourable test results at the other hand. In choosing regulation, particular 
attention should be paid to the consequences for new developments and applications 
of genetics. Likewise, attention should be paid to the restriction of the administrative 
burden for both mainstream and ‘alternative’ providers.
The State is obliged to take measures to combat without proviso access to and supply 
of DNA (self)tests, not just to prevent damage to health, but also to protect the rights 
and freedoms of others.
On the one hand the lack of validity, benefits and reliability of the DNA (self)tests 
offered in the Netherlands does not necessarily mean damage to health. The actual 
material and immaterial damage in the Netherlands as a result of DNA (self)tests for 
the risk of cancer is unknown. The same is true regarding the number of Dutch or 
European people who make use of DNA (self)tests.95 But on the other hand, from a 
human rights perspective, the restriction of autonomy (negative freedom), is justified 
by the protection of the interests of others. Autonomy implies that the human person 
is a social animal and has a responsibility towards others and society. Measures to 
promote protection and quality requirements are necessary to protect the rights of 
others. DNA (self)tests can divulge information about others. It is not inconceivable that 
94 Grann & Jacobson 2002, p. 346.




with non-regulation the cost for healthcare can increase through unnecessary follow-up 
tests or not strictly medically necessary treatment.96 Even though two Dutch studies97 
tone down the argument of the rising costs, healthcare remains a scarce commodity. 
Escalating costs through DNA (self)tests undermine the accessibility and the availability 
of healthcare. Measures that provide effective protection against possible damage to 
health from DNA (self)tests contribute to the strengthening of autonomy as a positive 
freedom, and do not detract from it.98Given the cross-border problem of DNA (self)
tests the adoption of measures will not just have to be at national level, but also at a 
European level and/or worldwide.
2.6. CONCLUSION
Owing to the increasing expertise in the field of genetics, the knowledge and application 
of techniques for the detection of the carriership of (latent) present diseases and 
disorders continues to expand. Due to the specialised nature of DNA testing and the 
legal, ethical and social implications, strict requirements apply to the provision of it. At 
the same time, it is quite simple to order a test for an analysis of DNA via the internet 
or to undergo testing in a neighbouring country. The legislation – also at European and 
international level – has loopholes.
DNA (self)tests bring with them advantages and disadvantages for the people concerned 
and for society as a whole. The quality, safety, reliability and user-friendliness of the 
tests are debatable, as well as the conditions in which providers inform the (potential) 
consumers about the benefits and the risks.
In making DNA (self)tests freely available, the fundamental principles of autonomy and 
protection conflict with each other. These principles are closely bound to fundamental 
human rights and freedoms. They are inalienable rights aimed at safeguarding human 
dignity. Neither of these principles is given the absolute value that they are entitled to. 
To what extent is the State obliged to curb the access to and supply of DNA (self)tests, 
in which the initiative comes from the consumer? As argued above, from a human 
rights standpoint there are good arguments to set strict (quality)requirements for the 
access to and supply of DNA (self)tests. Not only it can be questioned if there is always 
informed consent from the consumer; also DNA diagnostics can – unlike conventional 
medical testing – infringe on the rights and freedoms of others. Moreover, there is the 
risk of false concern (or reassurance) and rising health costs as a result of such testing 
not always being reliable. In short, many reasons to resort to regulation of the access.
96 Van der Weijden et al. 2007, p. 73. 
97 Van der Weijden et al. 2007, p. 83 & Nielen et al. 2009, p. 381.




Which form of regulation safeguards the quality and patient rights most effectively, 
requires further investigation. This contribution argues in favour of regulation in which 
a differentiation of quality requirements is introduced for the risk of manifestation, the 
seriousness of damage to health and the implications of unfavourable test results. For 
screening and individual diagnostics the same minimum quality requirements should 
apply. Furthermore, in our view in choosing regulation, attention should be paid to the 
consequences of it for new developments in genetics and the application of them. 
                            CHAPTER
PRENATAL SCREENING IN THE LIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION
Abstract: Information is of great importance for exercising self-determination in prenatal 
screening. The Dutch Health Council, the Dutch Government and Parliament attach 
great importance to standardised information and a non-directive attitude of those 
who supervise the pregnant woman within the scope of the national prenatal screening 
programme. However, to ensure the self-determination of the pregnant woman it is 
important that the provision of information about prenatal screening is perceived as 
a social-dialogic process that goes further than just providing factual information. 
Furthermore, it is imperative to dispense with the age limit for the reimbursement of 
the combined test, so that the pregnant women actually have freedom of choice in 
decisions surrounding prenatal screening for Down syndrome.
Rachèl van Hellemondt, Carla van Os, Aart Hendriks & Martijn Breuning, ‘Prenatale 







Prenatal screening can provide the pregnant woman99 with information about (the risk 
of) abnormalities in their unborn child. Based on the results, they can decide if they 
want to continue the pregnancy or not.
Providing access to such information, and thereby to these diagnostics and screening 
methods, is not a ‘free-standing’ obligation. According to the settled case law of the 
European Court of the Human Rights (henceforth: ECtHR) the State is obliged to inform 
citizens adequately of serious (health) threats.100 Parents not infrequently experience 
having a child with serious anomalies, such as the syndrome of Down (trisomy 21, 
henceforth: Down syndrome), as a threat, about which they wish to be informed in 
good time. 
In accordance with the case law of the ECtHR, but also of the Dutch Supreme Court,101 
the pregnant woman must have timely access to relevant information on which she can 
decide if she wants to continue with the pregnancy or not.102 At the same time individuals 
have the right to be spared information that they do not appreciate. Both rights, to 
know and not-to-know, are part of self-determination, a notion which underpins all 
human and patient rights.103 Individual self-determination assumes that individuals are 
able to make free choices. This imposes requirements on the information which they 
(can) have access to and to the decision-making process.104 
In the decision-making process of the pregnant woman about participating in prenatal 
screening programmes various dimensions of self-determination play a role; self-
determination as the right ‘to be left alone’, self-determination ‘as freedom to choice’ 
and as a ‘claim to self-development’.105 In order to make use of all these dimensions of 
self-determination, adequate information is of essential importance. Furthermore, the 
way in which the screening programme is implemented must be critically examined.106
In this chapter we examine the guarantees for self-determination within the scope of 
the national programme of prenatal screening for Down syndrome. Down syndrome is 
a congenital disorder which is associated with intellectual disability as well as medical 
problems and physical characteristics. The prevalence of this disorder among all 
99 We mean by the term ‘pregnant woman’ also the (possible) partner.
100 More detailed Hendriks 2010, p. 57-68; see also ECtHR 28 February 2012, Kolyadenko et al./ Russia, no. 
17423/05.
101 Hoge Raad der Nederlanden.
102 ECtHR 26 may 2011, R.R./ Poland, no. 27617/04; HR 18 March 2005, NJ 2006, 606; HR 23 November 2003, 
NJ 2002, 386/387.
103 Hendriks 2008, p. 2-18.
104 Stirrat & Gill 2005, p. 127-130; Van Os & Hendriks 2010, p. 180-186.
105 R.E. van Hellemondt, A.C. Hendriks & M.H. Breuning, ‘Vrijheid, blijheid? Het reguleren van DNA-
diagnostiek in de zorg vanuit mensenrechtelijk perspectief’, Nederlands Tijdschrift voor de Mensenrechten 
(NTM/NJCM-Bulletin) 2010, p. 7-24.
106 Leenen et al. 2007, p. 189-190.
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pregnancies with a gestation period of more than twenty weeks in the Netherlands 
is 15.7 per 10,000 births. Furthermore, it should be noted that 42% of the children 
with Down syndrome are detected prenatally and in three-quarters of these cases it is 
decided to terminate the pregnancy.
In our research for the safeguarding of self-determination, we examine not just the case 
law of the ECtHR and the relevant national legislation, but also the (legal) conditions 
and basic assumptions which according to the Dutch Health Council, the Government 
and Parliament apply to the provision of information to pregnant woman regarding 
prenatal screening for Down syndrome. Particular attention is given to the age limit 
applied, that means the minimum age of the pregnant woman for having the prenatal 
screening costs reimbursement by a Health Insurance Company.
The structure of this chapter is as follows. After a short description of prenatal screening 
and the relevant legal framework, we examine, in section 3.3. The right of the pregnant 
woman to self-determination from a constitutional perspective. In section 3.4. we 
analyse the significance that the Dutch Health Council and the Government attach 
to self-determination within the scope of prenatal screening for Down syndrome. In 
section 3.5. we analyse the justification for erecting a financial threshold on the basis 
of age regarding the national prenatal screening programme. In section 3.6. we discuss 
the implementation of the current national prenatal screening programme in relation 
to self-determination and we offer a few recommendations for improvement. We end 
this chapter in section 3.7. with conclusions.
In this contribution we do not pay attention to the application of (new) technique(s) in 
which (cell-free) fetal DNA in the maternal blood can be examined for Down syndrome. 
The (future) use of non-invasive prenatal screening and diagnostics in which fetal 
DNA is examined for Down syndrome or other diseases and disorders, raises different 
legal issues than prenatal screening and diagnostics by means of the combined test, 
amniocentesis and the chorionic villus testing.107
3.2. THE FRAMEWORK OF THE DUTCH PRENATAL SCREENING 
PROGRAMME
3.2.1. Prenatal screening
The possibilities for the pregnant woman to seek advice about possible handicaps and 
diseases in the child before the delivery have increased considerably. The most well-
known and used tests are prenatal screening for Down syndrome and the prenatal 
screening for physical defects (the anomaly scan). Both are part of the national 
programme for prenatal screening. Midwives, gynaecologists and general practitioners 




draw the attention of all pregnant women in respectively the first and second trimester 
of the pregnancy to the possibility of these forms of screening. Prenatal screening 
in the Netherlands is seen as providing good care as part of the general provision of 
information to the pregnant woman.108 The aim of these screenings is to inform the 
pregnant woman concerning possible anomalies in the unborn child, also with a view 
to making a decision about continuing or terminating the pregnancy.
The combined risk assessment test is used for prenatal screening for Down syndrome 
in week 9-14 of the pregnancy. It is possibly preceded by a family history and an 
ultrasound (in week 9-12). This non-invasive test consists of a blood test of the pregnant 
woman and measurement of the skin fold in the foetus neck. This is conducted with an 
ultrasound scan. The risk of having a child with Down syndrome can be calculated with 
the results of these tests, in combination with the age of the pregnant woman and the 
length of the pregnancy.109 The percentage of the pregnant women that take part in 
this form of screening is 25-30%.
In prenatal screening for physical anomalies in the form of a structural ultrasound 
scan (US), better known as the 20-week scan,110 the structure and development of 
the organs111 of the foetus is checked, plus the size of the unborn child and whether 
there is sufficient amniotic fluid. The participation percentage in this examination is 
approximately 80%.
The structural US is included in the basic health insurance package of the Health 
Insurance Act (Article 10)112 and is reimbursed to all pregnant women. However, to 
participate in prenatal screening for Down syndrome there is a financial threshold. 
Women younger than 36 years do not get this screening reimbursed via their health 
insurance, as opposed to the pregnant woman of 36 years and older, (Article 2.4 (1a) 
Decree Health Care).113 This is different when from the (family)history of the pregnant 
woman, younger than 36 years, it emerges that there is an increased risk of having a 
child with a (genetic) disorder. In such situations the combined test is reimbursed due 
to the existence of a medical indication.
3.2.2. Prenatal diagnostics
Prenatal screening is sometimes confused with prenatal diagnostics. Prenatal 
diagnostics, unlike prenatal screening, takes place as a result of specific indications of 
108 Kamerstukken II 2003/04, 29 323, no. 1; Kamerstukken II 2003/04, 29 323, no. 3; Centraal Orgaan and 
RIVM 2011, p. 23.
109 The combined test also gives information regarding the risk of having a child with the Patausyndroom 
(trisomy 13) or Edward’s syndrome (trisomy 18). If the pregnant woman will remain of this information she 
has to state this prior to the screening.
110 An ultrasound scan sends high-frequency sound waves that are reflected by tissues and organs. The 
reflected sound waves are made  visible on a screen.
111 The foetus is examined for various physical defects, among other things, the heart, the skull, lungs, kidneys 
and bones, and also characteristics of Down syndrome.
112 Stb. 2005,358 (Zorgverzekeringswet).
113 Stb. 2005, 389 ( Besluit zorgverzekering).
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an increased risk of the (possible) presence of a (genetic) disorder.114 If it is determined 
there is an increased risk of Down syndrome, prenatal diagnostics is often offered in the 
form of a chorionic villus testing or amniocentesis. For these invasive tests a puncture 
is necessary. This puncture, as opposed to the combined test and the structural US, can 
interfere with the pregnancy, and can lead to a miscarriage.115
The human rights relevance of the difference between screening and diagnostics lies in 
the fact that the screening is offered to all individuals of the section of the population 
group concerned (in this case pregnant women) without having a medical indication for 
it. This makes specific demands on the safe-guarding of self-determination in whether 
or not to participate in the screening.
3.2.3. Legal framework
The Dutch Act on population screening (WBO) lays down quality criteria for the offer 
and practicing of (prenatal) screening. The permit system of the WBO applies to offer 
and performing prenatal screening for Down syndrome, because it is a population 
screening for the risk of a disorder for which no treatment or prevention is available.116 
According to the WBO the Minister of Health, Welfare and Sports grants a licence 
when the population screening is scientifically sound, the screening is in accordance 
with the professional medical practice standard and the expected benefits offset the 
risks.117Moreover, the decision regarding granting a licences is open to objection and 
appeal (Article 7:1 General Administrative Law Act),118 in which when failing to give a 
timely decision and after a declaration in breach the applicant could claim a penalty 
payment (Article 4:17 et seq Awb).
The aim of the WBO can be deduced from the balance between benefit and risk and 
the definition of population screening: promoting public health and gaining health 
benefits.119 In the case of prenatal screening the question can be asked what needs to 
be protected, the health of the pregnant woman, the unborn child or both the pregnant 
women and the foetus.120 The fact is that with the WBO the screening of unborn life 
has acquired a place in a law which is meant to protect the health of those who have 
been born already.121
Before granting a licence the Minister is advised by the Dutch Health Council.122 
The Dutch Health Council has advised the Minister a number of times regarding the 
114 > 0.5 by the combined test.
115 0,3 tot 0,5%. of the pregnancy ended in a miscarriage after an invasive tests. Downsyndroom. Prenatale 
Screening (version 2011), RIVM March 2011; www.rivm.nl/pns/Images/Down%20folder%20NED%20
%28mrt%202011%29_tcm95-57264.pdf
116 Art. 2(1) WBO.
117 Art. 7(1) WBO.
118 Stb. 1992, 315 (Algemene wet bestuursrecht). 
119 Art. 1(c); Art. 7(1c) WBO; Aartsen 1996, p. 71-84.
120 Van Os & Hendriks 2010.
121 Olsthoorn-Heim 1996, p. 57.




national programme for prenatal screening.123 We examine this in more detail in the 
next section.
To summarize, under the WBO a licence is required for offering and performing prenatal 
screening. A risk indicated test – combined test - for Down syndrome is offered to all 
pregnant women within the framework of the national prenatal screening programme. 
This takes place in week 9-14 of the pregnancy. The pregnant woman of 36 years and 
older and the pregnant woman with a medical indication have the choice between the 
combined test or to immediately undergo prenatal diagnostics – chorionic villus testing 
or amniocentesis.124 The combined test, unlike the structural ultrasound scan (US), in 
principle is not reimbursed by the health insurance to the pregnant woman younger 
than 36 years (Article 2.4 (1a) Decree Health Insurance).
3.3. CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
According to the ECtHR Self-determination – commonly referred as ‘personal autonomy’ 
– is an important aspect of the private life of individuals.125 Self-determination, or 
individual autonomy, is ‘an essential corollary of the individual’s freedom of choice’,126 
a view which denotes self-determination as ‘freedom of choice’. In this respect, self-
determination also includes the right to respect decisions about whether or not to 
become pregnant127 and the right to choose the circumstances to have children.128
The notion of self-determination ‘as a right to be left alone’, in other words the right to 
organise one’s own life without intervention by others,129 also means the freedom of 
pregnant women to decide for themselves about participating in prenatal screening. 
The self-determination of the pregnant woman thereby also encompasses ‘the right to 
freedom of choice’ and a ‘claim right’, namely the desire for information and help for 
‘self-development’ about whether or not to continue the pregnancy. These freedoms 
presume, according to the ECtHR in the R.R. case, that if required, the pregnant woman 
is to be given access to comprehensive, reliable and timely information, including 
information about the health of the foetus.130 This ‘freedom to choice’, as a separate 
dimension of self-determination in addition to ‘the right to be left alone’ and ‘right 
123 GR 2007a; GR 2006a; GR 2004; GR 2001b.
124 KNOV, Standpunt prenatale diagnostiek, Bilthoven: KNOV 2005.
125 ECtHR 29 April 2002, Pretty/ the UK, no. 2346/02; ECtHR 11 July 2002, Christine Goodwin/ the UK (GC), no. 
28957/95.
126 ECtHR 29 April 2002, Pretty/ the UK, no. 2346/02, para. 61; ECtHR 28 November 1984, Rasmussen/ 
Denmark, no. 8777/79, para. 54.
127 ECtHR 10 April 2007, Evans/ the UK (GC), no. 6339/05, para. 71.
128 ECtHR 14 December 2010, Ternovszky/ Hungary, no. 67545/09, para. 22.
129 There are various designations of this dimension of self-determination, see for example Dupuis 2004, p. 
56-58; Beers 2009, p. 29.
130 ECtHR 26 May 2011, no. 27617/04, R.R./ Poland, para. 197-199.
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to self-development’, provide specific responsibilities for the doctor regarding the 
counselling of the patient in making choices which fit in with him or her.131 However, 
it cannot be concluded from above that the right to personal autonomy is absolute.132 
In the case Ternovzky the ECtHR considered that ‘the mother is entitled to a legal and 
institutional environment that enables her choice, except where other rights render 
necessary the restriction thereof.’133 In other words, the being able to exercise self-
determination by pregnant women, in particular for their self-development, should 
be legally and socially guaranteed, but can be restricted as far as this is necessary for 
safeguarding other rights and interests.
At a national level this view of self-determination underpins Article 11 Dutch 
Constitution.134 It is also elaborated in the Medical Treatment Contract Act.135 In this 
view the possibility of rejecting an offer of treatment and/or care is an expression of 
self-determination. The Dutch Supreme Court ruled that not fulfilling the information 
obligation by a healthcare worker to the pregnant woman entails the risk that 
the patient cannot make use of her self-determination in the way she wishes, ‘and 
consequently entails the risk that the patient makes a choice which (s)he would not 
have made if (s)he was well-informed.’136
3.4. GUARANTEEING SELF-DETERMINATION AND PRENATAL SCREENING 
3.4.1. The Dutch health council and informed consent
Consent
In the opinion of the Dutch Health Council, the offer of prenatal screening for Down 
syndrome should be presented in such a way that the pregnant woman could make 
a decision based on ‘informed consent’ in order to realise self-determination. In its 
advisory reports the Dutch Health Council emphasizes that due to the unsolicited 
offer – ‘uninvited force into someone’s life’ – the offer of prenatal screening for Down 
syndrome requires strict quality norms for the provision of information and the consent 
procedure.137 The offer of prenatal screening for Down syndrome demands explicit 
consent for receiving objective information. The consent requirement does not just 
look at the performing of the screening, but also at the information given about the 
prenatal screening – a combination of the right to information (Article 7:448 BW) and 
the right of not-to-know (Article 7:449 BW).
131 MacLean 2006, p. 321-338.
132 ECtHR 16 December 2010, A.,B. & C./ Ireland., no 25579/05.
133 ECtHR 14 December 2010, Ternovszky/ Hungary, no. 67545/09, para. 24.
134 Kamerstukken II 1978/79, 15 463, no. 1-2, p. 5.
135 Art. 7:448; 7:450 BW.
136 HR 23 November 2001, NJ 2002, 386/387, para. 5.3; HR 18 March 2005, NJ 2006, 606.





The Dutch Health Council stipulates that making a well-considered choice about 
prenatal screening for Down syndrome requires time for consideration. Accordingly, 
and to prevent an information overload, the Dutch Health Council pleads, just like 
Government and Parliament, for a phased, uniform and standardised approach138 
of ‘informed consent’ concerning the decision-making process around prenatal 
screening.139 This process consists of three phases, namely a) the phase in which the 
pregnant woman is asked if she wants to receive information about prenatal screening; 
b) the phase in which providing information has the aim to give the pregnant woman a 
choice between whether or not to make use of prenatal screening for Down syndrome; 
c) the phase after establishing a higher risk of Down syndrome; the information from 
the health care worker will then concern possible follow-up diagnostic tests.140 During 
this decision-making process the health care worker should continually check if the 
pregnant woman is sufficiently informed to prevent her from making a choice which is 
not in accordance with her norms and values.141 This notes self-determination as a form 
of freedom of choice, which calls for counselling and protecting.
Guideline
In 2008 the then Minister Klink (CDA) of Health, Welfare and Sports informed Parliament 
about a guideline of quality requirements for the counselling of pregnant women. This 
guideline was established as a result of the call from the Parliament to inform expectant 
parents about prenatal screening in a standardised and non-directive way. The National 
Institute for Public Health and the Environment (RIVM) published a brochure and 
developed a choice-indicator (www.ikkiesbeter.nl) for pregnant women which should 
help them to choose whether or not to take part in the prenatal screening programme. 
According to the Minister, the most important objective of the prenatal screening – the 
informed choice of expectant parents – is guaranteed by these measures.142
3.4.2. Analysis
In prenatal screening for Down syndrome, the Dutch Health Council, as well as the 
Government and Parliament, emphasize the realisation of an informed choice. To 
safeguard the self-determination of the pregnant woman in the decision-making 
process surrounding prenatal screening he argues for a phased and standardised 
‘informed consent’-approach. The Dutch Health Council argued for standardised 
and non-directive attitude of those who inform the pregnant woman about prenatal 
screening and throughout the counselling.
138 GR 2006a, p. 12-13.
139 GR 2001b, p. 27.
140 GR 2006a, p. 11-13; GR 2001b, p. 29.
141 GR 2004, p. 59.
142 Kamerstukken II 2007/08, 29 323 and 22 894, no. 49.
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This approach offers good opportunities to establish quality requirements in the 
decision-making process and so promote the self-determination of the pregnant 
woman. A possible disadvantage of standardisation is that the health care worker does 
not feel free to tune the information to the individual and does not check enough if the 
way of informing also fits in with the person who has to process the information. Not 
everyone will find that (the same) factual, objective information sufficient to be able 
to make a choice. Standardisation that is too strict can therefore clash with the legal 
requirement that the health care worker should be guided by that which the patient in 
that specific case in all reasonableness should know (Article 7:448 (1) BW) and with the 
requirements of good health care worker practices (Article 7:453 BW). Consequently an 
important responsibility rests with the health care worker to check if the information 
is understood by the person concerned and if this information forms a good basis for 
making an informed decision. Important indications for the necessity for differentiation 
can also be found in a recent study by Erasmus University Rotterdam. Factors such 
as the level of education, cultural background and religion distinguish determine the 
extent to which women with ‘informed consent’ take part in prenatal screening.143
3.5. SELF-DETERMINATION AND AGE LIMITS
3.5.1. Justification age limit
In 2003 the then Secretary of State for Health, Welfare and Sports Ross-van Dorp 
(CDA) argued for restraint regarding the offer of prenatal screening, on the one hand 
to prevent medicalization and on the other hand ‘not proceed further down the road 
of a misleading idealised image, namely human enhancement.’144 She therefore made 
a distinction between the offer of prenatal screening for Down syndrome reimbursed 
by the insurance company and providing information about the combined test to all 
the pregnant women. Pregnant women, younger than 36, would have to pay for the 
prenatal screening themselves.145 Ross-van Dorp underpinned this distinction between 
information and offer with a reference to the research report ‘Opgelucht maar ook 
aangedaan’.146 This, while the researchers raised the question if it is realistic to expect 
that good information about the possibility of prenatal screening for Down syndrome 
can compensate the infringement of autonomy. The financial threshold on the basis 
of age is a restriction of the access to prenatal screening which affects the self-
determination of pregnant women.
143 Van Agt et al. 2012, p. 4.
144 Kamerstukken II 2003/04, 29 323, no. 1, p. 8.
145 Kamerstukken II 2003/04, 29 323, no. 3, p. 2.




3.5.2. Age limit dispute
The age limit regarding the offer and the reimbursement of the combined test is 
medically and socially controversial. Although the risk of having a child with Down 
syndrome increases in with years of age, the Dutch Health Council advised, already in 
2001, not to apply an age limit to prenatal screening.147 The combined test without an 
age limit gives the most favourable combination of false positive/false negative test 
results and detection-miscarriage ratio. Furthermore, most of the pregnant women are 
younger than 36 years, the combined test during the first trimester of the pregnancy 
will thus reduce the number of pregnant women that have to undergo an invasive test 
at a later stage of the pregnancy, for example as a result of the structural US.
3.5.3. Quiet introduction ultrasound at 20 weeks
The final cabinet standpoint that pregnant women must be informed about the 
possibility of prenatal screening for Down syndrome, but that for the reimbursement 
of this screening an age limit will apply, was announced to the Parliament in a letter 
dated 15 September 2005.148 A month later a letter followed in which it was announced 
that the structural US for all pregnant women would be reimbursed.149
While there were many and frequent discussions about the introduction of a national 
screening programme for Down syndrome, and the age limit associated with reimbursing, 
the reimbursement of the structural US for all pregnant women was quietly accepted. 
That is remarkable, given the fact that the decision-making process surrounding the 
structural US is complex due to the nature of the test. The decision-making process 
of prenatal screening for Down syndrome is compared to the structural US more 
transparent because yet one anomaly is screened.150 Moreover, in the structural US the 
pregnant woman is put under greater pressure of time because in accordance with the 
Termination of Pregnancy Act it is no longer permitted to terminate the pregnancy later 
than a few weeks after the structural US.
3.5.4. Analysis
Yet, in contrast to the structural US, an age limit applies to the reimbursement of 
prenatal screening for Down syndrome. A clear and unequivocal justification for the 
age limit is absent. The question must be asked whether an age limit for prenatal 
screening conflicts with the constitutional notion of self-determination in relation with 
147 GR 2001b, p. 13-15.
148 Kamerstukken II 2004/05, 29 323, no. 15.
149 Kamerstukken II 2005/06, 29 323, no. 17.
150 The combined test also gives information regarding the risk of having a child with the Patausyndroom 
(trisomy 13) or Edward’s syndrome (trisomy 18). If the pregnant woman will remain of this information she 
has to state this prior to the screening. See about the complexity of the decision making process ; Dondorp 
et al. 2010; vorige.nrc.nl/opinie/article2484612.ece/Echo_zorgt_voor_onverwachte_dilemma_s; De Kort 
2008, p. 36-37; Oepkes 2008, p. 38-40.
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the principle of non-discrimination due to the financial threshold for access to ‘health 
information’. If women younger than 36 years (have to) waive the prenatal screening 
with the combined test for financial reasons, also because they can be informed ‘free’ 
about it in the twentieth week of the pregnancy, it restricts their self-determination 
without good justification and in a seemingly discriminatory way.
3.6. IS IT ENOUGH?
3.6.1. Self-determination and standardised information
As we saw in the previous sections the information given to pregnant women about 
prenatal screening is standardised. Furthermore, Government, Parliament and 
professional associations set great store by the principle of non-directivity. Standardised 
information guarantees minimum quality requirements of the information for 
prenatal screening and is in accordance with the procedural norm of Article 8 ECHR. 
Nevertheless, a quarter of the women that participate in prenatal screening appear not 
to do this on the basis of an informed choice.151 In practice it was found that pregnant 
women do not only need to have information so that they can make an informed 
decision about rejecting (information about) prenatal screening for Down syndrome 
(self-determination as ‘right to be left alone’). The pregnant women say that they also 
want to receive information that is related to the implications of prenatal screening, 
namely the consequences of the test results and the choices arising from that about 
the continuation or termination of the pregnancy (self-determinations as freedom ‘to 
choice’ and as ‘self-development’).152 Illustrative are the experiences of parents of a 
child who has Down syndrome that took part in prenatal screening. In a survey only 32% 
of these parents stated that they remembered having received information regarding 
Down syndrome. Moreover, a quarter of this group found that the information was 
insufficient. The parents mostly had the feeling of being alone in the decisions about 
screening and about whether or not to continue the pregnancy.153 We emphatically 
note, however, that these figures are based on the experiences and memories of the 
parents.
Moreover (expectant) parents stated that they would also like to know more about 
the experiences of living with a child with Down syndrome, the psychosocial aspects of 
it.154 In addition to factual information the pregnant women also want support in taking 
decisions regarding the period after the combined test based on the interpretation 
of the test results. Furthermore, they expect the experts to state their opinion about 
151 Van Agt et al. 2012, p. 3.
152 Geelen 2004.
153 De Graaf et al. 2010, p. 37-48.




the seriousness of the situation, and the health care worker to advise the pregnant 
woman from his professional experience with regard to further diagnostics and the 
continuation or termination of the pregnancy.155
From the above it can be concluded that a standardised ‘informed consent’ approach 
as transfer of knowledge and information does not give an absolute guarantee of the 
pregnant woman being able to exercise self-determination and the freedom to choose 
with regard to prenatal screening. Should not be given more attention to individualised 
information tailored to the pregnant woman (Article 7:448 (1) BW)? After all, not 
every pregnant woman needs the same assistance to make the choices concerning 
prenatal screening. Furthermore, the need for information of those involved is 
strongly influenced by factors as knowledge and education, previous pregnancies, the 
circumstances in which the family lives, the presence of other children and the phase 
in the decision-making process of the screening. It seems advisable that the health care 
worker, who cares for the pregnant woman in the first trimester of the pregnancy, first 
and foremost finds out if the information regarding prenatal screening is understood 
by the pregnant woman, in order that this information actually helps her to make 
choices.156 Furthermore, the health care worker could be guided by the question 
which information, tailored to her individual needs, the pregnant woman needs in 
order to be able to make a decision and the purpose of the information. This implies 
a concept of professional responsibility from midwives, gynaecologists and general 
practitioners that goes beyond non-directivity. The safeguarding of self-determination 
via giving information and offering support is more than the provision of information 
about facts.157 There must be the opportunity to exchange feelings, ideas, doubts and 
dilemmas between the pregnant woman and those who supervise the pregnancy as 
professionals. Communication perceived as a social-dialogical process guarantees the 
material norm of self-determination better than a standardised and non-directive form 
of provision of information.158
3.6.2. Self-determination and the age limit
In view of self-determination it is important for the pregnant woman to receive 
information about the health of her unborn child as early as possible in the pregnancy. 
The sooner the risk of a (genetic) abnormality is detected the more time the pregnant 
woman is given for making choices after screening. It can be assumed that the barrier 
to participate in prenatal screening is higher if the pregnant woman has to pay for it, 
also because not reimbursing screening from the basic health insurance package of the 
Health Insurance Act seems to suggest that it is not necessary.159
155 Slagboom 2011, p. 21-22.
156 Coggon & Miola 2011, p. 523-547.
157 Van der Stouwe 2008, p. 43.
158 Geelen 2004, p. 52; Van der Stouwe 2008, p. 43.
159 Zeeman 2008, p. 40.
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If strict requirements apply to the information about screening due to the unsolicited 
offer, and having time for reflection is an important condition for being able to take 
a well-considered choice, then it seems that not reimbursing screening for Down 
syndrome to pregnant women younger than 36 years is an unnecessary restriction of 
self-determination, in terms of ‘freedom to choice and self-development’.
The procedural norm concerning self-determination of the pregnant woman as a 
‘right to be left alone’ is adequately safeguarded with the current screenings policy. In 
contrast, the material norm does not appear to be sufficiently safeguarded. Prenatal 
screening for Down syndrome and the structural US are part of the provision of 
information and good care for pregnant women. Not reimbursing prenatal screening for 
Down syndrome to pregnant women aged less than 36 years seems to be inconsistent 
policy, which is at odds with Article 8 ECHR. In our view the pregnant women under 36 
years have just as much right as pregnant women of 36 years and older to adequate 
and sound information given in good time about the risk that their foetus is affected 
with syndrome of Down. The decision of the Minister of Health, Welfare and Sports 
regarding reimbursement of the structural US shows that this can be arranged with a 
single letter to the Parliament. From a health and human rights standpoint this benefits 
the self-determination of all pregnant women in the dimension of ‘freedom to choice 
and freedom of development’.
3.7. CONCLUSION
Pregnant women have the right to self-determination and thereby have the right to 
make their own choice regarding their pregnancy and to undergo prenatal screening. 
Information is of great importance for exercising self-determination in prenatal 
screening. This information, according to the ECtHR, must be complete, reliable 
and timely accessible. In the advisory reports of the Dutch Health Council regarding 
prenatal screening for Down syndrome, self-determination in the dimension of 
providing possibilities for making informed choices predominates. Besides factual 
information it seems that in practice pregnant women especially have needs for 
professional counselling by health care workers in applying the information to their own 
situation. In respect of self-determination the professional groups and implementing 
agencies should reformulate the principle of non-directivity regarding the provision 
of information about prenatal screening. It should be formulated in such a way that it 
(better) expresses that informing pregnant women about prenatal screening is a social-
dialogical process that goes beyond just giving factual information. Furthermore, it is 
important that the Minister of Health, Welfare and Sports reconsiders the age limit for 
the reimbursement of prenatal screening for Down syndrome from the primary health 




the access to prenatal screening and receiving information about it – but that also the 
material norm for all pregnant women is guaranteed: actually having and experiencing 
freedom of choice.
                            CHAPTER
THE RESTRICTION OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION FOR HEALTH 
SERVICES VIEWED FROM AN EU AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
PERSPECTIVE
Abstract: In this chapter the authors analyse advertising for health services (regardless 
of whether via the internet) and the permissibility of the restriction of this form of 
expression from an EU and constitutional law perspective. Using a case study regarding 
direct-to-consumer (DTC) genetic testing, the authors examine EU and constitutional 
law provisions imposing restrictions on advertising for health services. The authors note 
that licensing or forbidding advertising for health services on health protection grounds 
will not easily be regarded as an unjustified infringement owing to the wide margin of 
appreciation granted to states.
From the case study it appears that EU law with regard to ‘pure’ cross-border 
advertising for health services provides more effective protection against infringements 
of freedom of expression than the ECHR. Furthermore, according to EU law there are 
fewer conditions attached to advertising bans than to systems of prior consent. 
It specifically applies to DTC genetic testing that the proportionality between an 
advertising ban or a licensing system for such testing and the desired objective can be 
called into question. Conceivable goals for the restriction of advertising such testing can 
be achieved with measures that encroach less on the rights and freedoms of consumers 
and providers. 
Moreover a laissez-faire attitude fits in with regard to advertising health services within 
the dominant free-market oriented view of healthcare, where unfortunately, freedom 
of choice and own responsibility are too often used as synonyms for self-determination.
R.E. van Hellemondt, A.C. Hendriks & M.H. Breuning, ‘Het beperken van de vrijheid 
van meningsuiting voor gezondheidsdiensten bezien vanuit EU- en grondrechtelijk 






A variety of health services and goods can be purchased via the worldwide virtual 
shopping centre on the web. Internet users can obtain information regarding all sorts 
of matters, ask specific health questions and buy all sorts of medicines and medical 
devices, including services that are not available in their own country.
Via the internet, services can be acquired such as the screening of individual health. 
By using such services, citizens are not only able to obtain information regarding 
their current state of health, but also about future health risks. This knowledge is 
indispensable for a healthy and longer life. At least that is what the providers of screening 
that directly focus on citizens via the internet would have you believe. However, these 
companies are less generous when it comes to the provision of information about the 
value and the risks of such tests.160
The question must be asked whether citizens should be protected from incomplete and 
possibly misleading information concerning internet health services, in particular about 
direct-to-consumer (DTC) screening.161 This protection could be achieved through the 
introduction of compulsory licensing for advertising these health services.162 This legal 
concept is in keeping with the existing legislation and regulations in the Netherlands for 
the offer and execution of risky screening.163
Answering this question raises various EU and constitutional law dilemmas. On the 
one hand, the State has a particular responsibility according to Article 2(1) Dutch 
Constitution and Article 8 ECHR with regard to the protection of health.164 According 
to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, this responsibility involves 
the positive obligation to safeguard the quality and safety of healthcare, to provide a 
system of supervision and to warn citizens in case of health risks (obligation to provide 
information).165 
The combination of a licence obligation for providing – and advertising – certain health 
services, such as screening, can be regarded as a curtailment of freedom of expression, 
as protected by Article 7(1), Dutch Constitution and Article 10 ECHR. Advertising166 
health services is considered to be an expression of an opinion.167 An advertising ban 
160 Bunnik 2009, p. 23-25; Singleton 2012, p. 435-436.
161 Goldsmith et al. 2012, p. 811-816.
162 DTC genetic test is a service; R.E. van Hellemondt, A.C. Hendriks & M.H. Breuning, ‘Wet bevolkingsonderzoek 
op gespannen voet met EU recht’, Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Europees Recht 2010, p. 245-251.
163 De Wert 2004.
164 Hendriks 2012a, p. 23-50; R.E. van Hellemondt, A.C. Hendriks & M.H. Breuning, ‘Vrijheid, blijheid? Het 
reguleren van DNA-diagnostiek in de zorg vanuit mensenrechtelijk perspectief’, Nederlands Tijdschrift 
voor de Mensenrechten (NTM/NJCM-Bulletin) 2010, p. 7-24.
165 More detailed Hendriks 2012b, p. 101-123; Hendriks 2010, p. 57-68.
166 Advertising is communication characterized by payment, publicity and promotion of goods and services, 
Kabel 2003, p. 175-191, www.ivir.nl / staff / cable.html. Last visited on March 21, 2013. Kabel mentions 
another feature, the influence of the channel on the spread of the message.




without prior authorisation (i.e., licence) can moreover impede the free movement of 
health services. This can be at odds with the free movement of services, one of the 
pillars of EU law. The restriction of access to health services, by means of a licensing 
system, can also be regarded as a restriction of the rights of a citizen searching for 
information about his health and life perspectives to self-determination. Individual 
self-determination or personal autonomy forms an important EU and constitutional 
value, which entails various negative and positive obligations for the State.168
In this chapter, we examine EU and constitutional law provisions with regard to the 
restriction (i.e., impediment) of advertising health services via a licensing system or 
ban. We do this using a case study regarding the restriction of advertising DTC genetic 
screening. The focus will be on the case law of the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) and the European Court of Justice (ECJ). 
We open with a short description of DTC genetic screening and the relevant Dutch 
constitutional framework (Section 4.2). Subsequently in Section 4.3, we examine the 
meaning of the principles of protection and self-determination with regard to the access 
to DTC genetic screening. In Sections 4.4 and 4.5 we analyse the ban of advertising 
(without prior authorisation) in relation to the right to the freedom of expression and 
the free movement regime. This chapter is concluded with a few remarks. 
4.2. THE FRAMEWORK
4.2.1. DTC genetic screening
Consumers can quite easily and without the intervention of a doctor, order tests for the 
mapping of (a part of) their genetic profile via the internet. Such a test – a DTC genetic 
test – is an application of genetic screening. 
Genetic screening is a (medical) examination that is aimed at uncovering hereditary 
disorders, genetic predisposition for diseases or risk factors that increase the risk of 
(hereditary) disease in people without health problems.169
A few days after placing an order over the internet the consumer receives a toolkit. This 
comprises a tube to collect the DNA sample, mostly through saliva. A few weeks after 
sending the sample, the individual receives the test results, often also via the internet.
The ‘commercial’ decoding of genes using a DTC genetic test in practice means the 
examination of a part of the genome – the complete set of genetic material of a cell – 
for certain variations and mutations which are associated with hereditary diseases. It 
is important to distinguish between monogenetic and multifactorial genetic disorders. 
In genetic mutations that correspond to monogenetic disorders, it can be determined 
168 Koffeman 2010.




with great certainty whether someone has a hereditary disorder and is going to develop 
symptoms of the disease in the future.170 In multifactorial genetic diseases, however, 
there is only a possibility of obtaining certain hereditary diseases.
Using a DTC genetic test, fragments of the genome are often simultaneously screened 
for more than a hundred, mostly multifactorial genetic disorders. Strong statements 
concerning the chance of getting certain multifactorial genetic diseases can mostly not 
be made as there is (still) too little known about the morbific genetic disorders in the 
genome and the precise interaction between genetic and environmental factors.
It is debatable whether consumers sufficiently realise the limited benefits and 
predictive value of DTC genetic testing, and the associated risks of false positive and 
false negative results. Furthermore, the interpretation of the test results, for a layman 
with little knowledge of genetics and statistics, is not an easy task. The use of DTC 
genetic tests can not only lead to avoidable damage (including psychological damage) 
to those tested, but can also cause unwanted side effects for society. Healthcare costs 
can increase due to the need to interpret or re-interpret the test results by general 
practitioners and clinical geneticists, follow-up tests (often times unnecessary) and 
over-treatment.171 In addition, the interests of blood relatives can also be at stake, as 
DNA tests for hereditary disorders can also give an insight into the possibility that blood 
relatives are carriers of the same genetic mutation(s). 
Due to the (potential) health risks strict conditions are attached to marketing (genetic) 
screening in the Netherlands in accordance with the Dutch Act on population screening 
(In Dutch: ‘Wet op het bevolkingsonderzoek’ (WBO)). 
4.2.2. The Dutch Act on population screening
The WBO is a public law regulation that seeks to protect individuals from certain types 
of (potentially) harmful screening. A ‘population screening’ according to the WBO is 
‘a medical examination which is carried out in response to an offer made to the entire 
population or to a section thereof and to detect diseases of a certain kind or certain risk 
indicators, either wholly or partly for the benefit of the persons to be examined’.172 This 
examination is not conducted because there is a concrete request for help from those 
involved (medically ‘indicated’ examination), but is directed towards individuals who in 
principle have no symptoms. This is the reason why strict due diligence requirements 
apply to the offer and execution of population screening.173 
In the legal definition of population screening, the term ‘offer’ should be interpreted 
broadly.174 It does not just mean the active invitation to individuals to have themselves 
tested, for example a personal written invitation to take part in the population screening 
170 Maassen 2006, p. 772-773.
171 Bloss et al. 2013, p. 5.
172 GR 1994, p. 18; art. 1(c) WBO.
173 Drewes et al. 2009, p. 1660-1664.




for breast cancer, but also the passive ‘seduction’ of consumers to buy a service or 
a good via advertising on websites, magazines and newspapers. For the offering and 
performing of (potentially damaging) population screening a licence is required.175 At 
the moment, there are three categories of population screening indicated in the WBO 
as potentially harmful, namely (a) population screening using ionising radiation, (b) for 
cancer and (c) for untreatable disorders.176 For other types of population screening no 
licence is required. 
The Minister of Health, Welfare and Sports (VWS) issues a licence for the offer and 
execution of population screening if it is scientifically sound, is in accordance with the 
professional medical practice standards and the expected benefits offset the risks.177 
The Act does not contain any specific licensing criteria with regard to the offer – 
including the advertising – of population screening.
Given the strict requirements which apply to the offer and execution of population 
screening and the oft-heard criticism of the limited predictive value and the benefits 
of DTC genetic tests,178 there is little likelihood of the Minister issuing a licence to a 
company in the Netherlands for the marketing of DTC genetic tests in which consumers 
are screened for (risk-indicators for) certain types of cancer or untreatable disorders.179 
4.2.3. Interim reflections
DTC genetic tests in the Netherlands fall within the scope of the WBO. Generally for the 
offer and execution of DTC genetic testing a licence is required under the WBO, because 
most of the time such a test provides information concerning the risk of contracting 
more than a hundred diseases, including certain types of cancer and untreatable 
disorders. 
As a rule in screening outside the mainstream circuit,180 also known as commercial 
screening, the concept of advertising is brought within the concept of ‘offer’. A 
distinction is rarely drawn between the concepts of offer, invitation and advertising 
in commercial screening, because public sales promotion texts on paid websites or 
advertising messages in newspapers and magazines screening are offered directly to 
consumers. This way consumers are invited to buy a health care service - screening. 
The licence obligation, which applies to screening for types of cancer and untreatable 
disorders, should in this way also protect the consumer from these types of advertising.
175 Art. 3(1) WBO.
176 Art. 2 WBO.
177 Art. 7(1) WBO.
178 Report EASAC & FEAM 2012.
179 To our knowledge the Minister has not yet issued a licence to a company which provides and/or carries out 
DTC genetic tests.
180 Screening which is not a part of the Dutch National Population Screening Programme or performed as a 




This raises the question of whether erecting barriers to advertising encounters EU or 
constitutional objections, especially the right to freedom of expression and the concept 
of self-determination.
4.3. PROTECTION AND SELF-DETERMINATION
4.3.1. The principles protection and the notion of self-determination
The State is bound to provide its citizens with optimum protection from risks and 
dangers to life, welfare and health. This ‘duty to protect’181 is not only conveyed in 
social economic fundamental rights, but also in the positive obligations of classic 
fundamental rights. It is also evident from the case law of the ECtHR. According to the 
ECHR, States Parties have a ‘best endeavours’ duty to protect people who live within 
their territory from damage, including damage to their health.182
This duty of protection – which is also potentially important for the regulation of 
health services, such as DTC genetic tests – has manifested itself in the case law of the 
ECtHR particularly in matters with regard to Article 2 (right to life), Article 3 (ban on 
torture) and Article 8 ECHR (right to privacy).183 For the subject matter of this chapter, 
the positive obligations that the ECHR has interpolated in Article 8 ECHR that concern 
protection from health damage and the access to information on one’s health, are of 
particular interest.
Individuals derive from Article 8 ECHR a proviso that the State ensure that they remain 
free of damage to health, as well as have the right to an effective and accessible 
procedure to obtain access to information in the event of possible health risks.184 
According to the ECtHR, the States Parties do not have to wait until the damaging effect 
is indisputably clear before standardizing the potentially harmful events and informing 
the population with regard to the health risks.185 Furthermore, it can be expected from 
the State that it take action against people who wilfully disseminate information that is 
damaging or at least potentially damaging to the health of people.186 Article 8 ECHR in 
principle thereby creates far-reaching positive obligations, although the ECHR always 
allows the States Party a certain extent of policy freedom to elaborate on this obligation 
at their own discretion. 
181 See Shue 1980. The typology of obligations (‘to respect, to protect and to fulfil’) became better known 
after the Special Reporter Eide 1987 was published. See also San Giorgi 2012, p. 42 and further.
182 ECtHR 14 November 2002, Mouisel/ France, no. 67263/01; ECtHR 27 January 2009, Tatar/ Romania, no. 
67021/01.
183 San Giorgi 2012, p. 103-109.
184 ECtHR 19 February 1998, Guerra et al./ Italy, no. 14967/89; ECtHR 19 October 2005, Roche/ the UK no. 
32555/96, para. 167; ECtHR 26 July 2011, George & Georgeta Stoicescu/ Romania, no. 9718/03.
185 ECtHR 27 January 2009, Tatar/ Romania, no. 67021/01.




The rapidly increasing offer of health checks, DTC genetic tests and other types of 
screening fits in well in healthcare determined by a free-market, with the emphasis on 
freedom of choice and personal responsibility as expressions of self-determination.187 
With regard to the access to such health services, it is the question whether individuals 
under Article 8 ECHR should not only have access to collected and recorded information 
related to them,188 but also if they should be entitled to access as yet unknown 
information via a so-called ‘right to screening’. In the light of existing case law of 
the ECtHR, the question whether a general right to health screening exists must be 
answered negatively.
At the same time it follows from case law of the ECtHR that the State should respect 
decisions made competently, even if they are possibly damaging to the welfare and 
the health of the person concerned. The restriction of access to DTC genetic tests with 
a limited predictive value, which result in possible damage, including health damage, 
is consequently at odds with the freedom of individuals to allow themselves to be 
screened for future health risks and to receive information with regard to these risks 
without State interference. This freedom of choice is also protected by Article 8 ECHR.189 
However, when no informed consent is provided, the situation is very different.
According to the ECHR, the requirement of informed consent for medical treatment is 
an essential safeguard of the right to respect for private life (Article 8 ECHR) and the 
self-determination of the individual.190 It expresses the principle that consent based on 
adequate information is a condition for carrying out a medical procedure. This implies, 
for example, that State Parties have the positive obligation to safeguard that individuals 
are informed about the foreseeable consequences of a contemplated medical 
treatment in good time, sufficiently and understandably.191 Accordingly, the case law 
ECtHR has recognised a general right to information regarding choice.192 However, in 
the case of people using DTC genetic testing, we must ask ourselves if there is valid 
consent as information about the limited benefits and predictive value is not provided.
4.3.2. Interim reflections
The right to self-determination, as recognised in the context of Article 8 ECHR, does not 
entail a right to claim access to health services such as DTC genetic testing. However, 
the State has a positive obligation to impose quality requirements on the access to, the 
information regarding and the use of such health services. 
187 GR 2008, p. 13.
188 ECtHR 7 July 1989, Gaskin/ the UK, no. 10454/831990; ECtHR 13 February 2003, Odièvre/ France, no. 
42326/98 (GC); ECtHR 25 September 2012, Godelli/ Italy, no. 33783/09. 
189 ECtHR 13 November 2012, no. 47039/11 & 358/12, Hristizov et al./ Bulgaria, para. 117.
190 ECtHR 9 March 2004, Glass/ the UK, no. 61827/00, ECHR 20 March 2007, Tysiąc/ Poland, no. 5410/03, 
para. 107; ECtHR 10 April 2007, Evans/ the UK (GC), no. 6339/05, para. 71; ECtHR 26 May 2011, R.R./ 
Poland, no. 27617/04.
191 ECtHR 5 October 2006, Trocellier/ France, (admissibility decision), no. 75725/01 & no. 75725/01; ECtHR 2 
June 2009, Codarcea v. Romania, no. 31675/04, para. 105.




Imposing quality requirements on the offer and the execution of DTC (genetic) screening 
is in our view permissible and desirable, also regarding the possible (consequences 
of) test results for the fundamental rights and freedoms of others. Such quality 
requirements may, however, not conflict with EU and constitutional law. In this chapter, 
we focus specifically on the advertising of DTC genetic tests as little mention is made 
of this aspect of the testing in academic literature; a situation that contrasts starkly 
with the EU and constitutional objections regarding the use of and procedure for such 
health services.193




With the advent of internet, the possibility has been created for companies to simply 
and quickly inform large groups of people about certain health services.194 At the same 
time individuals are able to obtain a wealth of information via the internet. The so-
called ‘freedom of communication’ safeguards not just from State intervention with 
regard to the content of the communication, but also from impeding communication.195 
Freedom of communication thus affects the self-determination of the individual in 
question to choose if and the way in which he or she wishes to express his opinion or 
wants to receive an opinion.196
Advertising DTC genetic tests entails commercial communication about a specific health 
care service. Advertising is defined as any form of communication intended for the 
direct or indirect promotion of goods, services or the image of a business, organisation 
or person that exercises an industrial or craft activity or a regulated profession.197 
Advertising is an expression of an opinion.198 In the following section, we examine the 
restriction of advertising DTC genetic tests in the context of the Dutch Constitution and 
Article 10 ECHR.
193 Kaye 2008, p. 180-183; Soini 2012, p. 143-153; Roscam Abbbing 2010, p. 11-22; DTC genetic test is a 
service; R.E. van Hellemondt, A.C. Hendriks & M.H. Breuning, ‘Wet bevolkingsonderzoek op gespannen 
voet met EU recht’, Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Europees Recht 2010, p. 245-251; R.E. Hellemondt, A.C. 
Hendriks & M.H. Breuning, ‘Regulating the use of genetic tests:is Dutch law an example for other countries 
with regard to DTC genetic testing?’, Amsterdam Law Forum 2011, p.13-24.
194 Heerma van Voss & Zwaan 2010, p. 207.
195 Dommering et al. 2000, p. 48.
196 Asscher 2002, p. 6.
197 Directive 2000/31/EC.




4.4.2. Advertising and the Dutch Constitution
Article 7 Dutch Constitution safeguards the freedom of public communication:
‘1.  Nobody requires prior permission to publish thoughts or feelings through the press, 
without prejudice to the responsibility of everyone under the law. 
2.  The law lays down rules concerning radio and television. There is no prior supervision 
of the content of a radio or television broadcast.
3. Apart from everyone’s responsibility under the law no one requires prior permission 
to publish thoughts or feelings through other means than those mentioned in the 
previous sections because of its content. The law can regulate the access to holding 
performances to people below the age of sixteen years to protect good morals.
4.  The previous sections are not applicable to commercial advertising.’
According to Article 7(4) Dutch Constitution, commercial advertising is excluded from 
the scope of constitutional protection. This means that other types of (commercial) 
communication regarding goods and services, such as communication relating to ideals 
or informative communication, do enjoy the protection of Article 7 Dutch Constitution. 
Idealistic expressions, irrespective of whether they are related to advertising, are 
expressions in which the commercial interest is not the main issue, but rather the ideal, 
or the social or political interest is.199 Think of the ‘Loesje posters’, posters for political 
parties and the former ‘Postbus 51’ (translated as ‘PO Box 51’) advertising. The hallmark 
of informative expressions is the lack of a clear commercial message. Examples of 
informative expressions are the announcements on an annual fair billboard, a market 
or a sports event. 
By excluding commercial advertising from the scope of constitutional protection, the 
legislature has created the possibility of imposing restrictions by means of secondary 
legislation on commercial advertising in order to protect, for example, public health. 
As a result, some types of commercial advertising, such as medicine advertising can be 
subject to prior supervision.200
The classification of communication based on the nature of the expression – ideals 
or purely commercial – proves to be difficult in practice. Partly as a result of this, the 
National Commission on the Constitution recommended in 2010 to lift the exclusion 
of commercial advertising from constitutional protection.201 Restricting or forbidding 
commercial advertising would still be possible due to the dissemination jurisprudence.202 
However, this proposal from the National Commission was not taken up by the cabinet 
of that time.203
199 HR 25 October 2005, LJN AU2030; HR 1 April 1997, LJN ZD 0677.
200 Dommering et al. 2000, p. 61.
201 Staatscommissie 2010, p. 75; Commissie Franken 2000, p. 99-101, 107 & 111-112.
202 HR 28 November 1950, NJ 1951, 137; Staatscommissie 2010, p. 75.




4.4.3. The significance of Article 7 Dutch Constitution for DTC genetic testing
In its rulings the Dutch Supreme Court has never really determined what should be 
understood by commercial advertising. The highest court (always) dexterously avoided 
defining the concept of commercial advertising in its rulings.204 According to Advocate-
Generals Machielse and Knigge, commercial advertising is any form of public extolling 
of goods and services for commercial purposes.205 This implies that advertisements for 
DTC genetic tests in newspapers, magazines and websites and promotional texts on the 
internet should be classified as commercial advertising, at least, as long as these tests 
are offered commercially, in other words with a financial contribution in return.
With their advertisements and promotional texts, providers of DTC genetic tests 
primarily intend to seduce consumers to buy their services. Some providers also 
explicitly mention this on their website by stating that their services are a form of 
amusement and pleasure and do not entail medical services. Such providers endeavour 
to achieve financial gain with a service that predicts the risk of disease. It should also be 
assumed that providers, who offer DTC genetic testing outside the ‘mainstream circuit’ 
and advertise such services, do not enjoy the protection of Article 7 Dutch Constitution. 
This does not mean that the freedom to advertise commercially lacks constitutional 
protection. The Dutch Supreme Court introduced advertising in the field of freedom of 
expression via Article 10 ECHR.206
4.4.4. Advertising and Article 10 ECHR
The freedom of expression is also laid down in Article 10 ECHR. This freedom is defined 
in the first paragraph of this provision as:
‘1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to 
hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by 
public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from 
requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.’
Informing others and holding an opinion, as well as the freedom to receive and pass on 
information and ideas without hindrance, are independent rights.207 However, the right 
to receive information does not go beyond the freedom to gather already available 
and accessible information. In contrast to Article 8 ECHR, Article 10 ECHR contains 
no positive obligation for the State to safeguard the access to information, including 
health information.208 
204 HR 25 October 2005, LJN: AU3030; HR 1 April 1997, NJ 1997, 457.
205 Conclusion by HR 25 October 2005, LJN: AU3030; HR 1 April 1997, NJ 1997, 457.
206 HR 13 February 1987, NJ 1987, 899.
207 ECtHR 26 April 1979, Sunday Times/ the UK, no. 6538/74, para. 65; ECtHR 20 November 1989, Markt 
Intern/ Germany (GC), no. 10572/83.
208 ECtHR 19 February 1998, Guerra et al./ Italy, no. 14967/89; ECtHR 10 July 2006, Sdružení Jihočeské Matky/ 
Czech Republic, no. 19101/03. This case is covered public sector information, which cannot be equated in 




According to the ECtHR, advertising is ‘a means of discovering the characteristics of 
services and goods’ and, therefore, falls within the scope of the freedom of expression.209 
For the protection of the freedom of expression – as opposed to the constitutional 
protection under Article 7 Dutch Constitution – the nature of the expression (i.e., 
whether commercial, informative, ideal or a mixture) is not relevant.210
Article 10 ECHR safeguards not just the content of announcements, including 
advertising announcements, but also the form in which they are delivered. Restrictive 
measures, such as a ban or a licence obligation for advertising, are permissible if 
such an infringement is justified by general interest objectives. One such interest is 
the protection of health. The scope of the margin of appreciation that States Parties 
are entitled to in taking measures that infringe the freedom of expression depends 
on the pursuit of a legitimate purpose, the relationship between the information and 
democratic society, and the existence of shared principles between State Parties.211 
The margin of appreciation granted to State Parties in advertising – i.e., commercial 
speech – is wider than expressions that are regarded as the core of the freedom of 
expression.212
This explains why as a rule the ECtHR deems permissible infringements of the expression 
of advertising messages more readily than expressions that are important for the 
social debate, provided that these restrictions are proportional and proportionate to 
the desired objective.213 State Parties consequently have a relatively wide authority 
to impose restrictions on ‘pure’ advertising messages. From case law, it is evident 
that such restrictions imposed by the ECtHR are not readily regarded as unjustified, 
certainly if it these relate to unfair commercial practices with respect to citizens (see 
also section 4.5.3.).
4.4.5. Interim reflections
Promotional texts on websites, newspapers and magazines for health services, such as 
DTC genetic tests, are types of commercial advertising that do not enjoy constitutional 
protection in accordance with Article 7 Dutch Constitution. The classification of 
209 ECtHR 18 October 2002, Stambuk/ Germany, no. 37928/97, para. 39.
210 ECtHR 29 October 1992, Open Door and Dublin Well Woman/ Ireland, no. 14235/88, para. 53- 55; ECtHR 
24 February 1994, Casado Coca/ Spain, no. 15450/89, para. 35; ECtHR 16 December 2008, Frankowicz/ 
Poland, no. 53025/99, para. 39.
211 Compare with each other for example ECtHR 7 December 1976, Handyside/ the UK, no. 5493/72 a case 
about common decency and sexual morality and ECtHR 26 April 1979, Sunday Times/ the UK, no. 6538/74 
criticism regarding the operation of the justice system. See also ECtHR 17 Oktober 2002, Stambuk/ 
Germany, no. 37928/97.
212 ECtHR 17 October 2002, Stambuk/ Germany, no. 37928/97, para. 29-30; ECtHR 29 January 2008, 
Villnow/ Belgium, (admissibility decision), no. 16938/05; ECtHR 5 March 2009, Hachette Filipacchi Presse 
Automobile & Dupuy/ France, no. 13353/05; Société de Conception de Presse et d’Edition & Ponson/ 
France, no. 26935/05; A.J. Nieuwenhuis 2012, p. 153.
213 Boukema & Drijber 2004, p. 70; ECtHR 21 March 2000, Wabl/ Austria, no. 24773/94; ECtHR 20 November 




commercial advertising appears difficult in practice. The Dutch Supreme Court has not 
provided a decisive answer on this issue, any more than the case law of the ECtHR 
about advertising. Probably this is not deemed very necessary, because all types of 
advertising are protected by Article 10 ECHR. 
The freedom of expression is not absolute. Advertising, however, enjoys limited 
protection under Article 10 ECHR due to the fact that such types of communication do 
not belong to the core of freedom of expression. In connection with this, the State has a 
wide margin of appreciation with regard to taking restrictive measures for commercial 
advertising. The ECtHR has only rarely decided that forbidding or requiring prior 
administrative consent procedures (i.e., licensing systems) with regard to advertising 
is contrary to Article 10 ECHR. 
Yet, how do such bans and consent procedures interact with EU law, in particular the 
free movement of services?
4.5. FREE MOVEMENT REGIME AND ADVERTISING
4.5.1. Charter of Fundamental rights of the European Union 
The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (hereinafter: EU Charter) 
has a provision that obliges EU and the Member States to safeguard the protection 
of human health during the determining and implementation of EU policy (Article 35 
TFEU).214 The protection principle (Article 35 EU Charter) is confirmed by Article 168 (1) 
TFEU (distribution of authority between the EU and the Member States with regard to 
health policy) and put into practice in Article 52 TFEU (health exception).215
Besides the protection principle for the free movement of health services, such as DTC 
genetic tests, important fundamental freedoms of expression (Article 11 EU Charter) 
and entrepreneurship (Article EU Charter) are laid down in the EU Charter. In a similar 
vein to Article 10 ECHR, Article 11 EU Charter should be explained extensively. It does 
not simply contain just the expressing of an opinion, but also the freedom to receive 
information.216 In the Damgaard217 case, the ECJ confirmed the case law of the ECtHR 
in that Member States are granted a certain margin of appreciation, depending on the 
activity, with regard to the restriction of advertising.218 In situations where the freedom 
214 C-544/10, C-544/10, Deutsche Weintor/ Land Rheinland- Pfalz [2012] ECR I-000 (not published yet), para 
53. 
215 C-570/07 & C571/07, Blanco Pérez & Chao Gómez [2010] ECR I-04629, para. 65; C-84/11, Marja-Liisa 
Susisalo, Olli Tuomaala & Merja Ritala [2012], not published yet, para. 37.
216 Case C-70/10, Scarlet Extended SA/ Société belge des auteurs, compositeurs et éditeurs SCRL (SABAM) 
[2011] ECR  I-11959, para 50. 
217 C-421/07, Damgaard [2009] ECR I-2629.
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of expression contributes to a debate of general interest, the ECJ (only) marginally tests 
whether the interference is reasonable and proportional. 
Advertising in the field of free movement is known by the term commercial 
communication. Commercial communication is classified as any form of communication 
intended for the direct or indirect promotion of goods, services or the image of a 
business, organisation or person who pursues a commercial, industrial or craft activity 
or a regulated profession. Goods and services can be extolled on the internet (i.e., 
online advertising), but also in newspapers, magazines and on television (i.e., offline 
advertising). A ban or a licensing system for advertising DTC genetic tests is a restriction 
of the free movement of services. It denies residents of EU Member State information 
and deprives them of the possibility of purchasing the services. 
In the Netherlands, however, Article 11 EU Charter is not of great interest for the 
restriction of advertising (genetic) screening from health considerations by the WBO, 
since this does not concern the implementation or determining of EU policy (Article 
51 EU Charter, box 1).219 This does not alter the fact that in cross-border situations 
– for example when a provider from another Member State wishes to establish in 
the Netherlands or desires to offer and exercise its services here – the ECJ weighs up 
the compatibility of an advertising ban or a licence obligation for the expression of 
business messages against the freedom of expression and the right to protection of 
human health and the freedom of entrepreneurship (Article 16 EU Charter).220 
219 However, see also C-617/10, Åkerberg Fransson [2013]. In this case the scope of the EU-Charter seems to 
be stretched. 
220 C-544/10, Deutsche Weintor/ Land Rheinland- Pfalz [2012] ECR I-000 (not published yet), para. 44-46.
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the Union with due regard for the principle of subsidiarity and to the Member States only 
when they are implementing Union law. They shall therefore respect the rights, observe the 
principles and promote the application thereof in accordance with their respective powers 
and respecting the limits of the powers of the Union as conferred on it in the other Parts of 
the Constitution.
2. This Charter does not extend the field of application of Union law beyond the powers of the 
Union or establish any new power or task for the Union, or modify powers and tasks defined 
in the other Parts of the Constitution.’
The interpretation of Article 51 EU Charter of Fundamental Rights:
The Charter of the Fundamental rights of the European Union does not, contrary to the ECHR, 
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The ECJ compares the compatibility of an advertising ban or a licence obligation for 
the expression of business messages with the freedom of expression and the right 
to protection of human health and the freedom of entrepreneurship (Article 16 EU 
Charter).221 In such an evaluation, none of these fundamental rights have absolute 
validity. The fundamental rights involved should be reconciled with each other in the 
sense that a proper balance should be found.222 This can also lead to the freedom 
of entrepreneurship being subject to restrictions for purposes of general interest. 
The condition is, however, imposed that the restriction must be proportionate to 
the pursued goal and furthermore may not affect the core fundamental rights.223 
Consequently under the EU Charter the offer (i.e., the advertising) of DTC genetic tests 
can in principle be restricted for health purposes by institutions and Member States of 
the EU.
4.5.2. Free movement of advertising services
The offer of DTC genetic tests is subject to the regulation of free movement for 
services.224 Directive 2000/31/EG regarding certain legal aspects of information society 
services, also known as the E-Commerce Directive, is applicable to online advertising.225 
The E-Commerce Directive leaves room for restrictive measures with regard to online 
advertising to safeguard public health, provided that the barrier of the free movement 
of information society services is proportionate to the desired objective.226 In addition 
the E-Commerce Directive does not obstruct licensing systems that do not specifically 
and exclusively concern information society services.227 Measures that Member 
States take to regulate online advertising services must however be submitted to the 
European Commission.228
In the absence of community harmonisation measures, the provisions of the treaty 
with regard to the free movement of services are applicable to offline-advertising for 
DTC genetic tests (Articles 56-62 TFEU). Compelling reasons of general interest – in 
this case public health – can justify barriers to free movement for services, including 
advertising services.229 Established case law concerning the exception of public health 
is meant to guarantee accessible healthcare for all, to achieve a high level of health 
221 C-544/10, Deutsche Weintor/ Land Rheinland- Pfalz [2012] ECR I-000 (not published yet), para. 44-46.
222 C-544/10, Deutsche Weintor/ Land Rheinland- Pfalz [2012] ECR I-000 (not published yet), para. 47.
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Commissiion/ Italy [2009] ECR I-4103, para. 43-44; C-169/07, Hartlauer Handelsgesellschaft mbH/ Wiener 
Landesregierung, Oberösterreichische Landesregierung [2009] ECR I-1721, para. 33-36.
225 OJ 2000, L 178/16.
226 Art. 3 Directive 2000/31/EC; C-108/09, Ker-Optika [2010] ECR I-12113, para. 76.
227 Art. 4(2) Directive 2000/31.
228 Art. 3(4) (b) Directive 2000/31.
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protection and to maintain the financial balance to prevent serious damage to the 
social security system.230 
According to established case law of the ECJ, a justifiable barrier must meet the 
requirements of non-discrimination and proportionality.231 To meet the second criterion, 
the proportionality requirement, the restriction of advertising DTC genetic tests may 
not go any further than the realisation of the desired objective.232 Moreover, national 
legislation should be suitable for both the realisation of the pursued objectives, as well 
as their coherent and systematic implementation.233 The regulation of prior consent 
may not be used to justify discretionary action by national authorities. To prevent this, 
a system of prior authorisation must contain objectively discernible criteria.
4.5.3. Misleading advertising
The content of advertisements is regulated by EU law concerning the protection of 
(public)health and consumers rights.234 The ban on unfair commercial practices, 
including misleading advertising originates from the EU Directive 2005/29/EG 
concerning unfair commercial practices. Directive 2005/29/EU235 has been implemented 
in the Netherlands in Book 6 of the Dutch Civil Code and for the most part adopted 
into a system of self-regulation in the form of the Dutch Advertising Code. The 
implementation Act ‘Unfair Commercial Practices Act’ came into force on 15 October 
2008.236 The judge and the Advertising Code Commission have repeatedly concluded 
that advertising messages are misleading, for example either because a rosy picture is 
painted or health risks are not sufficiently stated.237 
EU Directive 2005/29/EG is applicable to communication (including advertising) from 
traders or providers that have a direct connection with influencing the decisions 
of individuals about the purchase of products.238 The Directive sets information-
requirements for advertising health services, such as DTC genetic tests. For a number 
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of commercial practices it is assumed that they always obstruct the average consumer 
from making an informed choice; they are, therefore, always regarded as unfair.239 
Accordingly, a so-called black list of unfair commercial practices has been developed, 
which includes deceptive claims that a product, i.e., a good or a service can cure 
diseases, deficiencies or deformities,240 as well as factually false statements concerning 
the nature and the extent of the danger that would threaten the personal safety of the 
consumer if the consumer does not buy the product.241 
Advertising is not only classified as misleading due to the single fact that an expression 
is false, incomplete or unclear. A commercial practice is unfair, and can be classified 
as misleading advertising, if it is at variance with the requirements of professional 
dedication and the commercial practice limits, or if it can limit the consumer in making 
an informed decision, causing the average consumer to purchase a good of a service 
that he otherwise would not have done.242 The average consumer is ‘a reasonably 
informed, prudent and perceptive consumer’.243 Professional dedication is the normal 
level of special skill and meticulousness that can reasonably be expected of traders.244
Examples of misleading advertising are: the provision of false information, half-truths, 
as well as factually correct information, which through the way of presenting leads the 
average consumer ‘up the garden path’.245 A misleading omission under the Directive 
includes holding back or concealing essential information or ambiguous presentation 
of the information because of which the consumer is not able to make an informed 
choice.246 The EU Directive 2005/29/EG only safeguards the economic interests of 
consumers and no other interests such as health. Through this, the Directive, despite 
the fact that the basic assumption of this Directive has maximum harmonisation, 
provides Member States with the possibility to uphold restrictions – licensing systems 
– and advertising bans to protect the health and safety of consumers.247 The Member 
States have a wide freedom policy with regard to choosing appropriate instruments for 
the way in which the norms from the Directive are upheld, and in which way ‘unfair 
traders’ are sanctioned. This must, however, be in accordance with the principles of 
effectiveness and proportionality, and the chosen system should have a preventive 
effect.248
The Netherlands has chosen a reasonably complicated system of enforcement when it 
comes to combating unfair commercial practices. It is outside the scope of this chapter 
239 Annex I of Directive 2005/29/EG.
240 Item 17, Annex I, Directive 2005/29/EC.
241 Item 12, Annex I, Directive 2005/29/EC.
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to thoroughly address this matter. It suffices to observe that besides the individual 
enforcement by the consumer, a system of public law enforcement has also been 
created in the framework of Regulation 2006/2004 on cooperation between national 
authorities responsible for the enforcement of consumer protection laws.249 The 
Consumer Protection Act 2006250 placed public law enforcement in the hands of the 
Authority for Consumers and Markets.
4.5.4. Interim reflections
In principle, the EU Charter and the free movement regime for services also offer 
sufficient space to Member States to limit advertising with regard to health services 
by means of an advertising ban or licensing system, but only in the framework of the 
protection of public health. Hence, the restriction or barrier to free movement should 
be proportionate to the pursued goal and to the requirement of non-discrimination. 
The fight to protect the consumer against unfair commercial practices has been 
harmonised at the European level. The Directive Unfair Commercial Practices is also 
applicable to health services and seeks to guarantee informed choice, and with this 
also self-determination, of the average consumer in the purchase of such a service. 
4.6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
As a result of examining the EU law and Dutch constitutional legal framework with 
regard to the restriction of advertising DTC genetic tests, a few general conclusions can 
be drawn regarding advertising health services. Advertising a health care service is an 
expression of an opinion and fall within the scope of Article 10 ECHR. The introduction 
of a licensing system for advertising or an advertising ban with regard to health services 
is an infringement of the freedom of expression. However, as a result of the wide 
margin of appreciation that applies as a result of the ECtHRs case law to the regulation 
of advertising the licensing or banning of advertising health services tests on health 
protection grounds will not quickly be regarded as an unjustified infringement. 
It is notable that EU law for advertising health services, which is primarily directed 
at harmonising and securing free movement, provides a more effective protection 
against infringements of the freedom of expression than the ECHR. The ECJ employs 
a stricter test than the ECtHR at least for restrictions such as administrative consent. 
It is also remarkable that evidently under EU law fewer conditions are attached to 
banning advertising, despite the fact that such measures more deeply encroach on 
the free movement regime for services, including health services, than on systems of 
249 OJ 2004, L 364/1.




prior consent, including administrative consent. Through this, advertising bans less 
frequently conflict with the rules for the free movement of services than licensing 
systems that do not forbid but attach certain conditions to the access and use of health 
services.
In concluding, we would like to draw attention to some specific issues regarding the case 
study on the EU law and constitutional framework for advertising with regard to health 
services. In our opinion, citizens as consumers should be protected from incomplete 
and possibly misleading information emanating from providers of screening in general 
and in particular genetic screening. 
In the Netherlands a licence under the WBO is necessary for the offer and performing of 
certain types of screening. In practice the health protecting measure of the WBO wards 
off DTC (genetic) screening from the ‘screening market’, thus depriving individuals of 
access to (predictive) health information. Moreover, for the offer and performing of 
DTC genetic tests a licence is normally required, because providers of such testing 
generally screen (fragments of) the genome for more than 100 diseases. They often 
also look for mutations and variations that are associated with certain types of cancer 
and untreatable diseases. 
In our view imposing quality requirements on the use of DTC genetic tests and 
advertising is easily defensible from an EU and constitutional law perspective. Potential 
risks, including health risks, that can cause damage adhere to the use of DTC genetic 
tests. The information concerning the testing leaves much to be desired.251 Accordingly 
individuals are not able to make an informed choice.252 This is not just a condition 
for being able to exercise self-determination, but it is also an important criterion for 
conducting a ‘good commercial practice’ and ‘fair advertising’. Other important reasons 
for the regulation of the access to DTC genetic tests are the potential risks of avoidable 
health damage and – which is not unimportant in today’s society – the probability of 
rising costs of healthcare due to unnecessary follow-up diagnostics and over-treatment 
as a result of drawing up the genetic profile ‘commercially’.
However, questions need to be asked about the proportionality of a ban (without 
prior administrative authorisation) for DTC genetic tests and the desired objective. 
Conceivable goals for the restriction of advertising DTC genetic tests are or can also 
be achieved with measures that encroach to a much lesser extent on the fundamental 
rights and freedoms at stake of individuals and providers of such tests. 
The licensing system of the WBO sets quality requirements on the procedure of DTC 
genetic tests to protect individuals from (potentially) risky screening, which can cause 
health damage. The question can be asked whether a restriction of advertising DTC 
genetic tests by means of a ban or a licensing system adds something to the already 
251 Eindsiedel & Geransar 2009; Singleton et al. 2012.




offered protection of health. Why should a provider that has been granted a licence 
under the WBO not be allowed to invite individuals for services, or for services for 
which no licence is required under the WBO? Why should these individuals not be 
allowed to have at their disposal advertising regarding approved or permitted tests? In 
addition the Minister of Health Welfare and Sports issues a licence under the WBO if 
the procedure of DTC genetic tests takes place in accordance with current legislation for 
medical treatment. This also means that there are sufficient safeguards that meet the 
informed consent requirement during the execution of the screening. Moreover the 
Dutch Civil Code and the Advertising Code also impose requirements on the content 
of advertising, both for DTC genetic tests that require a licence, as well as for the less 
common tests not requiring a licence. In the past this was sometimes more effective 
with regard to the protection of the consumer in a dubious offer of cross-border 
preventive healthcare, than the licence obligation for the offer under the WBO.253
To conclude, a laissez-faire attitude complements the advertisement of health services 
within the dominant free-market oriented view of healthcare, where freedom of 
choice and personal responsibility unfortunately are too often used as synonyms for 
self-determination.
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LEGISLATION ON DIRECT-TO-CONSUMER GENETIC TESTING 
IN SEVEN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES
Abstract: An increasing number of private companies is now offering direct-to-
consumer (DTC) genetic testing services. Although a lot of attention has been devoted 
to the regulatory framework of DTC genetic testing services in the USA, only limited 
information about the regulatory framework in Europe is available. We will report on 
the situation with regard to the national legislation on DTC genetic testing in seven 
European countries (Belgium, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Portugal, France, Germany, 
and the United Kingdom). This chapter will address whether these countries have 
legislation that specifically address the issue of DTC genetic testing or have relevant 
laws that is pertinent to the regulatory control of these services in their countries. The 
findings show that France, Germany, Portugal and Switzerland have specific legislation 
that defines that genetic tests can only be carried out by a medical doctor after the 
provision of sufficient information concerning the nature, meaning and consequences 
of the genetic test and after the consent of the person concerned. In the Netherlands, 
some DTC genetic tests could fall under legislation that provides the Minister the 
right to refuse to provide a license to operate if a test is scientifically unsound, not in 
accordance with the professional medical practice standards or if the expected benefit 
is not in balance with the (potential) health risks. Belgium and the United Kingdom 
allow without restrictions the provision of DTC genetic tests.
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A wide variety of genetic tests are currently being offered directly to consumers by 
private companies that are located within the USA, Europe and elsewhere. The 
type of tests being offered to the public are diagnostic tests, (preconception) carrier 
tests, tests indicating a predisposition to common disorders, tests profiling a risk to 
addiction, nutrigenomic tests, pharmacogenomics tests and ancestry tests. According 
to the companies selling these tests, individuals have a fundamental right to access 
information about themselves, including genetic information.254 Companies market 
their tests to consumers on the basis that they will be able to use the test results in their 
daily life, particularly, in monitoring or improving their health conditions.255 Moreover, 
companies maintain that ordering a genetic test outside the traditional healthcare 
system will result in a better guarantee of privacy, at least with respect to insurance 
companies and employers. Autonomy, empowerment, prevention, convenience and 
privacy are usually the keywords in the marketing of these direct-to-consumer (DTC) 
genetic tests.256
There have also been a number of criticisms made about the services that these 
companies provide to consumers. Although a few companies are currently involving 
physicians in the provision of their services,257 the majority of companies operate 
without the involvement of a healthcare professional. Indeed, in some cases, a 
health-care professional may have been hired by the company to ‘formally’ sign off 
on orders to circumvent legal issues,258 most companies do not require consumers 
to ever interact directly with a health-care professional in order to obtain a genetic 
test. This is contrary to the way that genetic tests have been provided within most 
healthcare frameworks. The DTC provision model of genetic tests has been criticized 
for its absence of individualized medical supervision,259 the absence and/or dubious 
quality of pre- and post-test information provision and genetic counselling,260 and the 
inappropriate genetic testing of minors.261 This adds to the concerns regarding the 
limited predictive value, clinical validity and utility of various DTC genetic tests presently 
on offer.262 Further concerns include the way that DTC genetic testing companies carry 
out research,263 the (lack of) respect for privacy and the potential burden on public 
health-care resources.264 
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In light of these concerns, various professional organisations and governmental 
agencies have published statements to inform, educate and/or warn consumers about 
DTC genetic testing.265 Along these lines, the European Society of Human Genetics’ 
statement set a bench mark that included recommendations to ensure the quality 
of the testing services, the provision of pre-test information and genetic counselling, 
and individualized medical supervision.266 Furthermore, most statements have 
urged for closer regulatory oversight of this market. Recently, the US Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) has decided to investigate more closely the market activities of 
DTC genetic testing companies; this may impact on the future regulatory oversight of 
the DTC genetic testing market both in the US and elsewhere.267 
Although various publications have focused on the regulation of DTC genetic testing 
activities in the US7,268only a limited attention has been devoted to the regulation of 
these activities in the Europe.269 Therefore, the aim of this article is to analyse whether 
specific European countries have national legislation that specifically addresses DTC 
genetic testing or that have other legislation that may impact on the regulatory 
control of these genetic testing services. This publication discusses national initiatives 
from different European countries and does not focus on the European Union legal 
framework. However, it is important to stress that various European legislations are 
binding for companies offering DTC genetic testing in the European Union. Specifically, 
the Directive 95/46/EC on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing 
of personal data and on the free movement of such data; the Directive 2000/31/EC on 
certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, 
in the internal market; the Medical Devices Directives; the Directive 97/7/EC on the 
protection of consumers in respect of distance contracts; Consumer legislation and the 
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Directive 2006/114/EC concerning misleading and comparative advertising; and the 
Directive 2005/29/EC concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices 
and Competition Law.
5.2. METHODS
Experts in Health Law (all co-authors of this paper) from seven European countries 
(Belgium, Germany, France, the Netherlands, Portugal, Switzerland and the United 
Kingdom) were contacted by PB and HCH to describe the regulatory frameworks that 
apply to DTC genetic testing activities in their countries. In answering this question, they 
were asked first, whether their country had legislation that specifically addressed the 
issue of DTC genetic testing, and second, whether there was legislation that regulated 
genetic testing services in general. These countries were selected on the basis of the 
willingness of experts to participate and on the basis of previous involvement in debates 
on this subject. The United Kingdom has been the most active European country in 
this area. Since 1997, the Advisory Committee on Genetic Testing270 and subsequently 
the Human Genetics Commission (HGC) has published various documents specifically 
addressing the issue of DTC genetic testing.271 In Belgium, the National Advisory 
Committee on Bioethics prepared a document on this issue in 2004272 and the Superior 
Health Council is at this moment debating whether more regulatory control for DTC 
genetic testing is necessary. In France and Portugal, the National Consultative Ethics 
Committee for Health and Life Sciences273 and the National Council for Ethics in the Life 
Sciences, respectively, issued statements on the direct marketing of genetic tests in 
2008.274 In the Netherlands, the Health Council275 and the Council for Public Health and 
Health Care276 both published a report on self-testing, discussing DTC genetic testing as 
well. In Switzerland, the Swiss Society of Medical Genetics had published a statement 
270 Advisory Committee on Genetic Testing: Code of Practice and Guidance on Human Genetic Testing Services 
Supplied Direct to the Public. London: Health Departments of the United Kingdom, 1997.
271 Human Genetics Commission: A Common Framework of Principles for Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing 
Services 2010, http://www.hgc.gov.uk/Client/ document.asp?DocId=280&CAtegoryId=10 (accessed 2 
May 2011); Human Genetics Commission: Genes direct. Ensuring the Effective Oversight of Genetic Tests 
Supplied Directly to the Public 2003, http://www.hgc.gov.uk; Human Genetics Commission: More Genes 
Direct. A Report on Developments in the Availability, Marketing and Regulation of Genetic Tests Supplied 
Directly to the Public 2007, http://www.hgc.gov.uk.
272 Belgian Advisory Committee on Bioethics: Opinion no. 32 of 5 July 2004 on the free availability of genetic 
tests, 2004, http://www.health.fgov.be/bioeth.
273 National Consultative Ethics Committee for Health and Life Sciences: Opinion no. 86. Problems connected 
to marketing self-kits for HIV screening and diagnosis of genetic disease, 2004, http://www.ccne-ethique.
fr.
274 National Council for Ethics in the Life Sciences: Opinion no. 56 on direct marketing of genetic tests to the 
public 2008, http://www.cnecv.pt/admin/files/data/docs/ 1273504469_56CNECV2008_EN.pdf.
275 Gezondheidsraad 2007.
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on DTC genetic testing.277 In Germany, DTC genetic testing has been discussed in 
relation to new legislation278 and in a report elaborated by German National Academy 
of Sciences.279 This demonstrates that this is a key issue across Europe, and there has 
been considerable debate around the best way to regulate this area.
5.3. RESULTS
Belgium
In Belgium, no specific legislation forbids or regulates the provision of DTC genetic tests. 
A Royal Decree of 14 December 1987 (published in the Belgian Official Journal of 25 
December 1987) lays down the rules for the provision of genetic testing in the Centres 
for Human Genetics in Belgium. Genetic examinations are only reimbursed by statutory 
health insurance if they are carried out at one of the eight recognized Centres for 
Human Genetics. No information is provided about the potential provision of genetic 
testing outside this context. The only legal basis applying to DTC genetic tests could be 
found in Article 2 of the Law on the practice of health-care professions (Royal decree 
n°178 (B.S. 14.11.1967)), which stipulates that a physician should be involved in the 
practice of medicine. Hence, if a DTC genetic test falls under the practice of medicine, 
as a consequence, a physician should be involved and the law on patient rights would 
apply. In this respect, it is important to determine whether a DTC genetic test could be 
considered the ‘practice of medicine’. As we know, most DTC companies write in their 
‘terms of services’ that they are not practicing medicine, and that their tests should not 
be considered medical information, but only serve ‘informational purposes’. Whether 
or not this statement would stand further legal or judicial scrutiny has yet to be proven.
France
In France, genetic tests are well described and framed in the context of health, and 
this legislation could apply to the DTC context. According to the French Law (Article 
16–1 Civil Code) genetic tests can only be performed for an individual for ‘medical 
or scientific research purposes’. When accomplished in a medical context, the genetic 
analysis should fulfil one of the following elements: (a) to give, confirm or refute the 
diagnosis of genetic disease for an individual; (b) to detect characteristics of one or 
more genes, which may be the cause of developing a disease by a person or family 
members potentially affected; or (c) to adapt the medical care of a person according to 
its genetic characteristics (Article R1131-1 Public Health Code). As a consequence, there 
277 Swiss Society of Medical Genetics Tests 2011.
278 Katz & Schweitzer 2010, p. 90-197. 
279 German National Academy of Sciences: Predictive Genetic Diagnostics as an Instrument of Disease 




is no possibility in France to access a genetic test for another aim, for example, just to 
obtain information. Moreover, the Public Health Code provides some complementary 
provisions with regard to (a) the quality of laboratories and training of scientists and 
(b) the respect of the medical relationship. First, in order to perform genetic tests in 
France, laboratories need to get a specific authorization delivered for 5 years, by the 
Head of the Regional Agency for Health after consultation of the Biomedicine Agency 
(Article R1131-14, Public Health Code). In the same way, geneticists must conform to 
specific requirements to perform genetic tests. They must be specifically trained to be 
able to verify the results of a genetic analysis (Articles R1131-6 and R1131-7, Public 
Health Code). Second, the use of genetic tests in the clinical context means that the 
relationship between the user (patient) and the provider (medical doctor) should be 
defined as a ‘medical relationship’. Any other use outside of this context is outlawed 
and cannot be covered by the following provisions. The French Law gives details on 
the respect of various duties regarding the terms of the patients (or their family) 
information, the test prescription and the announcement of the results (Articles R1131-
4 and following). The law is also strict on the requirements for consent, which must be 
obtained in writing after the patient has been informed of the nature and the purposes 
of the test. This regulation insists on the importance of the quality of the information 
delivered by a medical doctor or explained by a genetics counsellor. 
During the revision process of the French Bioethics Law (Law 2004–800 of 6 August 
2004 on Bioethics, JO 182 of 7 August 2004 adapting the Law 94–653 of 29 July 1994 
on respect for the human body and the Law 94–654 of 29 July 1994 on the gift and 
use of parts and products of the human body, for medical assistance to procreation 
and prenatal diagnosis), some of the preparatory reports underlined the necessity to 
elaborate specific provisions with regard to DTC genetic testing. Considering that DTC 
tests are being offered internationally and that anticipating the scope of the consumer 
demand in France will be very difficult, these reports have encouraged the legislator 
to adopt two kinds of provisions. The conclusions of the reports proposed that, first, 
prohibition for individuals to use the results of these tests in France should be enshrined 
in law, and, second, that the Biomedicine Agency should be charged to watch the 
websites offering these tests to ensure their quality and validity (Parliamentary Office 
on Scientific and Technological Choices (evaluation of the application of the Law of 6 
August 2004 on Bioethics, 20 November 2008), Biomedicine Agency (the evaluation of 
the Law of 6 August 2004 on Bioethics, 2008), information mission on the revision of 
the Bioethics Law (Information Report n° 2235, deposited on 20 January 2010)). 
Finally, the new Bioethics Law that entered into force on 7 July 2011 (Law n°2011-
814 of 7 July 2011, published JORF n°0157 8 July 2011, page 11826) has implemented 
most of these proposals. The most significant of these is that from the persons’ rights 
perspective, for the first time the French Public Health code prohibits a person from 
requesting a genetic test for herself or for a third person, or for identification through 
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her DNA profile, outside the conditions laid by the law (Article L.1133-4-1). This 
action is punishable under the Article 226-28-1 of the criminal code by a fine of 3.750 
Euro. Second, from the institutional perspective, the French Bioethics Law reinforces 
the conditions to be fulfilled by the laboratories, which perform genetic tests. In 
particular, the new Article L. 1131-2-1 (Public Health Code) specifies that the study 
of the genetic characteristics of a person or the identification of a person through his 
DNA profile can only be performed by authorized and accredited laboratories (which 
excludes companies that are not considered as laboratories). Finally, the Biomedicine 
Agency is unlikely to be in charge of website surveillance due to the difficulty of such a 
management. Nevertheless the new law added a new mission for the Agency to ‘make 
information about the uses of direct to consumer genetic tests available to the public 
and to elaborate a benchmark for the evaluation of their quality’ (Article L. 1418-1 
paragraph 9, Public Health Code). The modalities to implement this measure are not 
given by the law. It will be up to the Biomedicine Agency to act as an independent body 
and to choose the best way to ensure and fulfil this mission.
Germany
In Germany, there is no legislation that specifically addresses the issue of DTC genetic 
testing. However, on 24 April 2009 the German Bundestag passed the Human Genetic 
Examination Act (The Genetic Diagnosis Act, GenDG),280 which covers some aspects 
of these genetic testing services. A prior aim of this law, which came into effect on 
the 1 February 2010 (sec. 27 para. 1; for divergences, see sec. 27 para. 2 to 4), is on 
one hand the strengthening of the right to informational self-determination concerning 
the execution of diagnostic or predictive genetic tests, and on the other hand the 
protection against abusive use of the information originating from genetic testing and 
screening. The Act, however, focuses on tests carried out under specific circumstances. 
As sec. 2 para. 1 points out, the Act only applies to genetic examinations and genetic 
analyses conducted within the framework of genetic examinations involving born 
natural persons, as well as embryos and foetuses during pregnancy and the handling 
of genetic data and genetic samples gained thereby for medical purposes, for purposes 
of determining descent as well as in the insurance and employment sectors. This Act 
does not apply to genetic analyses or the handling of genetic samples or genetic data 
conducted for research purposes or on the basis of applicable regulations relating to 
criminal procedures or the Infection Protection Act. 
According to sec. 7 para. 1 of the Act, a diagnostic genetic examination may only be 
undertaken by physicians and a predictive genetic examination may only be undertaken 
by medical specialists in the field of human genetics or other physicians who have 
280 Bundesrat Gesetz über genetische Untersuchungen bei Menschen (Gendiagnostikgesetz-GenDG) [Human 
Genetic Examination Act (The Genetic Diagnostis Act)] 2009, http://www.gfhev.de/de/startseite_




qualified themselves via the acquisition of some specialist designation for genetic 
examination within their specialist area. Para. 2 states that the genetic analysis of a 
biological sample may only be carried out within the scope of a genetic examination 
and by the medical person in charge or by person or institution commissioned by the 
responsible medical doctor. Para. 3 finally declares that genetic counselling according 
to sec. 10 may only be undertaken by physicians named in para. 1 and who are qualified 
to provide genetic counselling. 
Furthermore, a precondition for valid informed consent is the clarification presented 
in sec. 9 para. 1–3: ‘Before obtaining consent, the medical person in charge must 
inform the person concerned on the nature, meaning and consequences of the genetic 
examination. After being informed the person concerned must receive sufficient 
time for consideration before deciding to provide consent. The clarification covers in 
particular: (1) the purpose, type, scope and significance of the genetic examination 
including the results attainable in the course of the purpose of the examination and 
with the designated means of examination; the foregoing also includes any genetic 
characteristics which are to be examined and which are significant in terms of 
avoiding, preventing or treating any illness or health condition; (2) the health risks 
for the person concerned which are connected to the knowledge of the results of the 
genetic examination and the procurement of the necessary biological sample (…); (3) 
the intended use of any sample as well as the results of any genetic examination or 
analysis; (4) the right of the person concerned to revoke his or her consent at any time; 
(5) the right of the concerned person to not have to know results (….)’. 
Under this legislation, the DTC provision of genetic tests in Germany is clearly restricted. 
Genetic tests can only be carried out by a medical doctor after the provision of sufficient 
information concerning the nature, meaning and consequences of the genetic test, and 
after the consent of the person concerned. The German Law described in this article 
does not regulate tests for research purposes, but companies cannot just avoid this 
legislation by suggesting that their tests are for research and educational purposes 
only. However, the mere sale of test kits and the application of DTC GT outside the 
areas described are not prohibited per se, and individuals purchasing tests from abroad 
will not be penalized. Finally, it must also be noted that the legal discussion of the DTC 
problem has just begun and therefore many questions are still open. In particular, the 
relevance of self-determination as a legal concept and the degree to which German 
Law requires protection of the person concerned from their own decisions remains to 
be clarified. 




The Netherlands has no legislation that specifically addresses DTC genetic testing.281 
In principle, companies are allowed to offer DTC genetic tests to the public. However, 
the Dutch Act on population screening (henceforth Act),282 by way of a permit system, 
seeks to protect individuals against screening programmes that may be a threat to 
health. This legal framework was introduced to establish and guarantee a fair balance 
between the right of self-determination individuals and the need to protect them 
against (potentially) harmful screening programmes.283 Hence, although the Dutch Act 
on population screening was not developed to regulate the access and the use of DTC 
genetic tests specifically, it does apply to certain of these tests.
In this Act, population screening is defined as ‘a medical examination which is carried 
out in response to an offer made to the entire population or to a section thereof and 
to detect diseases of a certain kind or certain risk indicators, either wholly or partly for 
the benefit of the persons examined’.284 The key word in the definition is ‘offer’. DTC 
genetic tests that predict diseases on the basis of risk indicators fit within this definition 
due to the fact that companies advertise and offer their genetic tests directly to the 
public in magazines, newspapers and through the Internet. The fact that individuals 
visit the website or the web shop of ‘test companies’ on their own initiative makes no 
difference when classifying DTC genetic tests as population screening. 
According to the Act, some forms of DTC genetic tests can only be carried out with 
a permit issued by the Dutch Minister of Welfare and Sports. Offering and practicing 
DTC genetic tests for detecting (risk factors of) cancer and (risk factors of) ‘incurable’ 
diseases – which can neither be treated nor prevented – without a licence is against 
the law in the Netherlands. Moreover, performing these tests without permission is a 
punishable offence (Article 3 (1) and Article 13).285 Based on Article 7, the responsible 
Dutch Minister can refuse to provide a licence if a test is scientifically unsound, is not in 
accordance with the professional medical practice standards or if the expected benefit 
is not in balance with the (potential) health risks. The Act does not set up quality norms 
for the information to be provided to consumers of DTC genetic tests nor for consent 
to use samples and counselling to be provided. Nevertheless, DTC genetic testing 
companies wishing to sell genetic tests for detecting (risk factors of) cancer and (risk 
factors of) ‘incurable’ diseases have to comply with the professional medical practice 
281 R.E. Hellemondt, A.C. Hendriks & M.H. Breuning, ‘Regulating the use of genetic tests:is Dutch law an 
example for other countries with regard to DTC genetic testing?’, Amsterdam Law Forum 2011, p.13-24; p. 
13-24; Bonneau et al. 2010, p. 396-401; Kaye 2008, p. 180–183; Borry 2008, p. 736–737.
282 Wet op het bevolkingsonderzoek [Dutch Act on population screening], http://wetten.overheid.nl/
BWBR0005699/geldigheidsdatum_09-02-2010 (accessed 19 April 2011).
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standards, which entail the main rights of patients laid down in the Dutch Civil Code. 
Furthermore, the Dutch ‘Medical Treatment Contracts Act’, as part of the Dutch Civil 
Code, applies to all contracts whereby a health-care provider undertakes to provide 
medical services. The main purpose of this ‘Act’ is to clarify and strengthen the legal 
position of the patient. It lays down the rights and obligations of care providers and 
the patient. Among other rights, it sets up quality norms for the information to be 
provided, for obtaining consent and how to deal with confidential patient data. 
According to the ‘Medical Treatment Contracts Act’, health-care providers have to give 
information about the indication, the proposed treatment, alternatives, prognoses, 
risks and possible side effects before starting with a medical intervention. 
The Dutch permit system guarantees normative criteria for DTC genetic tests aimed 
at detecting (risk indicators of) cancer and (risk indicators of) ‘incurable’ diseases. 
This legal framework effectively prevents individuals from getting access to some DTC 
genetic tests, with a questionable validity and clinical utility in the Netherlands. 
However, from the beginning there was confusion about the scope of the Act, and 
thus uncertainty about the requirement of obtaining a licence. The Health Council 
– a scientific advisory body – has been allotted the task of advising the Minister on 
the provision of a licence to applicants under the Act (Article 6). The Dutch Health 
Council has written several reports to clarify the scope of the Act. Despite these helpful 
reports certain uncertainties remain that are probably inherent to the use of terms 
like ‘population screening’, ‘offer’ and incurable’. In the light of these difficulties, 
already more than 10 years ago there was a call to revise the Act in order to enhance 
its effectiveness.286
Portugal
In Portugal, the Law n°12/2005 of 26 January 2005287 defines the concept of health 
information and genetic information, and sets forth rules for the collection and 
preservation of biological products for genetic testing for clinical or research purposes. 
In Article 10 of this law, different genetic tests are categorized based on use: tests to 
be used for the detection of carriers of recessive disorders; pre-symptomatic tests for 
monogenic diseases; predictive tests allowing the detection of susceptibility genes; 
pharmacogenetic tests; prenatal tests and tests used for screening. According to Article 
9.2 of the Law n°12/2005, the detection of the heterozygosity status of recessive 
diseases, the presymptomatic diagnosis of monogenic diseases and the tests for 
genetic susceptibility in healthy persons can only be carried out by request of a medical 
geneticist, following a genetic counselling consultation and subject to the express 
286 Van der Maas et al 2000.
287 Lei n°12/2005. Informação genética pessoal e informação de saúde [Personal genetic information and 
health information law] http://dre.pt/pdf1sdip/2005/01/018A00/06060611.pdf Accessed 19 April 2011, 
2005).
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written and informed consent of the person in question. Article 9.7 also advances 
that in situations of risk of severe, late-onset diseases that appear in the beginning of 
adulthood and that have no cure or proven effective treatment, the performance of 
any presymptomatic or predictive testing must be preceded by a previous psychological 
and social evaluation and by the follow-up of the patient after the delivery of the tests 
results. Besides, Article 17.3 also states that every citizen has the right to receive 
genetic counselling and, if appropriate, psychological and social support, before and 
after heterozygosity, presymptomatic, predictive or prenatal genetic tests. In this 
context, it is also important to state that Portugal ratified the Oviedo Convention,288 
through Presidential Decree n°101/2001, which means that the aforementioned 
Convention has force of law throughout the national territory. According to Article 12 
of this convention, ‘tests which are predictive of genetic diseases or which serve either 
to identify the subject as a carrier of a gene responsible for a disease or to detect a 
genetic predisposition or susceptibility to a disease may be performed only for health 
purposes or for scientific research linked to health purposes and subject to appropriate 
genetic counselling.’289 Finally, in July 2008, the National Council of Ethics for the Life 
Sciences290 issued an opinion that genetic testing for health purposes should not be 
offered directly to the public, in compliance with fundamental ethical principles. This 
document is not a legally binding document. 
Based on these provisions, various jurists advance that DTC genetic testing is forbidden 
in Portugal.291 However, Article 15 of Law n°12/2005 still attributes responsibility to 
the Government to regulate the conditions of availability and performance of genetic 
testing. This is meant to prevent that tests are made available by national or foreign 
laboratories that do not have the support of a proper and multidisciplinary medical 
team, and to avoid the possible over-the counter marketing of this type of tests. 
Notwithstanding this legal provision and an Order, issued in September 2008, by the 
Ministry of Health,292 creating a work force to regulate the Law n°12/2005, there are still 
no regulations that determine measures for accreditation, certification and licensing of 
public and private laboratories responsible for genetic testing. As a consequence, there 
is no specific legislation addressing DTC genetic testing enacted yet, and according to 
some authors, no real legal provisions prohibiting DTC genetic testing services.
288 Council of Europe: Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with 
Regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine: Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine. Oviedo: 
Council of Europe, 1997.
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In Switzerland, the conditions under which human genetic testing may be performed 
has been regulated under the Federal Act on Human Genetic Testing293 from 8 October 
2004.294 The genetic tests offered directly-to-consumers correspond to the definition 
of ‘genetic in vitro diagnostic medical devices’ as formulated by Article 3j of the above 
mentioned law: ‘ready-to-use products for the determination of characteristics of 
human genetic material’. Those tests are covered by Article 9 of this Act that reads 
as follow: ‘(1) It is forbidden to supply genetic in vitro diagnostic medical devices 
to individuals for a purpose which cannot be considered part of those individuals’ 
professional or commercial activities; (2) The Federal Council may, having consulted 
the Expert Commission for Human Genetic Testing, make provision for exceptions 
to this prohibition provided the products are used under medical supervision and 
misinterpretation of the test result is not possible’. 
The Act has been completed by two ordinances: the Federal Council Ordinance on 
Human Genetic Testing from 14 February 2007295 and the Federal Department of Home 
Affairs Ordinance on Human Genetic Testing from 14 February 2007.296 None of these 
regulations provide for an exception to Article 9 of the Act prohibition for DTC genetic 
testing. To the best of our knowledge, no one has yet requested from the competent 
authorities the right to benefit from the exceptions mentioned in the Act. One could 
therefore conclude that such tests remain unlawful in Switzerland. 
In fact, the Act297 makes it a criminal penalty to infringe this prohibition as stated in 
Article 38: ‘(1) Any person who, in contravention of Article 9 paragraph 1, wilfully 
supplies genetic in vitro diagnostic medical devices to individuals for a purpose which 
cannot be considered part of those individuals’ professional or commercial activities 
shall be liable to a fine; (2) If the act is committed for commercial gain, the penalty shall 
be a custodial sentence not exceeding three years or a monetary penalty’. 
Yet, it should be underlined that the prohibition or at least the severe restriction of the 
law is limited to putting those devices on the market, and not the use of them. There 
is no explicit sanction in the law against someone who imported such test for his or 
her personal use. The issue is indeed very similar to the one importing any therapeutic 
products. In practice, this is tolerated by the law as long as it remains limited to personal 
use and does not present a risk in terms of public health. For genetic testing, there 
is still another dimension as there are many companies advertising on the internet 
293 Federal Assembly of the Swiss Confederation: Federal Act on Human Genetic Testing 810.12 2004, http://
www.admin.ch/ch/e/rs/8/810.12.en.pdf (accessed 19 April 2011).
294 Sprumont 2004, p. 71–88. 
295 Federal Assembly of the Swiss Confederation: Federal Council Ordinance on Human Genetic Testing. 
810.122.1 2007, http://www.admin.ch/ch/f/rs/8/810.122.1.fr.pdf (accessed 19 April 2011).
296 Federal Department of Home Affairs: Ordinance on Human Genetic Testing 810.122.122.
297 Federal Assembly of the Swiss Confederation: Federal Act on Human Genetic Testing 810.12 2004, http://
www.admin.ch/ch/e/rs/8/810.12.en.pdf (accessed 19 April 2011).
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that offer simple and rather inexpensive paternity tests.298 The key point in this case is 
that the test requires testing not only the potential father(s) but also the child. When 
the latter is a minor, there is a clear conflict of interest for the ‘father’ to consent for 
him or her, especially when he is not actually the legal father. Courts have already 
decided that such tests are invalid and could not be used to challenge the family links 
between a man and a child. There could also be an issue of liability as the test could 
be considered as an infringement of the personal rights of each person whose DNA is 
analysed without their consent299 – without mentioning his or her legal parents if their 
family relationship is denied – and therefore open the way for obtaining indemnities.
United Kingdom
Within the UK, there is no specific legislation that relates to genetic testing in general 
and nothing that addresses DTC in particular. However, if a DTC genetic testing company 
operated in, and from, the UK, it would have to comply with a wide range of legislation 
and other regulatory factors. There are a number of statute-based Laws that a UK-
based DTC company should be aware of, all of which are at least partly anchored in the 
realm of consumer protection. These legal instruments – variously acts (or ‘primary 
legislation’ made by the UK Parliament) and regulations (or ‘secondary legislation’ 
typically made by a senior Minister authorized by primary legislation) – for the most 
part reflect a wider, harmonized European position (i.e. on medical devices, general 
consumer protection, advertisements, contractual terms or data protection). While 
these laws are not unique to the UK, there are provisions in the UK Human Tissue Act 
2004 – legislation primarily concerned with the use of biological samples rather than 
data – that criminalize genetic analysis of human tissue without the consent of the 
donor. Obtaining the valid consent of genetic test consumers in the UK is therefore 
extremely important. 
The common law system in the UK provides another layer of law, through which judge-
made decisions can either serve to clarify the application of existing legislation or 
‘fill in the gaps’ where there are no appropriate acts or regulations. There have, as 
yet, been no court or tribunal decisions concerning matters pertinent to DTC genetic 
tests, meaning that the most relevant aspect of the common law will be the general 
obligations of confidentiality applicable to the test results provided to consumers. Such 
obligations will, of course, overlap with many of the responsibilities created by Data 
Protection Law. 
The most relevant, and recent, regulatory instrument that applies to DTC genetic tests 
in the UK comes in the form of a voluntary set of guidelines drawn up by the UK HGC: an 
advisory, rather than a regulatory body. The 2010 ‘Common Framework of Principles’ 
298 Sprumont et al. 2003, p. 1280-1290.




aims to ‘promote high standards and consistency’ in the provision of DTC genetic 
tests by commercial providers, so as to ‘safeguard the interests’ of consumers and 
their families.300 The HGC Principles cover matters such as information to be provided 
to prospective consumers, counselling and continuing support, the role of consent, 
laboratory processes, the provision and interpretation of results, and complaints 
procedures. It will be interesting to see how many companies – based in the UK and 
elsewhere – make a point of demonstrating compliance with the HGC Principles, 
particularly as the HGC is soon to be disbanded as part of the UK Government’s current 
cost-cutting drive. Finally, other regulatory schemes that DTC genetic test companies 
should be aware of include voluntary accreditation schemes for testing undertaken in 
laboratories (for example, those offered by the United Kingdom Accreditation Service), 
codes of practice relevant to certain types of advertising and general consumer-facing 
business practices. (Dealt with the Advertising Standard Authority and The Office of 
Fair Trading, respectively).
5.4. DISCUSSION
This report provides an overview of national legislation in seven EU countries with 
regard to DTC genetic testing services. All countries discussed have national legislation 
that partly or fully applies to DTC genetic testing. However, none have legislation that 
was created specifically to regulate DTC genetic testing services and therefore it was 
necessary to use analogy or interpretation of existing legislation. A common pattern 
was that the legislation in many of the countries stipulated that genetic tests should be 
offered only under medical supervision and with genetic counselling. This is the case 
in France, Germany, the Netherlands, Portugal and Switzerland. In these countries, the 
underlying premise is that individuals should be given the opportunity to make their 
decisions freely and this should be based on adequate information about the limitations 
of (DTC) genetic tests and their (physical, psychological and social) implications. 
This position is in line with the latest developments within Europe regarding the 
regulatory control of genetic testing, which is found in the 2008 Additional Protocol 
to the 1997 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human 
Being with regard to the application of Biology and Medicine, concerning Genetic 
Testing for Health Purposes.301 This Additional Protocol (although not currently binding) 
is the first European legal instrument in this area and has been opened for signing since 
300 Human Genetics Commission: A Common Framework of Principles for Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing 
Services 2010, http://www.hgc.gov.uk/Client/document.asp?DocId=280&CAtegoryId=10 (accessed 2 May 
2011).
301 Council of Europe: Additional Protocol to the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, concerning 
Genetic Testing for Health Purposes 2008, http:// conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/treaties/html/203.htm 
(accessed 17 January 2012).
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November 2008. The original European Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine 
states in Article 12 that ‘tests which are predictive of genetic diseases or which serve 
either to identify the subject as a carrier of a gene responsible for a disease or to detect 
a genetic predisposition or susceptibility to a disease may be performed only for health 
purposes or for scientific research linked to health purposes, and subject to appropriate 
genetic counselling’. The 2008 Additional Protocol on genetic testing stated in Article 7 
§1 that ‘a genetic test for health purposes may only be performed under individualised 
medical supervision’.302
In the Explanatory Memorandum to the Protocol, which is important for the 
interpretation of the Protocol, it is explained that Article 7 §1 has been ‘driven by the 
concern to enable the person concerned to have suitable preliminary information with 
a view to an informed decision regarding the carrying out of this test and, if appropriate, 
to have access to appropriate genetic counselling. A precise evaluation of the situation 
of the person concerned, involving direct contact with him of her, is a determining 
element in that respect. A mere telephone conversation with a medical doctor, for 
example, does not allow for such evaluation’.303 In addition, the protocol states that 
genetic tests should meet well-accepted criteria of scientific validity and clinical validity 
(Article 5), and that clinical utility of genetic tests should be an essential criterion for 
deciding to offer a test to a group of persons (Article 6). Moreover, it underlines that 
individuals should be provided with prior appropriate information and appropriate 
genetic counselling (Article 8). This legislation mirrors the recommendation that was 
expressed by some professional organizations. For example, the American Medical 
Association advanced in a letter to the American Food and Drug Administration that 
‘genetic testing, except under the most limited circumstances, should be carried out 
under the personal supervision of a qualified health-care professional, and provide 
individuals interested in obtaining genetic testing access to qualified health-care 
professionals for further information’.304 Although the Committee of Ministers of the 
Council of Europe approved the additional protocol, this document has until now only 
been signed in Finland, France, Iceland, Luxembourg, Moldavia and Slovenia. The two 
last countries have also ratified it in their internal legislation. 
It is also evident that there will need to be further debate to define the type of services 
(and information) offered by DTC genetic testing companies, and whether or not this 
is relevant in legal terms. There have been attempts to clearly distinguish ‘medical 
302 Council of Europe: Additional Protocol to the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, concerning 
Genetic Testing for Health Purposes 2008, http:// conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/treaties/html/203.htm 
(accessed 17 January 2012).
303 Council of Europe: Explanatory Report to the Additional Protocol to the Convention on Human Rights and 
Biomedicine, concerning Genetic Testing for Health Purposes 2008, http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/
Reports/Html/203.htm (accessed 17 January 2012).
304 American Medical Association: AMA letter to the FDA regarding molecular and clinical genetics panel 
of medical devices advisory committee 2011, http://www.ama-assn.org/ama1/pub/upload/mm/399/




genetic tests’ (which are to be ordered by a healthcare provider and which are used 
to make a treatment decision or diagnosis) and ‘informational genetic tests’ (which 
could be ordered directly by an individual and which aim to gain a better understanding 
of general health and disease susceptibility).305 Most DTC genetic testing companies 
are adamant that the genetic information they provide to consumers is ‘not intended 
to substitute for professional medical advice, diagnosis or treatment’ and that this 
information is only for informational purposes.306Almost every company provides 
disclaimers on their website and consent forms with the aim to inform consumers 
of the limitations of the tests that they are providing as well as to give themselves 
some protection from liability. In countries such as France, the Netherlands, Portugal 
and Switzerland such a distinction doesn’t seem to influence the application of the 
relevant regulation, but in Belgium and Germany such a distinction has a role in the 
interpretation whether or not a DTC genetic test would be covered by the law. 
The Netherlands have a quite unique permit system that guarantees normative criteria 
for DTC genetic tests aimed at detecting risk indicators of cancer and of ‘incurable’ 
diseases. This legal framework aims to prevent individuals from getting access to 
DTC genetic tests with a questionable validity and clinical utility in the Netherlands. 
The problem with these different regulatory approaches is enforcement. National 
enforcement measures can easily by bypassed because DTC tests are offered through 
the internet. Without an international regulatory framework, the enforcement of 
whether or not a company is adhering to several national or regional legislations is 
based on voluntary compliance by the company. We observed that some DTC genetic 
testing companies respect the fact that DTC genetic testing is outlawed in certain 
American States, and state on their website that they do not process samples submitted 
from citizens from these states. 
The protection of individuals against questionable testing services calls for international 
vigilance and comprehensive measures by the international community. As international 
regulatory oversight is difficult to achieve, considerable effort has put into working with 
the DTC industry in order to develop a code of practice.307 It has also been suggested 
that an international product quality certificate (such as an International Standards 
Organisation (ISO)) should be introduced that controls for compliance with ethical 
standards, provisions for counselling and stringent standards of scientific validity.308 
 
305 Personalized Medicine Coalition: An Introduction to Informational Genetic Testing 2008, http://www.
personalizedmedicinecoalition.org/sites/all/themes/zen_pmc/documents/Medco-PMC-consumer-
genetics.pdf (accessed 17 January 2012).
306 Howard & Borry 2009, p. 11–13; Kaye 2008, p. 180–183.
307 Human Genetics Commission: A Common Framework of Principles for Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing 
Services 2010, http://www.hgc.gov.uk/Client/ document.asp?DocId=280&CAtegoryId=10 (accessed 2 
May 2011).
308 Hauskeller 2011, p. 2317.
Legislation in seven countries
91
5
Effort is also being put into improving the functioning of in vitro diagnostics medical 
devices regulations.309
5.5. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have focussed on national initiatives from European countries 
rather than on the European Union Framework itself. We have demonstrated that 
there are differences in approaches as well as similarities between countries within 
Europe. However, as Europe is a sui generis multilevel system of governance, Europe’s 
regulatory framework is required to respond not only to processes of economic and 
political integration but also seek to harmonize rules at a transnational level regarding 
health and consumers protection. Therefore, in the challenge is whether it is possible 
to provide uniform normative guidance for DTC genetic testing across all European 
States, when there are different national legal systems and different methods have 
been used to regulate DTC.
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                            CHAPTER
DUTCH POPULATION SCREENING ACT IS AT ODDS WITH EU 
LAW
Abstract: The Dutch Government is concerned that individuals may have their genetic 
map decoded via internet and without the intervention of medical specialists or 
other experts. Although companies established in other countries are able to carry 
out this testing, Dutch companies also make use of services from providers located 
across abroad. In this way the individual receives information concerning the risk of 
contracting hereditary diseases. This online sale is at odds with Dutch legislation. As a 
result, a ‘foreign route’ has been created, whereby consumers and companies can quite 
easily sidestep Dutch law. This chapter examines the freedom of the Dutch State as an 
EU-Member to regulate the access to and supply of commercial genome sequencing. At 
the same time Dutch legislation is examined in light of European yardsticks and appears 
not to be EU-proof.
R.E. van Hellemondt, A.C. Hendriks & M.H. Breuning, ‘Wet bevolkingsonderzoek op 







Health is for sale and manageable if we are to believe the website of the company 
23andMe.310 VARA-presenter Menno Bentveld put it to the test in the programme 
‘Nieuwslicht’. He sent a DNA sample to the provider311 for the ‘decoding’ of his genetic 
map via a toolkit ordered on the internet. This is known as the sequencing of the 
genome. After a few weeks, a password gave access to the results on internet. The 
results show that the presenter has a 24 percent risk of getting prostate cancer. This 
is 33 percent more than the reference value of 18 percent. Besides this, he has a risk 
of 1.3 percent of diabetes mellitus, compared to the reference value 1 percent. For 
a layman the significance of these risks given in percentages is difficult to grasp. The 
presenter asked clinical geneticist Martijn Breuning to interpret the test results. The 
risk that Bentveld will die with a mild type of prostate cancer is many times higher than 
that he dies of prostate cancer.
Sequencing the genome of people without health problems and/or indications of 
hereditary diseases or disorders in the family, from the point of healthcare does not have 
any added value at the moment. Nevertheless, the provision of genome sequencing is 
a lucrative market where businesses are able to grow. Dutch consumers also make 
use of these companies. Foreign providers of commercial genome sequencing are 
not ‘hindered’ by the Dutch laws due to the fact that companies make use of ‘foreign 
constructions’,312 thus enabling cross-border movement.
In the Netherlands strict requirements apply to screenings, that is to say: restrictive 
measures. This is due to the specialised nature of the process and the associated legal, 
ethical and social implications. The Dutch Act on population screening313 (hereinafter 
abbreviated to WBO)314 sets quality requirements for screenings, which are classified as 
population screening. Dutch policymakers feel the need to regulate315 the cross-border 
access to, and supply of, commercial genome sequencing in accordance with the Dutch 
legal framework.316 This is synonymous with curbing the industry. Banning, licensing or 
setting up a quality mark for commercial genome sequencing on the internal market is a 
barrier to the free movement of services and the freedom of establishment. This leads 
to interesting questions of European Union law regarding the freedom for Member 
States regarding the regulation of health services.
310 https://www.23andme.com/
311 In general the suppliers of DTC genetic tests are also the providers of these tests.
312 Companies in the Netherlands make use of the services of companies and/or healthcare workers that are 
established in Belgium, Germany or elsewhere, or these companies have branches or institutions outside 
the Netherlands and use these branches for the genome analyses. 
313 Wet op het bevolkingsonderzoek.
314 Stb. 1992, 611( Wet op het bevolkingsonderzoek).
315 Commercial genome analysis refers to the sequencing of the genome without a medical indication by 
private companies.




The subject of this chapter is the freedom of EU Member States to regulate the access 
to, and supply of, commercial genome sequencing within their national borders and 
the consequences that this may have for the Netherlands. This chapter opens with a 
short description of the concept of sequencing the genome and the risks of analysing 
the genome for healthcare purposes. thereafter, attention shifts to a description of 
how the Netherlands currently regulates the access to commercial genome sequencing 
(section 6.3). Subsequently, the case law of the Court of Justice of the EU (henceforth: 
ECJ) regarding the freedom for States to regulate health services will be examined. 
At the same time, the extent to which the Dutch methods for regulating commercial 
genome sequencing against the European yardstick (section 6.4) will be determined. 
After that attention is paid to the importance of the E-Commerce Directive317 for the 
access to commercial genome sequencing on the internet. Lastly, an answer will be 
provided to the central question of this chapter, thus concluding that the current 
methods employed in the Netherlands to regulate commercial genome sequencing is 
not EU-proof (section 6.5).
6.2. SEQUENCING THE GENOME AND THE RISKS
The genome is the genetic material of a body cell. In practice, the sequencing of the 
genome means the examination of a part of the genome for certain variations and 
mutations that are associated with hereditary diseases and disorders. The distinction 
between monogenetic and multifactorial hereditary diseases and disorders is of 
importance in this process. Monogenetic hereditary diseases are caused by a mutation 
of one gene and multifactorial genetic disorders by a combination of genetic and non-
genetic factors, such as lifestyle and environmental factors.318 In genetic mutations, 
which correspond with monogenetic disorders, it can be determined with great 
certainty if someone has a hereditary disorder and is going to develop symptoms of the 
disease in the future.319 Testing for multifactorial genetic diseases provides information 
about the risk of getting certain hereditary diseases. 
In commercial genome analyses, fragments of the genome are screened mainly for 
multifactorial genetic diseases. Consumers can order a toolkit via internet, without 
a medical reason320 and without the intervention of a medical specialist. The toolkit 
comprises a laboratory tube to collect a DNA sample, usually saliva. The consumer then 
sends the DNA sample to the provider. The DNA-material is first decoded in a laboratory 
317 Directive 2000/31/EC, OJ 2000, L 178/1.
318 Pieters & Meijman 2008, p. 291.
319 Maassen 2006, p. 772-775.





(the genome is broken into small pieces and reassembled in the right order) and then 
analysed using software (compare variations and mutations). The provider calculates on 
the bases of the collected data the risks of certain hereditary diseases. The risk profile 
is established using the scientific knowledge of that moment. The risk calculations and 
the test results are influenced by the number of people who are tested, the number of 
variations and mutations which are found, the available knowledge about the interplay 
between genes and the environmental factors. The way in which providers inform the 
consumers about the test results varies. Consumer often receive an internet account 
from the provider for viewing and regular ‘upgrading’ the test results. 
In relation to the current scientific knowledge about the interaction of genes and 
external factors, the benefit of commercial genome sequencing is minimal. It calls 
into question whether consumers are actually aware of the limited predicted value of 
commercial genome sequencing. Furthermore, commercial genome sequencing can 
lead to false negative or false positive test results and thus to unjustified reassurance or 
anxiety. Moreover, health costs can increase due to the demand for reappraisal of test 
results, follow-up tests and overtreatment in the ‘mainstream circuit’.
In short, the predictive value of commercial genome sequencing is limited, certainly 
in multifactorial diseases, and there are few treatments available. At present, the 
health risks of commercial genome sequencing are considerably greater for the person 
concerned than the benefits
 
6.3. DUTCH ACT ON POPULATION SCREENING
Dutch legislation sets requirements for the access to and supply of commercial 
genome sequencing in order to protect individuals against harmful screenings. A 
licence is required to offer and/or perform commercial genome sequencing, because 
the variations and mutations which are found during the analysis are compared with 
variations and mutations which are associated with hereditary forms of cancer and 
untreatable disorders.321
The WBO provide quality safeguards for screenings which are classified as population 
screening. The Act aims to protect individuals from population screening that can be 
harmful to the physical or mental health of the people being tested.322 Article 1(c) 
defines population screening as follows: ‘a medical examination which is carried out to 
an offer made to the entire population or to a section thereof and to detect of diseases 
of a certain kind or certain risk indicators, either wholly or partly for the benefit of the 
persons examined’. ‘Offer’ is according to the WBO not just actively inviting individuals, 
321 GR 2009, p. 13.




but also the passive ‘seduction’ of people via adverts on websites and magazines and 
newspapers to undergo a screening.323
Due to the (potential) health risks, a licence is required for the offering and/or performing 
of population screening using ionising radiation, for (risk-indicators for) cancer and 
untreatable diseases due to the (potential) health risks. In accordance with the WBO 
the Minister of Health, Welfare and Sports grants a licence when the population 
screening is scientifically sound, in accordance with the professional medical practice 
standard and the expected benefits offset the risks.324 Before the Minister grants the 
licence he or she obtains the advice of the Dutch Health Council. 
The practice is strict. In practice offering commercial genome sequencing without a 
licence is tolerated. The Healthcare Inspectorate is assigned the task to enforce the 
permit system of the WBO. However, the enforcement of the licence obligation is 
difficult.325 Since the WBO came into force, confusion has surrounded its scope, and 
thus uncertainty has arisen with respect to the requirements imposed to obtain a 
license. We will cover this more depth in the following sections.
6.4. COMMERCIAL GENOME SEQUENCING AND THE FREE MOVEMENT 
REGIME FOR SERVICES AND ESTABLISHMENT
6.4.1. Commercial genome sequencing: a service 
In the European Union a free movement regime exists for services (Article 56 TFEU) 
and for goods (Article 28 TFEU). Commercial genome sequencing is a service and not 
a good, as some authors have argued in academic literature.326 The use of a toolkit 
for the collection of the DNA sample does not justify the qualification of commercial 
genome sequencing as a medical device for in-vitro diagnostics. Products for general 
laboratory use also fall outside the scope of the IVD-Directive.327 Even when the toolkit 
is not regarded as a product for general laboratory use, the free movement regime 
for goods does not apply to commercial genome sequencing. To distinguish services 
and goods from each other the ECJ uses ‘the centre of gravity’ test. This means that 
the ECJ shall appraise a national restrictive measure in relation to one freedom. The 
ECJ adjudicates the measure in relation to two freedoms only if it appears from the 
circumstances of the situation that one of the freedoms is not entirely secondary to 
the other one.328 The toolkit and the collection tube, the goods, are not essential for 
323 IGZ 2008, p. 14.
324 Art. 7 lid 1 WBO.
325 Art. 10 WBO; IGZ 2008, p. 17-20. 
326 Borry 2008, p. 736-737; GR 2008, p. 31-32 & 94-95.
327 Art. 2(b) Directive 98/79/EC, OJ 1998, L 331 (IVD-Directive).
328 C-20/03, Burmanjer et al. [2005] ECR I-4133, para. 35; C-390/99, Canal Satélite/Administración General del 
Estado [2002] ECR I-607, para. 31-33; C-275/92, Her Majesty’s Customs & Excise/Gerhart Schindler & Jörg 




carrying out commercial genome sequencing. The main focal point in the sequencing 
of the genome is the laboratory analysis and informing the consumer appropriately. 
The distribution of power between the EU and the Member States in the area of 
public health does not hamper the qualification of medical and care activities as 
services (Article 57 TFEU). This means that the fundamental freedoms regarding the 
free movement of services (Article 56 TFEU), the freedom of establishment (Article 
49 TFEU) and the public health exception (Article 52 TFEU) apply.329 It is not relevant 
whether the service has a private or public nature, nor whether it occurs in a hospital 
or elsewhere.330
6.4.2. Restrictive measures
It is settled case law case law of the ECJ that Member States choose their own health 
security level.331 That does not alter the fact that the free movement regime restricts 
the freedom of Member States to regulate health services in the case of cross-border 
activities.332 This applies to screening which falls under the scope of the WBO. The 
permit system of the WBO applies to the provision (the offer and the performing) of 
population screening in the Netherlands that is mostly permitted in other countries, 
or at least not prohibited. The licence system affects the access to providers located 
outside the Netherlands. The application for a licence, as will be argued later, bring 
with it uncertainties and possible adverse effects for non-Dutch licence applicants. 
The Dutch State de facto tolerates the performing of genome sequencing, which is 
not allowed in the Netherlands, which may be an example of reverse discrimination.333 
Although EU law does not prohibit this, it does not alter the fact that the rules of free 
movement are at stake.
In the meantime there is a ‘crystallised jurisprudence line’ of the ECJ regarding the 
regulation and reimbursement of cross-border medical services.334 The cases Hartlauer, 
Apothekerskammer des Saarlandes and Commission/Italy confirm this case law 
regarding the freedom of establishment of healthcare providers.335 
The prohibition, the licensing or the setting up of a quality assurance standard for 
commercial genome sequencing must be defined as a restriction. Restrictive measures 
discourage and derogate the free movement of services and the free movement of 
329 Van der Steen 2001; C-157/99, Geraets-Smits [2001] ECR I-5473, para. 54-58; C-385/99, Müller-Fauré & 
Van Riet [2003] ECR I-4509, para. 39; Stergiou 2006; Van Eijken, 2008, p. 3-4.
330 Stergiou 2007, p. 238-245, para. 22; C-372/04, Watts [2006] ECR I-4325, para. 86.
331 Stergiou 2006.
332 C-212/06, Government of the French Community & Walloon Government/Flemish Government [2008] ECR 
I-1683.
333 C-98/86, Mathot [1987] ECR I-809.
334 See also Directive 2011/24/EU on the application of patients’ rights in cross-border healthcare.
335 Maasdam & Sluijs 2009; C-171/07 & C-172/07, Apothekerkammer des Saarlandes et al. [2009] ECR I-4171; 




establishment.336 The same is true of setting requirements for advertising commercial 
genome analyses,337 because forbidding advertising has an impact on the purchasing 
of this service.338 
6.4.3. The protection of (public) health
Imperative requirements of general interest can objectively justify the restriction of 
the free movement of services and establishment.339 The public health exception, 
recognised in Article 52 TFEU and the case law of the ECJ, is aimed at guaranteeing 
accessible healthcare, realising a high level of health protection and for securing the 
financial balance to prevent serious damage to the social security system.340 The ECJ 
recently confirmed its earlier decision regarding the justified restriction of services that 
have been placed legally on the internal market in the country of establishment.341 
In the absence of EU legislation, the Member States are allowed to take restrictive 
measures, in accordance with their own fundamental norms and values, in situations 
in which considerable moral, religious and cultural differences exist between Member 
States.342 
The licence obligation of the WBO for offering and performing commercial genome 
sequencing aims to protect individuals against physical or mental health damage.343 
The presence of a real risk of health damage in the use of not-valid commercial genome 
sequencing does not have to be fully proven (precautionary principle).344 We can 
assume that a licensing system for commercial genome sequencing protects health and 
maintains a financial balance. Establishing quality requirements protects individuals 
from harm and unnecessary costs due to overtreatment and unnecessary follow-up 
tests as a result of false positive test results.
336 C-171/07 & C-172/07, Apothekerkammer des Saalandes et al. [2009] ECR I-4171, para.22-23; C-531/06, 
Commission/Italy [2009] ECR I-4103, para. 43-44; Case C-169/07, Hartlauer Handelsgesellschaft mbH/ 
Wiener Landesregierung, Oberösterreichische Landesregierung [2009] ECR I-1721, para. 33-36.
337 C-500/06, Corporación Dermoestética/ To Me Group Advertising Media [2008] ECR I-5785, para. 35-36.
338 C-500/06, Corporación Dermoestética/ To Me Group Advertising Media [2008] ECR I-5785, para. 32-33.
339 C-171/07 & C-172/07, Apothekerkammer des Saarlandes et al. [2009] ECR I-4171, para. 25; C-531/06, 
Commission/Italy [2009] ECR I-4103, para. 49; C-169/07, Hartlauer Handelsgesellschaft mbH/Wiener 
Landesregierung, Oberösterreichische Landesregierung [2009] ECR I-1721, para. 39-47; Maasdam & Sluijs 
2009.
340 -169/07, Hartlauer Handelsgesellschaft mbH/Wiener Landesregierung, Oberösterreichische Landes-
regierung [2009] ECR I-1721, para. 46-49; C-444/05, Aikaterini Stamatelaki/NPDD Organismos Asfaliseos 
Eleftheron Epagelmation [2007] ECR I-3185, para. 31; C-372/04, Watts [2006] ECR I-4325, para. 108-109; 
C-385/99, Müller-Fauré & Van Riet [2003] ECR I-4509, para. 80; C-157/99, Smits & Peerbooms [2001] ECR 
I-5473, para. 76-80.
341 C-42/07, Liga Portuguesa de Futebol Profissional & Bwin International [2009] ECR I-7633.
342 C-447/08 & C-448/08, Otto Sjöberg & Anders Gerdin [2010] ECR I-6921; C-258/08, Ladbrokes Betting & 
Gaming Ltd & Ladbrokes International Ltd/Stichting de Nationale Sporttotalisator [2010] ECR I-4757.
343 Van der Maas et al. 2000, p. 7. 
344 C-171/07 & C-172/07, Apothekerkammer des Saarlandes et al.[ 2009] ECR I-4171, para. 30; C-531/06, 




6.4.4. Non-discrimination and proportionality
According to the WBO, a licence is necessary for performing commercial genome 
sequencing. The licences requirement also applies to companies established outside 
the Netherlands that offer their services in the Netherlands. This permit system of the 
WBO is not a justifiable barrier to the free movement of services and establishment. On 
the one hand, the licence obligation does not pursue its public health goal coherently 
and systematically, whilst on the other the permit system does not meet the conditions 
of foreseeable and accessible criteria to prevent discretionary action from national 
authorities. 
It is settled case law of the ECJ that a restrictive measure, which is necessary for the 
protection of public health, should meet the requirements of non-discrimination 
and proportionality.345 The licence obligation for commercial genome sequencing 
(ostensibly) meets the first condition, as the same regime applies to both Dutch 
companies and businesses from other Member States. To meet the second criterion, 
i.e., proportionality, the restriction of commercial genome sequencing should not go 
beyond that which is objectively necessary for attaining the objective of the restriction. 
The WBO licence requirements for offering and the performing of commercial genome 
sequencing meets this condition.346 The licensing system seeks to ban non-valid 
tests from the Dutch market to prevent health dangers and unnecessary costs. Less 
restrictive measures, such as a quality assurance standard, discourage the consumer 
from using (certain) commercial genome sequencing, but not-valid genome analyses 
are still available on the Dutch market. 
Moreover, national legislation is appropriate for realising objectives pursued if it 
pursues its goal in a consistently and systematically way.347 A permit system, in which 
the provision of commercial genome sequencing without a licence is tolerated if 
this service is performed outside the Netherlands, is difficult to regard as consistent 
and systematic. The performance of commercial genome sequencing outside the 
Netherlands is no less harmful than such a procedure executed in the Netherlands. 
Enforcement of the permit system of the WBO, as mentioned earlier, is difficult, due 
to the fact that offering and performing of certain categories of population screening 
is unlawful, but only performing commercial genome sequencing without a licence is 
345 C-169/07, Hartlauer Handelsgesellschaft mbH/Wiener Landesregierung, Oberösterreichische Landes-
regierung [2009] ECR I-1721, para. 44; C-444/05, Aikaterini Stamatelaki/NPDD Organismos Asfaliseos 
Eleftheron Epagelmation [2007] ECR I-3185, para. 34; C-385/99, Müller-Fauré & Van Riet [2003] ECR 
I-4509, para. 68.
346 C-171/07 & C-172/07, Apothekerkammer des Saarlandes et al. [2009] ECR I-4171, para. 57; C-531/06, 
Commission/Italy [2009] ECR I-4103, para. 82; Aikaterini Stamatelaki/NPDD Organismos Asfaliseos 
Eleftheron Epagelmation [2007] ECR I-3185, para. 35; C-385/99, Müller-Fauré & Van Riet, [2003] ECR 
I-4509, para. 68.
347 C-171/07 & C-172/07, Apothekerkammer des Saarlandes et al. [2009] ECR I- 4171, para. 41-42; C-531/06, 
Commission/Italy [2009] ECR I-4103, para. 66; C-169/07, Hartlauer Handelsgesellschaft mbH/Wiener 




punishable.348 A licence obligation for offering and performing of population screening 
in which only the performing is made punishable does not meet the requirement of 
being consistent and systematic. 
Systems of prior administrative authorisation may not be used to justify discretionary 
action by national authorities, absolutely not if the discretionary power – intended 
or unintended – is detrimental to providers establish in other Member States that 
want to provide their service in the Netherlands. A system of prior administrative 
authorisation must be based on objective criteria that do not discriminate and are 
known in advance.349 This limits the discretionary powers of national authorities thus 
avoiding arbitrariness and discrimination. Furthermore, such a system must be based 
on a procedural system, which is easily accessible to guarantee that the request for 
authorisation is assessed objectively and impartially and within a reasonable time.350 
The Dutch licensing system for the offering and the carrying out of commercial genome 
sequencing contains no objective advance announcement criteria. Since the WBO 
came into force, confusion surrounds its scope and thus the criteria for obtaining a 
licence. Due to this the Minister of Health, Welfare and Sports and the Dutch Health 
Council have a great deal of discretionary power in assessing licence applications. The 
Dutch Health Council advises the Minister with regard to the granting of licences under 
the WBO. During the execution of this advisory role the Dutch Health Council not only 
compares the licence applications with the legal criteria, but also the Dutch Health 
Council interprets the Act. In the past years the Dutch Health Council, at the request of 
the Minister, published seven advisory reports seeking to clarify the realm of the Act. 
These advisory reports are often drawn up during a pending licence application and as 
a result of confusion about the scope of the WBO.351 Within this framework, the Dutch 
Health Council redefined concepts such as ‘untreatable’ and ‘offer’.352 At the Health 
Care Inspectorate and the various providers of screenings there is still a lack of clarity 
regarding the scope of the WBO.353 The great discretionary power of the Minister in the 
granting of a licence under the WBO invites improper use in sensitive ethical issues. The 
Dutch Health Council stated in its advisory report, Between hope and hype, that the 
introduction of prenatal screening for all pregnant woman had resulted in unnecessary 
delays.354 The lack of clarity can moreover be detrimental to providers located outside 
the Netherlands that want to explore the Dutch market.
348 Art. 1 WBO & Art. 3 lid 1 in conjunction with Art. 13 WBO & IGZ 2008, p. 17-20.
349 C-169/07, Hartlauer Handelsgesellschaft mbH/Wiener Landesregierung, Oberösterreichische Landes-
regierung, [2009] ECR I-1721, para. 64.
350 C-169/07, Hartlauer Handelsgesellschaft mbH/Wiener Landesregierung, Oberösterreichische Landes-
regierung, [2009] ECR I-1721, para. 64; C-385/99, Müller-Fauré & Van Riet [2003] ECR I-4509, para. 84-85; 
C-157/99, Smits & Peerbooms, [2001] ECR I-5473, para. 90.
351 See letter regarding Gezondheidsraad, Wet bevolkingsonderzoek: de reikwijdte (7), de begrippen ‘aanbod’ 
en ‘medische indicatie’ (advies 2007/02WBO), not numbered pages; overview advices GR regarding the 
scope of the WBO till 2000 see Van der Maas et al. 2000, p. 27-33.
352 GR 2006b; GR 2007b.
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In conclusion, it can be noted that restrictive measures of cross-border commercial 
genome sequencing can be justified by the public health exception (Article. 52 TFEU). 
An objectively justified barrier to the free movement of services and establishment 
must meet the requirements of non-discrimination and proportionality. The permit 
system of the WBO, which also applies to commercial genome sequencing, is at odds 
with the free movement regime, as it does not satisfy the proportionality requirement. 
The E-Commerce Directive 355 applies to the online supply of commercial genome 
sequencing. The significance of this Directive for the regulation of commercial genome 
sequencing is discussed below.
6.4.5. The E-Commerce Directive
Advertisements in the media (offline advertising) could give rise to consumers 
purchasing commercial genome sequencing online. These online services and the 
related online contract fall within the scope of the E-Commerce Directive and the 
Distance Selling Directive.356 These Directives have been implemented357 in the Dutch 
Civil Code,358 the Dutch Code of Civil Procedure,359 the Dutch Criminal Code360 and the 
Economic Offences Act.361 The Distance Selling Directive seeks to harmonise some 
rights and duties for providers and consumers regarding distance-selling contracts to 
protect the consumer. The most important stipulation is the information requirements 
of the provider about his identity and the right for consumers to cancel the contract.
The E-Commerce Directive aims to remove a number of legal barriers that restrict the 
free movement of services and the right of establishment of the information society.362 
The online access to and supply of commercial genome sequencing is an information 
society service where in principle the E-Commerce Directive applies. Information 
society services are services that are normally provided for remuneration, at a 
distance, by electronic means and at the individual request of a recipient of services.363 
In the case of offline advertising that invites consumers to order a commercial genome 
sequencing online, although the offline advertisement does not fall within the scope of 
this Directive, the order options and the (commercial) communication concerning the 
product on the website do. 
Member States can restrict the online access to and supply of commercial genome 
sequencing from other Member States in order to protect the public health of its own 
355 OJ 2000, L 178/16.
356 OJ 1997, L 144/19.
357 Stb. 2004, 210 & Stb. 2000, 617.
358 Burgerlijk Wetboek
359 Wetboek van Burgerlijke rechtsvordering.
360 Wetboek van Strafrecht
361 Wet economische delicten.
362 Preamble and Art. 1 Directive 2000/31/EC.




citizens. These restrictive measures must be in proportion to their objectives.364 It is 
expected that when the occasion arises the ECJ would use the same judicial review 
standards for the exception in the E-Commerce Directive, as have been used regarding 
the public health exception (Article 52 TFEU) discussed in the previous section.365 
Restrictive measures of the free movement of services of the information society must 
be reported in advance to the European Commission.
‘The country-of-origin’ principle applies for establishment.366 The place of establishment 
is the place where the company has the centre of its activities. Member States are not 
allowed to make the taking up and pursuit of the activity of an information society 
service, subject to prior authorisation or any other requirement having equivalent 
effect.367 The E-Commerce Directive does not forbid licensing systems that are not 
specifically and exclusively targeted at information society services.368 This means 
that with respect to the online supply of commercial genome sequencing, the Dutch 
legislature may make offering and performing of this service dependent upon the 
acquisition of a licence. The licensing system of the WBO is not just applicable to the 
online access to commercial genome sequencing, but also to the offline offering and 
performing of this service.
It can be concluded that the E- Commerce Directive allows restrictive measures in regard 
to commercial genome sequencing for the protection of health unless these restrictions 
are not proportional to the pursued goal. The Directive leaves the licensing system 
of the WBO unimpeded because this permit system is not specifically and exclusively 
targeted at the online access to and supply of commercial genome sequencing.
6.5. DUTCH REGULATION NOT EU-PROOF
With the WBO and other legislation the Dutch State aims to protect its citizens 
against health hazards, for example against threats from unwarranted screenings. 
Nevertheless, it is relatively easy - and legislation does not preclude this - to order 
commercial genome sequencing over the internet. The example of VARA-presenter 
Bentveld is illustrative of this. Has the Dutch State, given the EU rules of the free 
movements, sufficient regulatory freedom to prevent people such as Bentveld from 
decoding their genome? 
364 Art. 3 Directive 2000/31/EC.
365 C-169/07, Hartlauer Handelsgesellschaft mbH/Wiener Landesregierung, Oberösterreichische Landes-
regierung [2009] ECR I-1721; C-444/05, Aikaterini Stamatelaki/NPDD Organismos Asfaliseos Eleftheron 
Epagelmation [2007] ECR I-3185; C-385/99, Müller-Fauré & Van Riet [2003] ECR I-4509.
366 Preambule Directive 200/31/EC, para. 19.
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Member States have a degree of discretion in the regulation of health services such as 
commercial genome sequencing. The EU treaty provisions according the free movements 
of services and establishment and the treaties public health exception, apply to cross-
border offline advertising and the performing of commercial genome sequencing. The 
fundamental freedoms of service and establish will be frustrated through measures, like 
a ban, a permit system or a quality mark for services. These restrictive measures can be 
justified for public health reasons if they meet the requirements of non-discrimination 
and proportionality. The way in which the Netherlands regulates commercial genome 
sequencing is at odds with EU law. The licence system of the WBO regarding offline 
access to and supply of commercial genome sequencing conflicts with the EU free 
movement regime for establishment because it is not proportional to the pursued goal 
due to the enforcement and scope problems of this Act.369 This can cause problems in 
situations in which a company from another Member States establishes itself in the 
Netherlands and wants to offer and perform commercial genome sequencing in our 
country.
The E-Commerce Directive is applicable to the online access to and supply of commercial 
genome sequencing. The Dutch permit system of the WBO for the provision of 
commercial genome sequencing is also applicable to companies from other Member 
States that provide their services in the Netherlands. The E-Commerce permits barriers 
for services from the information society for the protection of public health. Offering 
commercial genome sequencing without a licence is tolerated in practice, but that 
does not alter the fact that the Dutch licensing system conflicts with the E-Commerce 
Directive because it does not meet the proportionality requirement.
In accordance with the case law of the ECJ regarding the freedom of establishment 
and the E-Commerce Directive, a revision of the WBO is necessary. A revision of the 
WBO should focus on clarifying the definition of population screening and the licence 
criteria, so that the licence criteria are clear and known in advance. The powers of 
the Minister of Health, Welfare and Sports and the Dutch Health Council in regard to 
the granting the licence must be clearly defined. Besides, it is undesirable that during 
a decision on a licence application the scope of licence criteria ‘is once again being 
explored’. This gives the impression of arbitrariness. It is still somewhat convoluted to 
qualify individual commercial genome sequencing as population screening in which, on 
his own initiative, the consumer visits the website of the provider.
369 GR 2006b; GR 2007c; IGZ 2008, p. 14.
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REGULATING THE USE OF GENETIC TESTS: IS DUTCH LAW 
AN EXAMPLE FOR OTHER COUNTRIES WITH REGARD TO 
DTC GENETIC TESTING?
Abstract: Several European countries are considering the regulation of Direct-To-
Consumer genetic tests via internet in order to protect the public. This chapter addresses 
the question whether the Dutch Act on population screening, an internationally widely 
praised piece of legislation, could serve as an example for other European countries. 
While the Act adequately protects individuals against (potential) harmful screenings 
programmes, it falls short when it comes to offering protection against genetic tests 
offered to the public through the internet by commercial firms. It is therefore argued 
that the Act should be amended, also to secure consistency with European legal 
standards.
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Scientific knowledge of genetics is expanding rapidly, which generates many 
possibilities for predicting and improving human health and life.370 Individuals have high 
expectations about the potential benefits of genetics and are also increasingly eager to 
learn more about their genetic profile and future health. Commercial companies seek 
to appease the hunger for genetic information by offering Direct-To-Consumer (DTC) 
genetic tests, also via internet. These tests are carried out without the involvement 
of a healthcare provider, fail to provide adequate information and are not foreseen in 
genetic counselling services.371
After undergoing a DTC genetic test individuals will receive information about the 
presence of genetic risks and hereditary diseases. The validity of these tests is, however, 
questionable. The use of DTC genetic tests may thus easily cause unjustified anxiety 
and spur individuals to undergo unnecessary follow-up tests and medical treatment, 
at considerable personal and societal expense. Despite these shortcomings, it can 
be argued from a legal point of view that unrestricted access to DTC genetic tests 
strengthens the personal autonomy of individuals. It empowers them to take 
independent responsibility for their health and future,372 and it leaves them the 
decision of whether they want adequate information and genetic counselling. At the 
same time, States have the obligation to protect individuals against (potential) health 
risks, including exposure to misleading information upon the basis of which individuals 
may make decisions they would otherwise have rejected. This positive obligation is well 
entrenched in international human rights law.373 
Several European States are at present considering the introduction of legislation to 
regulate the supply of and access to DTC genetic tests.374 The Netherlands is one of the 
few countries that already have such legislation in place, in an effort to save the general 
public from harm resulting from preventive screening tools. The internationally widely 
praised Wet op het bevolkingsonderzoek (Act on population screening) seeks to offer 
protection against harmful screening programmes by way of a permit system. 
The Netherlands is a Member State of the Council of Europe and the European Union. 
These organisations influence, in their own specific way, the freedom of Member States 
to regulate the supply of and access to DTC genetic tests. National measures seeking 
to protect the public against harm from these tests have to abide by the standards 
adopted by these organisations.
370 Calsbeek et al. 2007, p. 493. 
371 Hogarth et al. 2008, p. 162-165; McBride et al. 2010, p. 429-432; GAO 2010. 
372 McGregor 2008, p. 9-10. 
373 See for instance Art. 25 of the UN Universal Declaration on Human Rights (1966) & Art. 14 of the UNESCO 
Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights (2005).
374 Brower 2010, p. 1611; the UK Human Genetic Commission 2010.
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This paper seeks to examine whether the Wet op het bevolkingsonderzoek can serve 
as an example for other European countries. It aims to assess the effectiveness of this 
Act as well as its compliance with European standards. We start by describing the 
normative questions surrounding the access tot and supply of DTC genetic testing 
by internet in section 7.2 en 7.3. Then, we unravel the international, but particularly 
European, patchwork of (legal) standards concerning the access to and supply of DTC 
genetic tests through Internet in section 7.4. Section 7.5. provides an overview of 
Dutch legal standards and problems that emerge in practice when seeking to regulate 
the supply of screening programmes, including DTC genetic tests. Lastly, in section 7.6. 
we formulate an answer to the above questions, followed by conclusions. 
7.2. DTC GENETIC TESTING
Genetic screening can be defined as any kind of test being offered to a person or 
group of individuals with the aim of detecting or ruling out a hereditary disease, a 
predisposition to such a disease or to determine whether a person carries a genetic 
variant that may produce a hereditary disease in their offspring.375 Individuals can buy a 
test kit for screening their DNA on the internet without the involvement of a physician 
or genetic counselling. After visiting the online shop and ordering a genetic test, the 
individual will receive a test kit from the company. This kit commonly includes a tube 
for taking a DNA sample, such as saliva or a hair, to be returned to the company. Upon 
receiving the DNA sample, the company’s laboratory starts the analytic process. A few 
weeks later the individual can download the test results using a simple code.
In this respect it is important to make a distinction between presymptomatic diagnosis 
and susceptibility genetic tests. Presymptomatic diagnostic genetic tests are mostly 
aimed at discovering a monogenetic disease, that is to say a gene mutation which, by 
definition, will almost inevitably lead to the development of disease at some point in 
later in life.376 By contrast, testing for multiple genetic variants is generally associated 
with low risks of developing common health conditions and traits. A ‘positive’ test 
result – meaning that an affected gene has been detected – generally implies a(n 
enhanced) statistical risk but not a certainty of developing the disease later in life.377 
The results of the latter susceptibility tests do not necessarily accurately establish the 
risk of developing a disorder, because in most cases not all risk factors are included 
and additional relevant factors, such as family history and lifestyle, are not taken into 
account by the test. Furthermore, there are carrier tests that have been developed 
to determine whether a healthy person or couple carries a relevant mutation for an 
375 Godard et al. 2003, p. 49-50.
376 Borry 2009, p. 1-2. 




autosomal recessive disorder.378 The majority of DTC genetic tests concern susceptibility 
tests, sometimes in combination with presymptomatic diagnosis tests or carrier tests.
Against this background it is not a surprise that the interpretation of test results can 
be challenging for a person, particularly for those with limited knowledge of genetics 
and medical statistics. It is well known from various studies on genetic counselling 
that complex information on risk factors is particularly difficult to handle for a layman, 
regardless of their background or education.379
7.3. NORMATIVE QUESTIONS SURROUNDING ACCESS TO DTC GENETIC 
TESTING
DTC genetic tests have the potential to empower individuals to take more responsibility 
for their health and life by providing risk assessment information.380 However, 
individuals often overestimate the benefits of DTC genetic tests now that these tests 
are generally offered without adequate information. It is well known that individuals 
may take important health decisions concerning prevention or prophylactic treatment 
based on incomplete or misunderstood information about their expected health.381 
The validity and clinical utility of these tests are questionable and can even have 
detrimental effects for the individual concerned as well as others due to needless and 
invasive follow-up tests or unnecessary medical treatment.382 Under human rights 
law, States are bound to protect individuals against such serious risks. Unrestricted 
access to DTC genetic tests can also interfere with other fundamental human rights 
and interests of others. Individual genetic health information can, for example, reveal 
information about family members and could have implications for their health, thus 
directly impacting on their rights and interests. If follow-up tests and unnecessary 
medical treatment happen on a large scale, unrestricted access to DTC genetic tests 
may also indirectly threaten the accessibility of the health care system.
States are then torn between Scylla and Charybdis383 when confronted with the 
shortcomings of DTC genetic tests. Should they allow individuals to freely make use of 
tests of questionable quality for the sake of respecting autonomous decision making, or 
should health concerns prevail, thus restricting the commercial activities of companies 
and inhibiting individual use of their products?
378 McBride, Wade & Kaphingst 2010, p. 430.
379 Van Dijk et al. 2004, p. 47-48. 
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DTC genetic testing offered by internet companies is a cross border activity affecting 
millions of people across the European region. In order to uphold the same standards 
with respect to autonomy and protection it is important that convergence is sought 
between the law and policies on screening in different jurisdictions.384 The main regional 
organisations in Europe, being the Council of Europe (Council) and the European Union 
(EU), have developed standards regulating the supply of and access to genetic tests 
for health purposes. These instruments also, and sometimes specifically, apply to DTC 
genetic tests. In this section we describe and examine the most important standards 
adopted within the context of the Council and the EU, relevant for the use of DTC 
genetic tests.
7.4.1. European Convention on Human Rights 
The Council of Europe’s most important legal instrument, the European Convention 
for the Protection on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR),385 is of crucial 
importance when it comes to regulating the use of DTC genetic tests, even though 
the Convention does not contain a reference to the right to health or a right to health 
care. From the European Court of Human Rights’ (ECtHR) case law it can, however, be 
seen that compliance with ECHR established rights also requires contracting States to 
the ECHR (henceforth: States Parties) to take adequate measures in the area of health 
promotion and the prevention of health risks. These duties to protect and ensure 
the enjoyment of Convention rights are known as positive obligations, as opposed to 
negative obligations that are imposed on States Parties not to interfere with human 
behaviour and inter-human relations.
The ECtHR’s doctrine of positive obligations is essential for health law, notably now 
that these obligations do not confine themselves to the vertical relations, but extend 
to horizontal ones. In other words, by imposing positive obligations regulating human 
conduct with respect to other private parties, the ECtHR acknowledges that States 
Parties should also uphold respect for human rights in the relations between private 
parties. By way of example, it can be recalled that the ECtHR has held that States Parties 
are obliged to formulate adequate legislation to protect the integrity of individuals 
against violations by others.386 
According to the ECtHR’s standing case law, States Parties are bound by the positive 
obligation to protect their citizens against (potential) health risks.387 The State has 
384 Gevers 2009, p. 6.
385 All Council of Europe treaties, incl. those referred to in this paragraph, can be found on http://conventions.
coe.int/ > treaties > full lisv.
386 ECtHR 26 March 1985, X & Y/ Netherlands, no. 8978/80.




equally emphasised the importance of adequate information, including informing the 
patient about health risks, as a precondition for informed consent.388 In a number of 
cases the ECtHR concluded that the failure to provide adequate information prior to a 
health intervention results in a violation of an individual’s physical integrity, which is 
protected by Article 8 of the ECHR.389
It can be argued that free access to DTC genetic tests strengthens the individuals’ 
autonomy, as protected by the right to private and family life.390 Autonomy, particularly 
relevant in the field of health care,391 also means that States have to respect the choices 
of harmful activities from mentally competent individuals.392 However, autonomous 
decisions have to be compatible with human dignity, the principle underlying all human 
rights. This explains why the ECtHR has held that an individual cannot legally consent 
to practices deemed to be at odds with human dignity, such as being tossed around to 
entertain others and gain oneself an income (dwarf tossing) or to engage in extremely 
violent sexual practices.393 
It can be maintained that the requirement to obtain the individual’s informed consent 
prior to a health intervention also entails obligations for companies offering DTC 
genetic tests – or at least a duty for States to ensure that these companies abide 
by the informed consent requirement.394 From the case law of the ECtHR it follows 
that an individual can only agree with an interference with his/her private life in the 
field of health care after he/she has voluntarily and unambiguously consented to this 
on the basis of prior and adequate information. It can be debated whether there is 
lawful consent when companies offering DTC genetic tests fail to provide adequate 
information on such issues as the scientific validity of these tests, their limitations and 
the benefits as well as the risks. 
In conclusion, the obligation to provide adequate information about the health 
benefits and risks prior to obtaining the consent of an individual is a well-established 
requirement recognised under the ECHR. States should ensure that this requirement 
is also upheld in the so-called horizontal relations. From a human rights perspective 
there are therefore good reasons for States to regulate the supply of and access to DTC 
genetic tests because of the (potential) health risks to individuals and the deficiencies 
with respect to adequate information and valid consent.
388 ECtHR 5 October 2006, Trocellier/ France (Dec.), no. 75725/01; ECtHR 2 June 2009, Codarcea/ Romania, 
no. 31675/04.
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390 ECtHR 7 February 2002, Mikulic/ Croatia, no. 53176/99; ECtHR 29 April 2002, Pretty/ the UK, no. 2346/02; 
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391 ECtHR 14 December 2010, Ternovszky/ Hungary, no. 67545/09.
392 ECtHR 20 January 2011, Haas/ Switzerland, no. 31332/07.
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Particularly relevant with respect to the use of DTC genetic tests is the Council’s 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with 
regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine (Biomedicine Convention). The 
Convention itself consists of principles, rights, and standards applying to specific fields 
of biology and medicine. Yet only a certain number of principles, rights and standards 
have been clarified by the drafters. Other issues, including those on which it is difficult 
to achieve consensus, have been or will be dealt with in Additional Protocols.
The Protocol concerning Genetic Testing for Health Purposes (the Protocol) deserves 
special attention. The Protocol, to be read in conjunction with the Biomedicine 
Convention itself, came into force on 1 December 2009. The Protocol seeks to protect 
the human dignity and the fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals with regard 
to genetic testing for health purposes. The Protocol applies to all genetic tests whether 
they are provided publicly or privately. It also covers genetic tests that are carried out 
for health purposes, such as DTC genetic presymptomatic diagnostic, predictive and 
carrier tests. Genetic tests carried out on the human embryo or foetus and for research 
purposes are, however, excluded from its scope.395 The Protocol requires States Parties 
to take the necessary measures to ensure that genetic tests meet generally accepted 
criteria of scientific validity and clinical validity. Clinical utility of genetic tests must, 
according to the Protocol, be an essential criterion for deciding to offer genetic tests 
to the public.396
The Protocol furthermore stipulates that when a genetic test is considered, the persons 
concerned shall be provided with prior appropriate information, notably about the 
purpose and the nature of the test, as well the implications of its results.397 Appropriate 
genetic counselling should also be provided.398
States that have ratified this instrument need to uphold these standards,399 which are 
considered to reflect European minimum standards. States are explicitly also allowed to 
grant potential test subjects a higher level of protection.400 It follows that the supply of 
and access to DTC genetic tests in European States, at least in those countries that have 
ratified the Protocol, should be in conformity with these standards. Failure to guarantee 
these standards equals a violation of human rights for which States eventually can be 
held accountable. 
7.4.3. The Internal Market Rules of the European Union
Despite the considerable powers of the EU in various areas of social life, the main 
responsibility for health policy and provision for health care rests with the Member 
395 Art. 2 Protocol, http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/html/203.htm (27/11/2008). 
396 Art. 6 Protocol.
397 Art. 8(1) Protocol.
398 Art. 8(2) Protocol.
399 By December 2010 5 States had ratified the Protocol. 




States.401 It is settled case law of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) that EU law does 
not detract from the freedom of Member States to choose their own health security 
level.402 Nevertheless, notably in the case of cross border activities, EU law indirectly 
regulates access to DTC genetic tests. States have the obligation to comply with the 
rules of European Free Market that prohibit – amongst others – measures that impair 
free-market competitions. Thus Member States are in principle required to respect the 
free movement of goods, services and establishment when exercising their power in 
the field of health.
As for EU law, it is important how to qualify DTC genetic tests. It is settled case law 
that the ECJ403 will examine in principle a national measure in relation to one freedom 
if a restriction relates to several fundamental freedoms. It shall appraise a national 
measure in relation to two fundamental freedoms if it appears that one of them is not 
entirely secondary to the other one.404 
In our opinion a DTC genetic test is not a good but rather a service because the test 
kit with the tube (good) is entirely secondary to the analytic process in the laboratory 
(service). In connection with this discussion, some authors argue that DTC genetic tests 
fall within the scope of Directive 98/79/EC on in vitro diagnostic medical devices. This 
Directive ensures a quality review before ‘high risk’ self-tests (for instance self-tests for 
HIV) are marketed.405 In our opinion DTC genetic tests are not covered by this Directive. 
In the first place this Directive does not apply to services. In the second place products 
of general laboratory use are not in vitro diagnostic.406 The tube for taking a DNA sample 
has no particular diagnostic value and is not produced with special characteristics for 
testing. 
In the absence of harmonisation of DTC genetic tests EU Member States are under 
certain circumstances allowed to take measures, which restrict the free movement of 
services and establishment to protect their citizens against (potential) health risks.407 
These measures have to be objectively necessary for the purpose, and the result could 
not be achieved through less restrictive rules. In addition, these measures should not 
discriminate services or the establishment on grounds of nationality.408 Furthermore 
401 Art. 152 TFEU; European Commission, Together for Health: A Strategic Approach for the EU 2008-2013, 
COM (2007) 630 final.
402 Case C-372/04, Watts/ United Kingdom [2006] ECR I-4325.
403 The Court of Justice of the European Union has the power to interpret the EU treaties, to measure the 
interpretation of these treaties by EU bodies and institutions, and to judge a limited number of conflicts 
within the realm of the EU law.
404 Case C-20/03, Burmanjer et al. [2005] ECR I-4133; Case C-390/99, Canal Satélite / Administración General 
del Estado [2002] ECR I-607;Case C-275/92, Her Majesty’s Customs & Excise/ Gerhart Schindler en Jörg 
Schindler [1994] ECR I-1039.
405 Borry 2008, p. 736-737.
406 Art. 1(2b) Directive 98/79/EC.
407 Case C-108/09, Ker Optika [2010] ECR I-12113.
408 Case C-169/07, Hartlauer Handelsgesellschaft mbH/ Wiener Landesregierung, Oberösterreichische Landes- 
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when measures derogate the free movement of services or establishment they must 
pursue its goal in a consistent and systematic way.409 Prior administrative authorisation, 
like permit systems, must be based on objective announce criteria that are stated well 
in advance.410 
Reference should also be made to Directive 2000/31/EC on certain legal aspects of 
information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market 
(E- Commerce Directive). This Directive covers the online services by which DTC genetic 
tests are offered on internet. In principle this Directive allows a permit system, which 
is meant to be exclusively for information society services. Information society services 
are services that are normally provided for remuneration, at a distance, by electronic 
means and at the individual request of a recipient of services.411 Member States may 
take measures to derogate the freedom to provide information society services to 
protect health under the same conditions as we have described above. 
7.4.4. Recommendations and White Paper
In 2004 the European Commission published 25 recommendations on the ethical, 
legal and social implications of genetic testing.412 A multidisciplinary expert group 
was invited by the Commission to discuss the implications of genetic testing. The 25 
recommendations are the results of the expert groups work. They seek to be a starting 
point for the EU and Member States to consider an action plan for genetic testing and 
the recommendations can be used for implementation by policy-makers. 
According to the report underlying these recommendations, genetic testing should only 
be carried out in specialised laboratories under the supervision of a trained geneticist. 
The application of genetic testing for non-medical reasons requires careful consideration 
with regard to its potential consequences for society. The report also requires that 
genetic testing in Europe has to be based on high quality scientific knowledge. A system 
for the validation of tests should be established by the EU. In the context, of human 
healthcare genetic tests should be offered only when there is a sound medical reason 
for testing. Furthermore the report stipulates that medical relevant genetic testing has 
always be a free personal choice. Therefore comprehensive information about genetic 
test should be available. Informed consent, the right to know and not to know, and 
genetic counselling must be guaranteed and are essential requirements for genetic 
409 Case C-171/07 & C-172/07, Apothekerkammer des Saarlandes et al. [2009] ECR I-4171; Case C-531/106 
Commission/ Italy [2009] ECR I-4103.
410 Case C-169/07, Hartlauer Handelsgesellschaft mbH/ Wiener Landesregierung, Oberösterreichische Landes- 
regierung [2009] ECR I-1721; Case C-385/99, Müller-Fauré & Van Riet [2003] ECR I-4509.
411 Art. 1(2) Directive 98/34/EC M1 aying down a procedure for the provision of information in the field of 
technical standards and regulations and rules on Information Society services.
412 European Commission, 25 Recommendations on the ethical, legal and social implications of genetic testing, 
Brussels 2004, at: http://ec.europa.eu/research/conferences/2004/genetic/pdf/recommendations_





tests, in particular for highly predictive tests for serious disorders. The report demands 
test providers to ensure that the information they provide is accurate and in agreement 
with international quality standards according to the recommendations. 
The EU has presented its strategy toward health in a so called White Paper.413 This 
Paper sets out a framework to give direction to EU health policy until 2013. The EU 
has pinpointed out objectives key areas to develop more specific activities to promote 
health. Two of these key areas are protection of consumers against health threats and 
supporting new technologies and considering their implications. 
7.4.5. Preliminary conclusions
The ECHR, the Biomedicine Convention and the Protocol offer an authoritative 
framework for the regulation of the use of DTC genetic tests across Europe. Not all States 
Parties to the ECHR, including the Netherlands, have, however, ratified the Biomedicine 
Convention, let alone the Protocol. That does not mean that these standards have no 
meaning for these countries. It can be argued that the adopted norms reflect emerging 
European standards that cannot always be enforced throughout Europe yet. When 
regulating the use of DTC genetic tests, the obligations enshrined in the ECHR, the 
Biomedicine Convention and the Protocol therefore have to be taken into account.
The supply of and access to DTC genetic tests is in principle also regulated by the 
Internal Market Rules of the EU, even though there is discussion with respect to the 
precise qualification of a DTC genetic test. This body of legislation has to be respected 
by Member States considering the regulation of the use of DTC genetic testing. The 
EU has as yet not adopted a Directive setting specific normative criteria for access to 
DTC genetic tests. The EU Commissions recently adopted 25 recommendations on the 
ethical, legal and social implications of genetic testing that provide normative guidance 
as it relates to the supply of and access to DTC genetic tests.
In the absence of more elaborate standards with respect to the supply of and access 
to DTC genetic tests at the European level, States enjoy a considerable margin of 
appreciation to regulate the supply of and access to DTC genetic tests in the way they 
deem most appropriate to find a fair balance between personal autonomy and the 
need to protect individuals against the disadvantages of these tests.
7.5. DUTCH LEGAL STANDARDS
7.5.1. The Dutch Act on population screening
In the Netherlands companies and health professionals are in principle free to offer 
health testing kits to the public. Some forms of screening can, however, only be carried 
413 European Commission, Together for Health: A Strategic Approach for the EU 2008-2013, COM (2007) 630 
final.
Is the Dutch law an example?
115
7
out with a permit issued by the Minister of Health, Welfare and Sports. The criteria to 
be met by the applicant for these forms of ‘high risk screening’ are laid down in the Act, 
‘Wet op het bevolkingsonderzoek’ (the Act). This system was introduced to establish 
and guarantee a fair balance between the right of self-determination of individuals and 
the need to protect them against (potentially) harmful screenings techniques.414 
In the Act, population screening is defined as: ‘a medical examination which is carried 
out in response to an offer made to the entire population or to a section thereof and 
to detect diseases of a certain kind or certain risk indicators, either wholly or partly for 
the benefit of the persons to be examined’.415 Offering and practicing tests for detecting 
(risk indicators of) cancer and ‘incurable diseases’ without a licence is unlawful.416 
Moreover, performing these screening methods without permission is a punishable 
offence.417 
According to the Act, the Dutch Minister of Health, Welfare and Sports grants the 
licence for screening (risk indicators for) of cancer or (risk indicators for) untreatable 
diseases, provided that the screening is scientifically sound, in accordance with the 
professional medical practice standards and maintains proper balance between health 
risks and benefits.418 The Act does not set quality norms for the information to be 
provided to the (potential) test subjects, consent, the use of samples, and counselling 
to be provided. Nevertheless, health care workers and companies wishing to perform 
a population screening programme have to comply with the professional medical 
practice standards that entail the main rights of the patient as laid down in the Dutch 
Civil Code.
7.5.2. Interpretation and enforcement problems
The Act came into force in 1996. From the very beginning there was confusion about 
its scope, and thus uncertainty about the requirements of obtaining a license. Over the 
last fourteen years the Dutch Health Council, a scientific advisory body that has been 
allotted the task of advising the Minister on the provision of a license to applicants 
under the Act, has written seven reports seeking to clarify the realm of the Act.419 
Despite these helpful contributions certain uncertainties remain that are probably 
inherent to the use of terms like ‘population screening’, ‘offer’ and ‘incurable’. There 
has therefore been a call to revise this Act to enhance its effectiveness.420
Moreover, the Act has several loopholes. Companies use these for their own benefit, 
for example in the area DTC genetic screening. Enforcement of the Act is difficult 
414 Van der Maas 2000, p. 7.
415 GR 1994, p. 18; Art. 1(c) WBO.
416 Art. 2 Wet op het bevolkingsonderzoek (WBO).
417 Art. 3(1) jo 13 WBO.
418 Art. 7 WBO.
419 Van der Maas et al. 2000, p. 37-33.




because offering and performing screening for the (risk of) hereditary cancer and 
incurable diseases without a licence are prohibited, but only practicing without a legal 
permission is actionable. Dutch companies offer screening directly to the public on 
internet sites, in newspapers and in magazines. They do this without a licence in their 
homeland and practice screening across the border. Furthermore the Act does not 
cover DTC carrier tests whilst these tests can have serious psychological and familial 
implications. The Act does not regulate the access to these tests because they do not 
detect the (risk of) hereditary disease of the individual but provides information about 
the risk of having a child with a genetic condition.
7.5.3. Preliminary conclusions 
The Dutch Act was not developed for nor does it exclusively regulate the use of DTC 
genetic tests. Nevertheless the Act does apply to DTC genetic tests due to the fact that 
these tests fall within the definition of population screening, as laid down in the Act. 
Therefore, the Act does apply legal quality standards to ‘high risk’ DTC genetic tests. 
DTC genetic testing is classified as population screening because companies offer their 
genetic services directly to the public. The key word in the definition of the Act is ‘offer’. 
The fact that individuals visit the web shop on their own initiative makes no difference 
when classifying DTC genetic tests as population screening. This means that in the 
Netherlands offering and practicing screening for detecting the (risk indicators of) 
cancer and untreatable diseases without a licence is unlawful421 and practicing without 
permission is a punishable offence.422 
7.6. DISCUSSION 
Can the Dutch Act serve as an example for other European countries, when regulating 
the use of DTC genetic tests in a way that is consistent with European legal standards? 
Despite various initiatives there is as yet no comprehensive European legal framework 
regulating the supply of and access to DTC genetic tests. When studying the different 
existing instruments and documents adopted by the Council of Europe and the EU, 
there appears to be a prevailing opinion that the validity and utility of genetic tests 
are essential preconditions for allowing them to be offered to the public. Moreover, 
there is widespread (international) support for the idea that genetic tests, including 
DTC genetic tests, should be offered only under medical supervision.423 DTC genetic 
421 Art. 2 WBO.
422 Art. 3(1) jo 13 WBO.
423 ESHG, official response of the EuroGentest network of Excellence in Genetic Testing to the Public 
consultation on the revision of Directive 98/79/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 
October 1998 on in vitro diagnostic medical devices, Vienna 2010. This document is available through the 
Internet https://www.eshg.org/fileadmin/www.eshg.org/documents/ESHG/ESHG-IVD-def.pdf (2010), p. 
7 (question 11).
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tests with risks that can have far reaching implications for the person concerned or 
his or her relatives should not be allowed without appropriate non-directive genetic 
counselling. Furthermore, there is a common opinion that individuals should be given 
the opportunity to make their decision freely and based on adequate information 
about the limitations of the test and its physical, psychology and social implications, 
meaning giving informed consent.
The Dutch Act, despite interpretations and enforcement problems, provides a basic level 
of protection against population screening activities that could potentially threaten the 
health of individuals. Yet, we doubt whether the Act in its current form can serve as 
an example for other countries considering regulating the use of DTC genetic tests. On 
the one hand, the Act appears to be too liberal compared to the European normative 
criteria in place.424 For example, the Act does not regulate access to all genetic tests 
and only guarantees the European normative criteria for DTC genetic tests aimed at 
detecting the (risk indicators of) cancer and (risk indicators of) untreatable diseases. 
On the other hand, the permit system established under the Act effectively prevents 
individuals from getting access to DTC genetic tests in the Netherlands if they have 
questionable validity and utility. However, the permit system only applies to the Dutch 
jurisdiction, seemingly not taking into account that its guarantees can easily be by-
passed by offering DTC genetic tests through the internet and performing the tests 
outside of the Netherlands. 
Besides these practical problems and shortcoming it should be noted that the Act is 
not in accordance with EU law. The definition of population screening and the licence 
requirements are ambiguous. The permit system of the Act does not meet the rules of 
the Internal Market because of the absence of objective advance announce criteria. A 
permit system without foreseeable and accessible licence criteria could be an invitation 
to arbitrariness. It could be used to avoid sharp ethical discussions or decisions and 
inhibit scientific knowledge.425 Furthermore, the Act conflicts with EU law because of 
its enforcement problems. It does not pursue its goal consistently and systematically, 
now that offering and practicing of DTC genetic tests for detecting (risk indicators of) 
cancer and untreatable diseases without a licence is unlawful426 and practicing without 
permission is punishable. In addition, the Act conflicts with the Protocol427 because it 
seems to be too liberal. Lastly, it could only be used with necessary adjustments as an 
example for other EU Member States, because it conflicts with the European law due 
to its interpretation and enforcement problems.428
424 ESHG, official response of the EuroGentest network of Excellence in Genetic Testing to the Public 
consultation on the revision of Directive 98/79/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 
October 1998 on in vitro diagnostic medical devices, Vienna 2010. This document is available through the 
Internet https://www.eshg.org/fileadmin/www.eshg.org/documents/ESHG/ESHG-IVD-def.pdf (2010), p 1.
425 GR 2008.
426 Art. 2 WBO. 
427 It should be noted that the Netherlands has not yet ratified the Biomedicine Convention.
428 R.E. van Hellemondt, A.C. Hendriks & M.H. Breuning, ‘Wet bevolkingsonderzoek op gespannen voet met 





Worldwide there is growing concern about the availability of DTC genetic tests. 
Individuals can easily access these tests without adequate information and genetic 
counselling services being provided, let alone safeguards with respect to the validity 
and utility of the tests. This raises the question of whether making use of these testing 
methods to obtain information about the presence of genetic risks and hereditary 
diseases, and thus one’s future health, truly reflects an expression of personal 
autonomy. It was argued here that there are good public health and human rights 
reasons to protect individuals from subjecting themselves to these tests.
The need to regulate the use of DTC genetic tests follows from the standards adopted 
within the context of the Council of Europe and the EU. Despite the absence of a 
comprehensive European normative framework, important principles and norms 
relevant to the use of DTC genetic tests, and thus its supply and access to, have 
gained recognition on a European level, which implies that the validity and utility of 
DTC genetic tests are crucial factors when deciding on allowing the marketing of such 
a test. Furthermore, DTC genetic tests with far reaching implications for individuals 
should not be allowed without the supervision of a healthcare worker and appropriate 
non-directive genetic counselling being offered. Moreover, access to DTC genetic tests 
should be accompanied by rigorous informed consent procedures. 
The Dutch Act on population screening is a unique piece of legislation regulating the 
use of screening programmes and also applying to DTC genetic tests. Yet in its present 
form, the Act cannot serve as an example for other countries considering the regulation 
of DTC genetic screening. The Act not only suffers from a number of practical problems 
and shortcomings, but is also inconsistent with some EU legal standards.
To conclude, a broad consensus exists among professionals in genetics that the 
implications of DTC genetic tests are far reaching and complex. Such testing should 
not be left to the free forces of the market, but should be accompanied by adequate 
information, and informed consent. There is – also in view of these concerns expressed 
by professionals – not only a need to revise the Dutch Act; it is above all important to 
elaborate on the emerging body of European legal standards applicable to DTC genetic 
screening. Offering genetic tests directly to individuals via internet raises complex legal 
questions that cannot merely be answered by individual States. National measures can, 
moreover, easily be bypassed by making use of cross border constructions. Adequately 
protecting individuals against questionable testing kits therefore calls for international 
vigilance and comprehensive measures by the international community, in Europe to 
start with the Council of Europe and the European Union.
                            CHAPTER
WHICH LESSONS CAN WE LEARN FROM THE EUROPEAN 
UNION LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF MEDICINES FOR THE 
REGULATION OF DIRECT-TO-CONsUMER GENETIC 
TESTS?
Abstract: The legal framework of the European Union (EU) for regulating access to 
and supply of direct-to-consumer (DTC) genetic tests is very liberal compared to the 
legal and regulatory framework for (internet) medicines. Nevertheless, both health 
related products can cause equally serious damage to the wellbeing of individuals. In 
this chapter we examine whether the legal framework of the EU for the safety and 
responsible use of (internet) medicines could be an example for regulating access to 
and supply of DTC genetic tests. The EU laws governing medicines can, notwithstanding 
their shortcomings, serve as an example for (central) authorising the marketing of DTC 
genetic tests on the internal market in accordance with strict criteria regarding predictive 
value and clinical usefulness. Furthermore, a legal framework controlling DTC genetic 
tests also should introduce system supervision as well as quality criteria with respect 
to the information to be provided to consumers in order to enhance health protection. 
However, DTC genetic tests purchased through online ordering are difficult to supervise 
by any agency. Adequately protecting individuals against questionable testing kits 
calls for international vigilance and comprehensive measures by the international 
community. For Europe, it is important to rank the regulation of DTC genetic tests on 
the ‘European regulatory agenda’.
R.E. van Hellemondt, A.C. Hendriks & M.H. Breuning, ‘Which lessons from the European 
Union Legal framework of medicines would be useful to the regulation of DTC genetic 






internet is a ‘global virtual shopping mall’. Almost everything can be purchased through 
the World Wide Web and delivered to the front door. Internet is also increasingly used 
for ‘Distance Health’. Distance Health encompasses not only free access to health 
information, medical education and electronic medical records, but it also includes 
promoting and selling health related services and goods.429 On the ‘E-commerce 
market’ for example there are hundreds of direct-to-consumer (DTC) genetic tests for 
human diseases and conditions available. 
The legal framework of the European Union (EU) for regulating access and supply of 
DTC genetic tests is very liberal compared to the legal and regulatory framework for 
(internet) medicines. Due to the rules pertaining to the latter framework access to and 
supply of (internet) drugs are strictly regulated within the EU.430 Although both health 
related products can cause serious damage to the wellbeing of individuals, the rules 
regulating access to both sets of products differ substantially from each other.
With DTC genetic tests individuals can acquire future health information with a simple 
mouse click on the button.431 They will receive information from these tests about the 
presence of genetic risks and hereditary diseases. The adverts of companies selling DTC 
genetic tests promise (potential) consumers the opportunity to control their health by 
identifying diseases earlier, thus enabling them to lead a longer and healthier life. 
Supporters of ‘Distance Health’ argue that unrestricted access to DTC genetic tests 
strengthens an individual’s autonomy. In their opinion these tests empower people to 
take more control over their health and life. However, DTC genetic tests are frequently 
offered without information about their, in general, limited predictive value while the 
received health information could be used to form the basis of profound decisions.432 
And accurate information is an important condition of empowerment and for being 
able to make autonomous choices. 
Most Member States of the European Union (EU) have no legislation that specifically 
addresses DTC genetic tests. Several Member States have, however, legislation that 
partly or fully applies to DTC genetic testing services.433 Nevertheless, there is growing 
concern in Europe about the seemingly unrestricted access to DTC genetic tests because 
of the potential health hazards of testing services of questionable quality. Policymakers 
of several European countries are considering national and European Union (legal) 
quality standards for the safety and responsible use of these tests.434 
429 Schafer 2008, p. 191-197.
430 cordina 2010, p. 4.
431 McBride 2010, p. 427-448; Brower 2010, p. 1610-1617. 
432 Marietta & McGuire 2010, p. 369-374.
433 For information regarding the legalisation of DTC genetic tests in several European countries and the laws 
on European level which addresses DTC genetic tests see: Carmen & Borry 2011; Chapter 5 of this thesis.
434 See for example: http://ec.europa.eu/health/medical-devices/files/recast_docs_2008/ivd_pc_outcome_
en.pdf (02/04/2012).
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In this contribution we examine whether the legal framework of the EU for the safety 
and responsible use of (internet) medicines could be an example for regulating access 
to and supply of DTC genetic tests particularly on the level of the EU. We start by 
describing the impact of the European Law on national health services in section 8.2. 
We then unravel the European patchwork of legal standards concerning access to and 
supply of DTC genetic tests in section 8.3. Section 8.4 provides an overview of the legal 
EU framework regarding (internet) medicines. Lastly, in section 8.5 we formulate an 
answer to the above question, followed by conclusions. 
8.2. THE IMPACT OF EU LAW ON NATIONAL HEALTH SERVICES
EU health policy has in practice a fundamental contradiction at its core.435 The 
Treaty of Lisbon (signed in 2007) states clearly that health policy and health care 
are the responsibility of the Member States (Article 168 TFEU). EU initiatives in the 
field of (public) health must balance universal rules and respect for Member States 
sovereignty. Moreover, it is settled case law of the Court of Justice of the EU (ECJ) that 
EU law does not detract from the freedom of Member States to choose their own 
health security level.436 However, the rules of the internal market have an impact on 
national health matters. The rules of this market are generally aimed at obtaining the 
economic benefits associated with increased competition and reduced barriers to 
trade by creating a free movement of people, services, goods and capital. According 
to Article 168 TFEU the Union should ensure in its policies and activities a high level 
of human health protection. Nevertheless, the free movement and equal access of 
goods and services within the EU has a major impact on (public) health. Due to the 
fact that in cross border situations Member States are in principle required to respect 
the free movement of health related goods (Articles 30, 34 and 35 TFEU), services 
(Article 56 TFEU) and establishment (Article 49 TFEU) when exercising their power in 
the field of health. They have to comply with the rules of the internal market when 
they take measures to have a high level of health. Furthermore, the EU develops 
specific legislation to achieve uniformity in laws of Member States in order to promote 
economic integration. The legislative body of the EU adopted specific legislation which 
covers also products related to the health sector. In the absence of harmonisation 
EU Member States are under certain circumstances allowed to take measures, which 
restrict the free movement of goods and services to protect their citizens against 
(potential) health risks.437 
435 Mossialios et al. 2010, p. 4.
436 Services & establishment art. 52 VWEU; Case C-372/04, Watts/ United Kingdom [2006] ECR I-4325.




To conclude, the relationship between the law of the EU and health matters is complex. 
Formally, health policy is the responsibility of EU Member States. Health policy thus 
falls outside the scope of the EU’s legislative competence. Nevertheless, the rules of 
the free movement of goods, service and establishment could (in)directly apply to DTC 
genetic tests and (internet) medicines, as we shall notice in the sections below.
8.3. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF THE EU FOR THE SAFETY AND 
RESPONSIBLE USE OF DTC GENETIC TESTS
8.3.1. DTC genetic testing
Genetic screening can be defined as any kind of test being offered to a person or 
group of individuals with the aim of detecting or ruling out a hereditary disease, a 
predisposition to such a disease or to determine whether a person carries a genetic 
variant that may produce a hereditary disease in its offspring.438 
Individuals can buy a test kit for screening their DNA on the internet without the 
involvement of a physician or genetic counselling. After visiting the online shop and 
ordering a genetic test, the individual will receive a test kit from the company. This 
kit commonly includes a tube for taking a DNA sample, such as saliva or a hair, to be 
returned to the company. Upon receiving the DNA sample, the company‘s laboratory 
starts the analytic process. A few weeks later the individual can download the test 
results using a simple code. 
Some companies make a distinction between making claims that directly affect 
healthcare decisions (genetic tests for health purposes) and making health-related 
claims (genetic tests not for health, but for informational genetic purposes), the 
so-called ‘informational genetic tests’.439 Companies use this distinction to protect 
themselves against liability and to skirt round the laws.440 
In this respect it is important to make a distinction between pre-symptomatic diagnosis 
tests and susceptibility genetic tests. Pre-symptomatic diagnostic genetic tests are 
mostly aimed at discovering a monogenetic disease, that is to say a gene mutation 
which, by definition, will almost inevitably lead to the development of a disease at 
some point in later in life.441 By contrast, testing for multiple genetic variants is generally 
associated with low risks of developing common health conditions and traits. A positive 
test result—meaning that an affected gene has been detected— generally implies a(n 
enhanced) statistical risk but not a certainty of developing the disease later in life.442 
438 Godard et al. 2003, p. 49-50.
439 Borry 2008, p. 736. 
440 Borry et al., ‘Legislation on direct-to-consumer genetic testing in seven European countries’, European 
Journal of Human Genetics 2012, p. 715-721.
441 Borry 2009, p. 1-2.
442 McBride et al. 2010, p. 430.
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The results of the latter, known as susceptibility tests do not necessarily accurately 
establish the risk of developing a disorder, because in most cases not all risk factors are 
included and additional relevant factors, such as family history and lifestyle, are not 
taken into account by the test. The majority of DTC genetic tests concern susceptibility 
tests, sometimes in combination with pre-symptomatic diagnostic tests or carrier tests. 
Thus DTC genetic tests can be seen as an online fortune teller.
The marketing and availability of DTC genetic tests through the internet has been 
criticized for the absence of individualized medical supervision and the lack of adequate 
pre- and post-test information provisions. Furthermore, concerns exist about the 
limited predictive value and clinical utility of a number of the DTC genetic tests being 
sold directly to individuals without the involvement of a healthcare worker. Individuals 
have often high expectations about the benefits of DTC genetic tests due to the fact 
that in general they are offered without adequate information about their limited 
value and without genetic counselling services. Therefore the interpretation of test 
results can be challenging for a person,443 particularly for those with limited knowledge 
of genetics and medical statistics. It is well known from various studies on genetic 
counselling that complex information on risk factors is particularly difficult to handle for 
a layman, regardless of his background or education.444 Accordingly, individuals could 
make important health decisions concerning prevention or prophylactic treatment 
based on incomplete or misunderstood information about their expected health.445 
Moreover, the use of questionable genetic tests can result in health damage and higher 
healthcare costs as a result of follow-up tests and unnecessary medical treatment. The 
free access to genetic information outside the ‘hospital care’ and the doctor-patient 
relation also gives rise to concerns regarding confidentially and privacy of individuals. 
Not at least because an individual genetic profile does not only give information about 
the genetic constitution of the tested person, but provides also information about the 
genetic makeup of its relatives. 
Although the concerns regarding DTC genetic testing associated with the loss of 
privacy and individual autonomy (self-determination) are important and legitimate, it 
falls beyond the scope of our contribution. In this Article we shall concentrate on the 
EU legal framework of DTC genetic testing and the EU legislation regarding (internet) 
medicines which relates to reliability, medical supervision and the pre- and post-
information provision.
8.3.2. DTC genetic tests is a service
The EU has not developed legislation which specifically covers the responsible use of 
DTC genetic tests. However, some Directives also apply to these tests although they are 
not primarily aimed at the access to and supply of them. As for EU law, it is important 
443 Hogarth et al. 2008, p. 162-165; McBride et al. 2010, p. 429-432; GAO 2010. 
444 Van Dijk et al. 2004, p. 47-48; Marietta & McGuire 2009, p. 370. 




how DTC genetic tests are qualified because distinctions are made between goods 
and services, and different legal regimes apply to each respectively. Moreover, certain 
Regulations and Directives only address one of the four fundamental freedoms (free 
movement of goods, capital, services and establishment, and people). 
It is settled case law that the ECJ446 examines, in principle, a national measure in relation 
to one freedom if a restriction relates to several fundamental freedoms. It will appraise 
a national measure in relation to two fundamental freedoms if it appears that one of 
them is not entirely secondary to the other one.447 In our opinion DTC genetic testing, 
thus a DTC genetic test, is not a ‘good’ but rather a ‘service’ because the test kit with 
the tube (good) is entirely secondary to the analytic process in the laboratory (service) 
and the communication process of test results to consumers (service).448
In relation to this discussion, some authors argue that DTC genetic testing falls within 
the scope of Directive 98/79/EC on in vitro diagnostic medical devices. This Directive 
ensures a quality review before ‘high risk’ self-tests (for instance self-tests for HIV) 
are marketed.449 In our opinion DTC genetic tests are not covered by this Directive. In 
the first place this Directive does not apply to services; secondly products of general 
laboratory use are not in vitro diagnostic.450 The tube for taking a DNA sample has no 
particular diagnostic value and is not produced with special characteristics for testing.
Directive 98/79/EC regulates a pre-market review for in vitro medical devices. The 
current pre-market evaluation mechanisms do not apply to DTC genetic tests - even if 
we qualified them as goods- because their present risk classification is low. Directive 
98/79/EC classifies devices according to the perceived level of risk. Each group of in 
vitro medical devices is subject to regulatory degree that reflects the perceived risk.
Recently, the EU Commission consulted several organisations in the field of genetics 
about the revision of Directive 98/79/EC.451 Many respondents have advised to extend 
the scope of this Directive to genetic tests independently from their proposals. Hence, 
86% of the respondents supported additional requirements/ restrictions for DTC 
genetic tests.452
446 The Court of Justice of the European Union has the power to interpret the EU treaties, to measure the 
interpretation of these treaties by EU bodies and institutions, and to judge a limited number of conflicts 
within the realm of the EU law.
447 Case C-20/03, Burmanjer et el. [2005] ECR I-4133; Case C-390/99, Canal Satélite/ Administración General 
del Estado [2002] ECR I-607; Case C-275/92, Her Majesty’s Customs & Excise/ Gerhart Schindler & Jörg 
Schindler [1994] ECR I-1039.
448 More detailed R.E. van Hellemondt, A.C. Hendriks & M.H. Breuning, ‘Wet bevolkingsonderzoek op 
gespannen voet met EU recht’, Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Europees Recht 2010, p. 245-251 ;The software 
which is used in the laboratory, to sequence the DNA sample, could be qualified as a good.
449 GR 2008, p 31-32; p. 94-95. 
450 Art. 1(2b) Directive 98/79/EC.
451 See for example ESHG official response of the EuroGentest network of Excellence in Genetic Testing to the 
Public consultation on the revision of Directive 98/79/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
27 October 1998 on in vitro diagnostic medical devices. This document is available at: https://www.eshg.
org/eshgdocs.0.html (02/04/2012).
452 European Commission, Revision of Directive 98/79/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
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8.3.3. The EU legal framework of DTC genetic testing services regarding information 
The E-Commerce Directive (Directive 2000/31/EC) sets up an internal market framework 
for electronic commerce. It covers also the online services by which health related goods 
and services are offered on the internet. The E-Commerce Directive regulates certain 
legal aspects of information society services. Information society services are services 
that are normally provided for remuneration, from a distance, by electronic means 
and at the individual request of a recipient of services.453 Furthermore, the Directive 
established harmonised rules on the information and transparency of online companies 
which provide (health related) goods and services. Information society services are in 
principle subject to the legislation of the Member State in which the internet company 
is established. The E-Commerce Directive requires internet companies to provide 
certain key information regarding the identity of the company such as name, the 
geographic address, the company’s email address, and the applicable (professional) 
rules, the relevant regulatory bodies and the supervisory authority.
Member States may take measures to derogate the freedom to provide information 
society services in order to protect health.454 These measures have to be objectively 
necessary for the purpose and the result cannot be achieved by less restrictive measure. 
In addition these measures should not discriminate services or the establishment on 
grounds of nationality.455 Furthermore when measures derogate from the fundamental 
right of free movement of services or establishment they must pursue their goal in a 
consistent and systematic way.456 
The Distance Selling Directive (Directive 97/7/EC on the protection of consumers in 
respect of distance contracts) applies to any contract concerning (health related) goods 
and services concluded between a supplier and an individual under organised distance 
sales.457 This Directive requires that anyone selling goods and services at a distance, 
including internet, should provide information to consumers about some basic rights 
of consumers. It stipulates that consumers shall be provided with sufficient information 
on the identity of the provider, the main characterises of the services, the price, the 
arrangements for payment and delivery performance.458 Furthermore the Directive 
creates the right for consumers to cancel the contract within seven working days after 
27 October 1998 on in vitro diagnostic medical devices, Summary of responses to the public consultation, 
EC, Brussels, Belgium : 2010, http://ec.europa.eu/health/medicaldevices/files/recast_docs_2008/ivd_pc_
outcome_en.pdf (02/04/2012).
453 Art. 1(2) Directive 98/34/EC.
454 Art. 3(4) Directive 2000/31/EC.
455 Case 169/07, Hartlauer Handelsgesellschaft mbH/ Wiener Landesregierung, Oberösterreichische Landes-
regierung, [2009] ECR I-1721; Case 444/05, Aikaterini Stamatelaki/NPDD Organismos Asfaliseos Eleftheron 
Epagelmation [2007] ECR I-3185; Case 385/99, Müller-Fauré & Van Riet [2003] ECR I-4509.
456 See for instance Case 171/07 & 172/07 Apothekerkammer des Saarlandes et al. [2009] ECR I-4171; Case 
531/106 Commission/ Italy [2009] ECR I-4103.
457 Art. 1-3 Directive 97/7/EC.




its conclusion without giving any reason.459 This Directive also allows Member States to 
introduce more stringent measures with regard to ensuring a higher level of consumer 
protection. 
On 22 November 2011 the Directive on Consumer Rights was published in the Official 
Journal of the EU.460 It merges four Directives into one and will replace the Distance 
Selling Directive. The highlights of this Directive are an EU-wide right for consumers 
to reject goods or cancel a service contract within two weeks, a requirement for 
companies to give consumers information in a clear and comprehensible manner, the 
duty to provide certain information regarding the main characteristics of the (online) 
products and the precise details on their total price, and the prohibition of ‘pre-ticked 
boxes’ which are (sometimes) used on shopping websites.461 
8.3.4. Preliminary conclusion 
The access to and supply of DTC genetic tests is, in principle, also (indirectly) regulated 
by the rules governing the internal market of the EU. However, the European legal 
framework regarding the access to and supply of DTC genetic tests does not guarantee 
sufficiently normative criteria for safeguarding the predictive value of tests, medical 
supervision and quality standards for providing information.
 
8.4. LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF THE EU FOR THE SAFETY AND RESPONSIBLE 
UsE OF (INTERNET) MEDICINEs
8.4.1. Introduction 
The pharmaceutical sector is an important part of the EU economy. This sector has 
been governed by an increasingly comprehensive body of EU law relating to quality 
standards for the development, manufacturing, supply and use of (internet) medicines 
and (internet) pharmaceutical services. The EU pursues two major objectives in its 
policy on (internet) medicines. It strives to secure a high level of health protection and, 
at the same time, to support a competitive industry that ensures that European citizens 
continue to benefit from new drugs.462
The first goal requires that medicines are safe and effective, but also, that individuals 
should receive the information necessary to make informed choices regarding the use 
of medicines.463 In terms of the free movement of goods the EU has developed and 
459 Art. 6 Directive 97/7/EC.
460 Directive 2011/83/EU, OJ 2011, L304/64. For further information: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/consumer-
marketing/rights-contracts/directive/index_en.htm (10-05-2012).
461 Pre-ticked boxes require consumers to opt out of buying services on websites, such as travel insurance or 
car hire when buying an airline ticket online.
462 Mossialos et al. 2010, p. 635. 
463 Mossialos et al. 2010, p. 635.
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adopted a regulatory framework for the authorisation, marketing and free movement 
of medicines. 
The body for this legal framework of medicinal products is Directive 2001/83/EC on 
the Community code relating to medicinal products for human use, recently, amended 
by Directive 2010/84/EU and Regulation 2004/726, recently, amended by Regulation 
2010/1235.464 Directive 2001/83/EC regulates, for example, which information has 
to be provided and in which form pharmaceutical products have to be presented 
to individuals.465 Regulation 2004/726 lays down Community procedures for the 
authorisation and supervision of medicinal products for human and veterinary use 
and for the establishment of European Medicines Agency (EMA). The Community 
code defines a medicinal product as ‘any substance or combination of substances 
presented as having properties for treating or preventing disease in human beings; or 
any substance or combination of substances which may be used in or administered to 
human beings with a view to restoring, correcting or modifying physiological functions 
by exerting a pharmacological, immunological, or metabolic action, or to making a 
medical diagnosis.’466 
In this contribution it is not our intention to examine and analyse the complex and 
detailed legal framework of medicines. In this section, however, we will describe 
certain legal issues regarding (internet) medicines which we think are relevant for the 
regulation of DTC genetic tests, namely premarket review, medical supervision and 
information. 
8.4.2. Review before market
Launching a new drug into the internal market of the EU and/or on national markets is 
subject to extensive regulatory procedures. The EU has created a centralised licensing 
agency, the EMA for authorising the marketing of new medicines in accordance with 
strict criteria regarding safety, quality and efficacy. The EMA is responsible for licensing 
new medicines as well as drafting guidelines on various stages in development and 
administration of new medicines.
According to Directive 2001/83/EC and Regulation 2004/726 there are two procedures 
for obtaining a marketing authorisation for pharmaceutical companies. The first 
procedure is a centralised application to the EMA for a marketing authorisation regarding 
the entire EU.467 The second is a decentralized application for an authorisation covering 
464 Directive 2010/84/EU and Regulation 1235/2010 strengthen and rationalise the current system for 
monitoring the safety of medicines on the European market. They were published on 31 December 2010 
and came into force in January 2011. Both instruments have to be transposed into national law by July 
2012. 
465 Feah 2011, p. 31.
466 Art. 1, Directive 2001/83/EC as amended by Directive 2004/27/EC and Directive 2010/84/EU.




only a Member State.468 This authorisation can be recognised by other Member States 
of the EU through the mutual recognition procedure. 
Under the centralised procedure,469 a drug manufacturer must submit for consideration 
a detailed dossier containing data on quality, safety and efficacy to the EMA.470 The 
marketing authorisation will be valid in all EU Member States. The centralised procedure 
is obligatory for biotechnological medicines, medicinal products with a new chemical 
entity for the treatment of certain diseases.471 The centralised procedure is optional 
for other drugs containing new chemical entities and sufficiently innovative medicines.
Under the decentralised procedure472 the pharmaceutical company grants one or more 
national marketing authorisations. The pharmaceutical company chooses one of the EU 
Member States ‘drugs regulatory agencies to serve as Reference Member States.473 The 
application will be submitted by that agency for review. The pharmaceutical company 
in question decides for itself which markets of EU Member States have its commercial 
interests. Each chosen Member State – Concerned Member State - makes a submission 
seeking mutual recognition of the Reference Member States authorisation decision. 
Unless a Concerned Member State raises an objection the pharmaceutical company 
grants an authorisation for marketing the medicines on the markets of the Member 
States he has indicated.474 
The safety of pharmaceutical products is also affected by activities after placing these 
products on the internal market during the distribution and consumption of the 
medicine.475 Despite the strict regulation concerning new drugs entering the internal 
market, falsified medicines476 has been identified as a serious concern for individuals’ 
safety within the European Union. 
On December 10th, 2008, the Commission adopted the ‘Pharmaceutical package’. 
The ‘Pharmaceutical package’ is a series of measures proposed by the European 
Commission impacting the pharmaceutical industry. The aim of one of these initiatives, 
Directive 2011/62/EU, is to address the risk of falsified medicines entering the legal 
supply chain of medicines in the EU. It aims to make sure that no fake medicines are 
legally distributed across and within Europe.477 
468 Art. 27 Directive 2001/83/EC.
469 Regulation 726/2004.
470 Chapter 1 Regulation 726/2004.
471 Art. 3(2) Directive 2001/83/EC.
472 Chapter 4 Directive 2001/83/EC.
473 Art. 28 Directive 2001/83/EC.
474 Art. 36 Directive 2001/83/EC.
475 Bausschke 2011, p. 92.
476 Art. 1 Directive 2011/62/EU amending Directive 2001/83/EC on the Community code relating medicinal 
products for human use, as regards the prevention of the entry into legal supply chain of falsified medicinal 
products defines falsified medicines as any medicinal product with a false representation of (a) its identity, 
including its packaging and labelling, its name or its composition as regards any of the ingredients including 
excipients and the strength of those ingredients; (b) its source, including its manufacturer, its country of 
manufacture, its country of origin or its marketing authorisation holder; or (c) its history, including the 
records and documents relating to the distribution channels used. 
477 COM (2008) 663 final. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/health/human-use/package_en.htm (02/04/2012).
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8.4.3. Medical supervision 
The introduction of new drugs into the internal market is closely harmonised by EU 
legislation. Contrary to this, the classification of prescription medicines is primarily the 
responsibility of Member States. A prescription drug is a medicinal product that can 
be purchased or dispensed only with written instructions from a licensed healthcare 
provider, such as a doctor, dentist, nurse practitioner or physician’s assistant, to a 
pharmacist. These written instructions are known as a prescription. 
Non-prescription medicines are available without a prescription; they are called over 
the counter medicines. According to Article 70 of Directive 2001/83/EC the approving 
authority is required to specify the classification of prescription drugs and non-
prescription drugs. However, Directive 2001/83/EC stipulates that a drug could only be 
available with a prescription from a health care worker in case they:
- are likely to present a danger either directly or indirectly, even when used correctly, 
if utilized without medical supervision, 
- are frequently and to a very wide extent used incorrectly, and as a result are likely to 
present a direct or indirect danger to human health, 
- contain substances or preparations thereof, the activity and/or adverse reactions of 
which require further investigation, 
- are normally prescribed by a doctor to be administered parenterally.478
The rapid growth of internet sales of medicines causes new risks for individuals 
because ‘traditional safeguards’ not always apply to internet medicines. This is not 
least by the lack of uniformity in the national regulations concerning medicines. Some 
authors mention that internet pharmacies can be a huge help to individuals because 
of their increased access – 24 hours a day –, the lower transactions and production 
costs, the anonymity and delivery to your home.479 However, the so-called ‘Rogue 
internet pharmacies’ – unapproved pharmacies – sometimes sell drugs without a valid 
prescription or falsified medicines.480 Moreover they use sometimes ‘cyber doctors’, 
sell drugs without a final authorisation and give misleading information about the 
medicines.481 
The facts underlying the DocMorris case illustrate what can happen when liberal 
legislation regarding internet medicines of a Member State is at odds with the more 
restrict regulations of another Member State of the EU.482 DocMorris is a ‘traditional 
(Dutch)pharmacy’ which also operates through internet as an internet pharmacy. A 
lot of DocMorris internet pharmacy consumers lived in Germany. In Germany, some 
prescription and non-prescription medicines may only be supplied by ‘traditional 
478 Art. 71(1) Directive 2001/83/EC.
479 Fung 2004, p. 188-194.
480 Cordina 2010, p. 4.
481 Cordina 2010, p. 4.





pharmacies’. According to German law internet sales of medicines and mail order 
services are only permitted in exceptional cases. In a preliminary ruling, interpreting 
the existing EU legal framework, the ECJ concluded that a national prohibition of mail 
order sales of drugs is contrary to EU law, when medicines are authorised in and are 
not subject to prescription in the ‘received Member Sates’.483 Furthermore, the ECJ 
found that the mail order prohibition concerning non-prescription medicines was not 
justified now the risk for individuals is the same as if they were supplied through a 
‘traditional pharmacy’.484 
Dispensing prescription drugs without an adequate review of an individuals’ medical 
history and selling unproven drugs can lead to serious consumer injury. The health 
care worker which is authorised to prescribe medicines is the main decision maker 
concerning the use of prescription medicines.485 The health care workers have the 
obligation to give individuals sufficient information when they prescribe a medicine, 
in order to enable them to exercise their right of making an informed decision.486 
However, in certain situations there is no health care worker involved in the decision-
making process regarding the use of a medicine.
8.4.4. Information
Directive 2001/83/EC and Regulation 2004/726 contain numerous provisions for 
advertising, information and transparency. Directive 2001/83/EC, for example, banned 
advertisement of medicines, subject to prescription, to the public and only allowed 
advertising for other drugs under certain conditions.487 Hence, Regulation 2004/726 
embodies requirements concerning the publication of a European Public Assessment 
Report which includes a summary written in a manner that is understandable to the 
public. Furthermore, Directive 2001/83/EC regulates the information and the form in 
which medicines have to be presented to the end users.488 These normative criteria for 
packing and labelling apply to drugs which are subject to the centralised procedure 
as well as the decentralised procedure.489 In accordance with the Directive 2001/83/
EC the competent authority shall refuse the marketing authorisation if the labelling or 
the package leaflet does not comply with the provisions of the Directive or if they are 
not in conformity with the particulars listed in the summary of product characteristics 
(European Public Assessment Report).490 The Directive stipulates which information 
483 Case C-322/01, DocMorris NV/ Jacques Waterval (Deutscher Apothekerverband) [2003] ECR I-14887, para. 
16.
484 Case C-322/01, DocMorris NV/ Jacques Waterval (Deutscher Apothekerverband) [2003] ECR I-14887, para. 
114.
485 Faeh 2011, p. 30-41. 
486 Faeh 2011, p. 30-31. 
487 Art. 86-88 Directive 2001/83/EC.
488 Art. 21, Chapter 4, Title 5 Directive 2001/83/EC; Feah 2011, p. 31.
489 Chapter 4, Title 5 Directive 2001/83/EC; Art. 9 Regulation 726/2004.
490 Art. 61 (2) Directive 2001/83/EC.
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must be printed on the packaging and written in the package leaflet.491 The package 
leaflet must be written and designed to be clear and understandable enabling the users 
to act appropriately, when necessary with the help of health professionals.492 Moreover, 
amending Regulation 2010/1235 and amending Directive 2010/84/EU require the EMA 
and national agencies to set up (European) medicines web-portals in order to increase 
public transparency regarding pharmacovigilance issues.493
The framework for providing information concerning medicines, which is merely 
product specific, is not always directly aimed at end users and it is above all very 
technical.494 Moreover, it does not restrict the freedom of Member States from 
developing their own approaches regarding the provision of information concerning 
medicines as long as they respect Regulation 2004/726 and Directive 2001/83/EC.495 
These approaches of Member States to additional factual information differ widely 
from Member State to Member Sate.496 In some Member States the provision of 
information is mainly ensured by public authorities. They provide, for example, only 
product specific information. Amongst these Member States, there are some, for 
example Portugal, which go beyond the provision of product related information by 
covering other types of information, such as guidelines on treatments, or comparative 
information on the value of medicines.497 Moreover, there are also Member States, 
such as Germany, which have in place public private partnerships or similar initiatives 
to provide information specifically intended to cover wider patient needs, such as 
treatment options or guides covering specific diseases or therapeutic areas.498 This 
practice gives rise to a number of concerns, namely; EU citizens have unequal access to 
information, the lack of quality standards for information within the EU increases the 
risk that individuals receive wrong, misleading or confusing information, and the lack 
of information may result in uninformed choices.499
The ‘Pharmaceutical package’ contains also a legislative proposal for providing EU 
citizens with understandable good quality, objective, reliable and non-promotional 
information about the benefits and the risks of medicines and treatments. It will 
maintain the current ban on direct advertising of prescription medicines and aims to 
clear differentiation between advertising and non-promotional information.500
491 Art. 62 (2) Directive 20011/83/EC.
492 Art. 59 Directive 200/83/EC. 
493 Art. 106 Directive 2001/83/EC; art. 26 Regulation 726/2004.
494 Art. 59 Directive 200/83/EC; Valverde 2010, p. 198.
495 Valverde 2010, p. 194.
496 COM (2007) 862 final, p. 8.
497 COM (2007) 862 final, p. 4-5.
498 COM (2007) 862 final, p. 4-5.
499 COM (2007) 862 final, p. 9.





The pharmaceutical sector is an important part of the EU economy. This sector has 
been governed by an increasingly comprehensive legal framework of EU law relating to 
quality standards for the safety and responsible use of (internet) medicines. Introducing 
a new drug into the internal or national market is subject to extensive regulatory 
procedures. Contrary to the authorisation of medicines, classification of prescription 
drugs and the provision of end users are primarily the responsibility of Member States. 
Legislation aimed at responsible use of medicines has been designed to achieve certain 
goals while many vital aspects remain outside the regulatory body.501 The efficacy and 
safety of pharmaceutical products can neither be guaranteed on the national level nor 
by a single necessarily premarket review, but rather calls for a procedural long-term 
perspective on European level and/or the awareness of the public for their role in 
pharmaceutical safety.502
8.5. DISCUSSION
Can the legal framework of the EU for the safety and responsible use of (internet) 
medicines be an example for regulating access to and supply of DTC genetic tests? In 
other words, which lessons can be learned from analysing the strict regulation of drugs 
and its effectiveness within the EU?
EU regulation of access to and supply of (internet) medicines entails a comprehensive 
framework which aims to remove disparities between national measures in order 
to ensure the proper functioning of the internal market, whilst at the same time 
safeguarding human and public health.503 By contrast, access to and supply of DTC 
genetic tests are poorly regulated in the EU, or at least on an EU level. As a result, in 
various Member States individuals have unrestricted access to these tests. 
Admittedly, DTC genetic tests and (internet) drugs have different legal characteristics 
as well as features concerning their contents. Medicines are for example goods with 
therapeutic value and a DTC genetic test is a service with a questionable diagnostic 
result. However, both health related products could have serious adverse health effects 
(section 8.3.1, 8.4.2 and 8.4.3). In this respect DTC genetic tests have been criticized 
for its absence of premarket review, medical supervision and provision of adequate 
information (section 8.3). These safety risks are harmonised under specific Directives 
and regulations concerning access to and supply of medicines to ensure the same 
level of health protection of individuals across the whole EU. (internet) medicines and 
DTC genetic test moreover, have in common that they easily cross borders –through 
internet - which posing complex problems of jurisdiction and conflicts of law.
501 Bauschke 2011, p. 111.
502 Bauschke 2011, p. 111.
503 Bauschke 2011, p. 111; COM (2008) 663 final, p. 3.
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When studying Directive 2001/83/EC and Regulation 2004/726 we have to conclude 
that these legal documents have made a major contribution to the achievement of the 
objective that (internet) medicines have to be authorised prior to their introduction 
into the internal market. Despite this comprehensive legal framework current concerns 
–of falsified medicines, the lack of uniformity between Member States regarding 
prescription (internet) medicines and the unequal access to information- related 
to (internet) drugs illustrate that effective regulation should start with an EU legal 
framework of authorisation and end with legislation on matters concerning the safety 
and responsible use of health related goods and services, the ‘post-authorisation 
process’.504 Hence, in order to increase the effectiveness of a legal framework of access 
to and supply of DTC genetic tests a premarket review should be the first step in the 
‘regulatory lifecycle’. It should therefore be seen as an important part of the whole 
‘regulatory lifecycle’ in regard to the responsible use of DTC genetic tests.  
It should be noted that some companies which offer DTC genetic tests make a 
distinction between genetic tests for health purposes and genetic tests for informational 
purposes.505 For that reason it is important that the ‘regulatory lifecycle’ applies to 
all DTC genetic tests which could detect or rule out human diseases, conditions and/
or acquire future health information. This means that no distinction should be made 
between several primary test purposes. And it also implies that a clear definition of DTC 
genetic tests and/or testing service, without a reference to possibilities of consumer or 
company intentions, is very important.
The EU legal framework of (internet) medicines can serve as an example for (central) 
authorisation of the marketing of DTC genetic tests on the internal market in accordance 
with strict criteria regarding predictive value and clinical usefulness. However, the 
responsible use of DTC genetic tests maybe calls for an authorisation system which 
applies to DTC genetic testing services and/or the test company. The main concerns 
are the quality of the service, inter alia the limited predictive value of the tests, the 
lack of proper information and the absence of medical supervision. Therefore, only a 
premarket review of the predictive value and clinical usefulness concerning DTC genetic 
tests is not enough to guarantee the responsible use of these tests.
The DocMorris case demonstrated that uniformity of laws regarding DTC genetic 
testing service is a necessary condition for the responsible use of genetic tests within 
the EU. As mentioned before, contrary to the authorisation of (internet) medicines 
the classification of drugs - thus the free access to medicines - is the responsibility 
of Member states. Using (internet) medicines and DTC genetic tests without the 
involvement of a health care worker could have far reaching implications (section 
8.3.1 and 8.4.3). Dispensing (internet) medicines without an adequate review of an 
504 Bauschke 2011, p. 92; COM (2008) 663 final.




individual’s medical history can lead to health hazards. The same can be said of DTC 
genetic testing services. Testing without the involvement of a health care worker and/
or genetic counsellor can lead to serious consumer injury, because interpretation of the 
test results is difficult for a layman. Moreover, genetic testing could have psychological 
and social implications. The ‘regulatory lifecycle’ concerning the responsible use of DTC 
genetic testing, therefore, also has to stipulate medical supervision and quality criteria 
for the information that has to be provided during the genetic testing services. The 
health care worker and/ or the genetic counsellor will be able to provide individuals with 
adequate information about DTC genetic testing service in order to enable individuals 
for making an informed decision, just like the health care worker which is authorised 
to prescribe medicines. As we have described in section 8.4.4. the information on 
the package leaflet is often very technical. Nevertheless, the normative criteria for 
packing and labelling (internet) drugs could be a model, to supply individuals with 
complementary objective information about the characteristics of DTC genetic tests.
DTC genetic tests traded via online markets are difficult, and may be impossible, to 
supervise.506 Offering genetic tests directly to individuals via internet raises complex 
legal questions that cannot merely be answered by individual States or the EU. In 
this respect adequate protection of individuals against questionable DTC genetic 
testing services demands quality standards which provide (potential) users with non-
promotional information about the benefits and risks of DTC genetic tests. 
Protecting individuals against questionable genetic testing kits calls for international 
vigilance and comprehensive measures by the international community. However, a 
legal EU framework regarding access to and use of DTC genetic tests is not meaningless 
because some DTC genetic testing companies respect the fact that DTC genetic 
testing is outlawed in certain (American) States, and announce on their website that 
they don’t process samples submitted from citizens from these States.507 And more 
importantly, EU quality standards for information concerning DTC genetic testing could 
help individuals to make informed decisions. It decreases the risk that individuals make 
their decisions based on wrong and misleading information. 
8.6. CONCLUSION
In Europe there is growing concern about the unrestricted access to DTC genetic 
tests because of the potential health hazards for consumers of testing services of 
questionable quality. 
506 Bauschke 2011, p.104.
507 Borry et al., ‘Legislation on direct-to-consumer genetic testing in seven European countries’, European 
Journal of Human Genetics 2012, p. 715-721.
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The legal framework of the EU for regulating access to and supply of DTC genetic tests 
is very liberal compared to the legal framework of (internet) medicines.508 Although 
both health related products can cause serious damage to the wellbeing of individuals, 
the accessibility to both is quite different. This raises the question whether the legal 
framework of the EU for the responsible use of (internet) medicines could be an 
example for regulating access to and supply of DTC genetic tests. It was argued here 
that efficacy and safety of pharmaceutical products can neither be guaranteed on 
the national level nor by a single necessarily premarket review but rather calls for a 
procedural and long-term perspective on a European level and/or the awareness of the 
public about their role in pharmaceutical safety.
To conclude, the EU legal framework of (internet) medicines could, notwithstanding 
its shortcomings, serve as an example for (central) authorisation of the marketing 
of DTC genetic testing services on the internal market in accordance with strict 
criteria regarding clinical utility and predictive value and usefulness. However, a legal 
framework of DTC genetic testing service also should introduce medical supervision and 
quality criteria for the information that have to be provided during the genetic testing 
procedure in order to increase the effectiveness of health protection. The normative 
criteria for packing and labelling (internet) drugs could serve as a model for supplying 
individuals with complementary objective information about the characteristics of DTC 
genetic tests. 
DTC genetic testing services traded via online markets are difficult, and may be 
impossible, to supervise. In this respect, EU quality standards concerning information 
to be provided will help individuals to make informed decisions regarding the use 
of DTC genetic tests and consequently decrease health risks. Adequately protecting 
individuals against questionable testing kits calls for international vigilance and 
comprehensive measures by the international community. For Europe, it is important 
to rank the regulation of DTC genetic tests on the European regulatory agenda.
508 Cordina 2010, p. 4.







This thesis contains the findings of the research project: ‘Use of predictive medicines, 
large scale applications of genomics in the field of predictive medicine in the Netherlands: 
the role of the law’. This project was carried out in the period May 2009 to June 2013. 
The first objective of the research project was to seek an answer to the question what, 
from a constitutional law perspective, are the responsibilities and obligations of the 
Dutch State with regard to access of individuals to genetic screening. In order to find 
an answer to this question I studied the case of direct-to-consumer (DTC) genetic tests, 
an application of genetic screening. The results of this study are described in Part A. 
The second aim of the project was to identify normative criteria to apply to genetic 
screening, in particular access to and supply of DTC genetic tests. The research findings 
of this part of the project are reflected in Part B. In this chapter I will summarise the 
most important findings of this study and make some concluding remarks.
9.2. BACKGROUND
Ever since the human genome has been unravelled, developments in the field of 
genomics have advanced at a breakneck speed. In recent years several companies have 
discovered an attractive market. They offer all kinds of DNA tests directly to customers 
without a doctor’s involvement or consultation with a genetic counsellor, frequently 
via Internet. 
In keeping with the Dutch State’s positive obligation to protect individuals against 
health threats, the access to and the supply of direct-to-consumer genetic tests are 
discouraged by law. The licensing system of the Act on population screening (in Dutch: 
‘Wet op het bevolkingsonderzoek’ (WBO)) wards off these DTC genetic tests from the 
Dutch ‘screening market’. This meets with criticism in society. Individuals experience 
the strict quality criteria regulating access to DTC genetic tests as an unnecessary 
restriction of their self-determination. DTC genetic tests have the potential to empower 
individuals to take more responsibility for their health. With these tests individuals 
obtain knowledge about their risks of getting diseases or disorders in later life. 
Frequently, with a DTC genetic test thousands of polymorphisms are typed, some of 
which modify the risk of disease. Genetic testing on multi-factorial inherited diseases is 
about risks and probabilities. The future is not only shaped by genes, but also by other 
factors such as life style. It has been noted that the scientific evidence supporting the 
association between a gene variant and a disease or preventive advice for many of the 
DTC genetic tests is limited.509 And in general the suppliers510 of DTC genetic tests - who 
509 Kalf et al. 2013.




as a rule are also the providers511 of the tests - are not very generous with providing 
information about the narrow predictive value of these tests and their (potential) risks. 
This raises the question: ‘what are from constitutional and European law perspectives 
the normative criteria for access to and supply of DTC genetic tests?’ 
9.3. PART A: SELF-DETERMINATION AND PROTECTION
9.3.1. Research findings part A
In the first chapter it was noted that by allowing DTC genetic tests to be freely 
obtainable, the answer to the question how to regulate the availability of DTC genetic 
tests is dependent on the question how to balance the fundamental notions of self-
determination and protection. Neither of these notions is given absolute value in 
the academic literature or in the case law of the ECtHR(chapter 2). Member States 
of the Council of Europe have the responsibility to take measures for the promotion 
and protection of health. States Parties of the ECHR have the obligation to ensure the 
enjoyment of ECHR rights to all individuals within their territories. According to the 
case law of the ECtHR regarding articles 2, 3 and 8 ECHR States Parties have a positive 
obligation to protect residents from (potential) serious health threats (part A).
However, the Dutch State is also obliged to respect the self-determination of individuals. 
Respecting self-determination, according to the ECtHR jurisprudence implies that 
individuals have the freedom to choose behaviour which can cause (health) damage. 
This freedom can be restricted in case the decision was not based on informed consent, 
if human dignity is affected or if the interests of others are at issue (chapter 2). 
In this respect it is important to notice that the question whether a right to screening 
or self-determination as a claim right exists, must be answered in the negative, in the 
light of the ECtHR’s case law (chapter 2 and 4). 
The requirement of informed consent for medical treatment forms an essential 
safeguard for the right to respect for the private life and the self-determination of the 
individual. According to the ECtHR the information must be complete, reliable and 
accessible in good time. Articles 8 and 10 ECHR entail, according to the ECtHR, a general 
right to information. The principle of informed consent is above all a norm which 
creates an obligation for the State, the health care worker and the supplier towards 
consumers. From a legal perspective healthcare providers and suppliers of genetic 
screening must do everything in their power to guarantee so that consumers have the 
opportunity to make an informed choice. This is not just important for respecting self-
determination but it is also a criterion for conducting a ‘good’ commercial practice and 
‘fair’ advertising (chapter 2 and 4). 




In conclusion: Under the ECHR the Dutch State has the responsibility to protect citizens 
from health damage stemming from unsound screening (chapter 2-5).
9.3.2. Case study 
The principle of informed consent and the interest of others were given special 
attention in the case study DTC genetic tests. DTC genetic tests are criticised in 
academic literature due to the limited predictive value, the failure by suppliers to 
provide adequate information and the absence of medical supervision and counselling 
during the process of genetic testing. 
In the framework of the concepts protection and self-determination States Parties of 
the ECHR should promote that prior to genetic testing individuals have the opportunity 
to make a choice based on information regarding the predictive value, advantages 
and possible side-effects of DTC genetic tests. It can be debated whether the supplier 
of certain tests spend sufficient effort to ensure that consumers can make informed 
choices, by working the way they do now. It can also be questioned if consumers give 
lawful consent. However, burdening (family) doctors with the responsibility to inform 
consumers about DTC genetic tests and interpreting the test results, instead of the 
provider, would be unacceptable to the physicians. Above all it is a curtailment of 
consumer self-determination.
The Dutch State is, according to the case law of the ECtHR, not just obliged to respect 
the fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals. States Parties have also the duty 
to guarantee these rights and freedoms, also with regard to horizontal relations. 
Horizontal relations are relationships between ‘equals’, for example the relationship 
between a doctor and a patient or a company and a consumer. The discussion about 
the desirability of ‘free’ access to DTC genetic tests does not just affect the self-
determination of (potential) users of these tests. It also touches the fundamental 
rights and freedoms of others as mentioned in part A and B. DTC genetic tests have 
the special characteristic, just like other forms of genetic screening, that they do not 
just give information about the genetic constitution of the ‘tested individual’ but also 
about his or her blood relatives. In such situations blood relatives, without counselling 
or prior consent, can be confronted with health information which they would have 
preferred to remain unaware of. 
Recent research shows that free access to DTC genetic testing can have implications 
especially for the cost of healthcare and the rights of individuals who are by legally or 
factually not in a position to make health care decisions themselves, such as minors.512 
Interests of others also can be at stake as avoidable follow-up tests and overtreatment 
as a result of DTC genetic tests are an unnecessary drain on the general financial 
resources. This might have consequences in the long-term on the accessibility of 
healthcare. 





On account of the two core values, protection and self-determination, there are 
good reasons for the Dutch State to regulate the use of DTC genetic tests, notably by 
making access to and supply of these tests conditional to quality standards. The Dutch 
State should regulate the access to and the supply of DTC genetic tests because of 
their limited predictive value, the deficiencies with respect to adequate information 
and valid consent. Regulating the use of DTC genetic tests is also justified in order to 
guarantee the right and freedoms of others. 
In the respect of a fair balance between the right to self-determination of individuals 
and the need to protect them against (potentially) harmful screenings. A conclusion of 
Part A is that regulation should be based on the differentiation of quality requirements 
for the risk manifestation, the seriousness of damage and the social, psychology 
implications of unsound genetic screening. 
9.3.3. Remarks 
Protective regulation for screening to ensure self-determination seems to be a 
contradiction in terms. Legislation which aims to protect individuals against unsound 
genetic screening could limit the free availability of DTC genetic tests and thus limit the 
self-determination of individuals. However, unrestricted access to genetic screening 
can affect the level of protection against potential harmful genetic screening. Self-
determination and health protection are communicating vessels. Self-determination 
in literature and jurisprudence is often regarded and interpreted as the ‘right to be left 
alone’. 
In my view self-determination has to be explained from different perspectives. 
Self-determination also implies the possibility of organising life as one sees fit, self-
determination in the dimension of freedom to choose how life is organised and in the 
meaning of freedom of self-development.513 In this view taking measures that provide 
protection against (health)damage or that respect the principle of informed consent, 
do not detract from the self-determination. They rather strengthen this notion in the 
perspective of freedom of choice and freedom of self-development. In this context 
the protection of freedom of development means the prevention of individual health 
hazards or harm from others that affect the freedom to organise life to our own 
wishes.514 
Attempts have been made by several esteemed institutions like the Dutch Health Council, 
RVZ515, the Minister of Health, Welfare and Sport and the European Commission to find 
the key to solve the problem of inappropriate screening in the Dutch and European 
‘healthcare market’. The solution in the Netherlands and the EU appears to have been 
513 Hendriks et al. 2013, p. 41-45.
514 Hendriks et al. 2013, p. 41-45.




found by setting requirements to the information provided with DTC genetic tests by 
suppliers and providers, as well as to its technical specification.516 The idea is to arm 
the public with knowledge so that individuals can make informed choices.517 This fits 
in with a healthcare system that is driven by an open-market where the emphasis is 
on people’s own responsibility, freedom of choice and self-management. Within the 
dominant open-market oriented view of healthcare it is evidently assumed that we are 
(all) competent to be able to make informed decisions, which is however debatable. 
Apart from that sensible well-informed people can take damage-causing decisions. I can 
broadly agree with the theory that individuals, when of sound mind, also have the right 
to take decisions which can be damaging to their health. This is different when there 
is no valid consent or when the rights and freedoms of others or society are affected, 
or human dignity is at stake (chapter 2). Consent is just one of the requirements for 
carrying out a DTC genetic tests.518 The State, the physician and the company that 
provide screening after a clear informed consent from an individual still have an ‘own’ 
(professional) responsibility.519 In my view physicians and companies should not be 
offering and performing DTC genetic tests on patients and consumers if the (potential) 
individual (health) risks overshadow the (health) benefits, even in situations where 
consumers, after reliable information about advantages and disadvantages, still wish a 
DTC genetic test or another screening. 
The difficulty regarding the competency and the capacity to make decisions regarding 
health and/or treatment of patients is beyond the objective of this thesis. However, I 
would like to make one comment regarding this subject. It is not easy for physicians 
in ‘regular’ circumstances to be certain whether patients can make reasonable 
assessment of their interests in matters of health. This is even harder when the doctor 
has no ‘face to face’ contact with the patient because they only communicate through 
the telephone or internet. With DTC genetic testing the involvement of a physician is 
absent. Who then determines the competence and capacity of consumers to make 
decisions regarding their health? 
To sum up, it must be kept in mind by States and suppliers that, when individuals seek 
access to DTC genetic tests, the substantive norm self-determination is not sufficiently 
warranted by standardised or general information about the characteristics (chapter 
3). The same is true for the provision of global information about the interpretation 
of the test results of certain tests. Within the framework of safeguarding self-
determination, there is a lot to be said for a standard offer of individual counselling in 
516 COM (2012) 541 final; Multidisciplinaire Richtlijn Preventief Medisch Onderzoek. Koninklijke Nederlandsche 
Maatschappij tot bevordering der Geneeskunst. Utrecht May 2013; Van der Maas 2000; GR 2008; RVZ 
2008.
517 GR 2008, p. 18.
518 Van Beers 2009, p. 109.




which the information about DTC genetic tests is tailored to the information needs of 
the consumer (chapter 3). 
More importantly, only providing information regarding the benefits and risks of DTC 
genetic tests by States and suppliers is in my opinion not enough nor an effective way 
of protecting individuals against potential health risks.520 Neither is it an adequate way 
of guaranteeing the rights and freedoms of others than the potential tested person. It is 
true, ‘Forewarned is forearmed’. But there is only one problem: the harmful screening, 
which can cause health damage to people, is still freely available.
9.4. PART B EUROPEAN LEGAL FRAMEWORK
9.4.1. Research findings
Regulating genetic screening on a European level
Although a comprehensive European normative framework is absent, important 
principles and norms, relevant to the access to and supply of genetic screening for 
health purposes, have gained recognition on a European level. I examined in part 
A the legal instruments of the EU and the Council of Europe which apply to genetic 
screening. These legal documents stipulate that the validity, specificity, sensitivity 
and clinical benefits are crucial factors if marketing and/ or implementing genetic 
screening is allowed. Furthermore, according to these documents genetic screening 
with far reaching implications for individuals or their relatives should not be permitted 
without the supervision of a healthcare worker. And appropriate non-directive genetic 
counselling should be offered before and after testing. Moreover, access to and the 
supply of genetic screening should be accompanied by rigorous informed consent 
procedures owing to the examined legal instruments of the EU and the Council of 
Europe (part B). 
Regulating genetic screening on national level
In the Netherlands, the ‘Act on Public Health’ 521 together with the WBO forms the legal 
framework that primarily aims to protect and to promote health at population level. 
Both Acts regulate matters in the field of public health which the legislator deems fit 
for a ‘healthy society’ (chapter 2).522 The first Act assigns duties and the powers of 
the Dutch State in the field of public health. The WBO is the most important legal 
instrument which regulates the access to and the supply of screening classified as 
population screening. This system was introduced to establish a fair balance between 
520 Dute 2013, p. 19.
521 De Wet publieke gezondheid.




the right to self-determination of individuals and the need to protect them against 
(potentially) harmful screenings.523 The WBO sets quality requirements through a 
licensing system for certain forms of screening, namely high risk population screening 
(part A and B). 
The Dutch ‘National Programme Population Screening’ (NPPS)524 is part of the domain 
of public health. The NPPS contains a number of large-scale, national screenings offered 
by the State.525 The NPPS is not legally entrenched and has no (formal) legal basis in the 
WBO nor in the Act on Public Health. This is remarkable. In the framework of the NPPS 
the Dutch State intrudes uninvited into the life of citizens, sometimes strongly urging 
them to avail themselves of the screening offer. It is generally accepted that population 
screening should be carried out with sufficient warrants for the self-determination of 
individuals due to the general risks of screening and the uninvited offer to healthy 
individuals.526 
Furthermore, the Dutch ‘Act Medical Treatment Contracts’527 as part of the Dutch Civil 
Code, applies to contracts in which a supplier provides medical services. This act lays 
down the rights and obligations of care providers and the patients and also in certain 
situations customers (chapter 2 en 3). 
9.4.2. Case study. 
In the Netherlands, traditionally DNA diagnostics have been available through the 
Clinical genetic departments of the University Medical Centres (chapter 2.4). According 
to the Dutch Act ‘Exceptional Medical Procedures’528 these departments have been 
granted a licence for complex genetic counselling and clinical DNA diagnostics. In 
general DTC genetic tests cannot be defined as a clinical genetic examination, due to 
the fact that certain tests mostly are performed outside the hospital care system. 
DTC genetic tests are qualified under the WBO as population screening. These tests 
come under the scope of this Act because the Dutch Minister of Health, Welfare and 
Sports and the Dutch Health Council take the position that the initiative (the offer) for 
a DTC genetic test rests with the (healthcare)provider. In their opinion businesses invite 
consumers via Internet or the media, with a financial contribution in return, to take 
part in a screening to detect (risk-indicators for) or exclude diseases. The fact that the 
individuals themselves are often actively searching for information about DTC genetic 
tests, for example via a browser on Internet, does not affect this. 
523 Van der Maas 2000, p.7.
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The WBO conflicts with the Protocol concerning Genetic testing for Health purposes. 
The Netherlands has not yet ratified this Protocol (Chapter 7). The WBO, contrary to 
the Protocol concerning Genetic testing for Health purposes, does not regulate access 
to an supply of all genetic tests and only guarantees the Council of Europe’s normative 
criteria for DTC genetic tests aimed at detecting the (risk indicators of) cancer and (risk 
indicators of) untreatable diseases. 
In part B I took the position that the IVD-Directive529 does not cover DTC genetic tests 
because the tube in the toolkit has no separate value and is nothing more than a 
product for general laboratory use. For the sake of completeness, the software which 
is used by analysts in the laboratories could be classified in some circumstances as 
medical devices which are under certain conditions covered by the Medical Devices 
Directive530 (6.2 and 8.3.2). 
In part B I concluded on the basis of the case study that the WBO and the way that it 
is applied, are not in accordance with the Internal Market rules of the EU regarding 
services and establishment (chapter 6). The principle of freedom of establishment 
enables a provider to offer and perform genetic screening in a stable and continuous 
way in one or more Member States of the EU. The principle of the freedom to provide 
services enables a provider in one Member State to offer and perform genetic 
screening on a temporary basis in another Member State, without being established 
over there. In accordance with Article 62 TFEU the exceptions regarding the freedom 
of establishment also apply to the free movement of services.
It can be debated why the EU’s primary law regarding the free movement of goods 
does not apply to the toolkit, now the IVD-Directive does not cover the supply of DTC 
genetic tests. 
In my opinion the licence criteria of the WBO, which is a restrictive measure, have 
to be examined in relation to the free movement of service. It is true that no case 
law of the ECJ exists regarding the free movement of DTC genetic tests. However, 
during the past twenty years several cases - Her Majesty’s Customs and Excise/Gerhart 
Schindler & Jörg Schindler (1994)531, Canal Satélite/Administración General del Estado 
(2002)532, Burmanjer et al. (2005)533 and Ker Optika (2010)534 – were brought before 
the ECJ regarding a measure which restricted directly or indirectly the free movement 
of several fundamental freedoms, mostly goods and services. As I have mentioned 
before it is settled case law in certain situations that the ECJ examines a restriction in 
relation to one freedom. In the past years, as far as I know, the ECJ only once examined 
529 Directive 98/79/EC.
530 Directive 93/42/EC as amended by Directive 2007/47/EC.
531 Case C-275/92, Her Majesty’s Customs and Excise/Gerhart Schindler & Jörg Schindler [1994] ECR I-1039.
532 Case C-390/99, Canal Satélite/Administración General del Estado [2002] ECR I-607.
533 Case C-20/03, Burmanjer et al.[2005] ECR I-4133.




a measure in relation to two fundamental freedoms in a similar situation.535 In this case 
it appeared that the good, the decoder, was not entirely secondary to the connected 
service. The cases where the ECJ examined a measure affecting several freedoms in 
relation to the free movement of goods, the concerned good had a separate value, like 
a contact lens, a magazine.536 In the case Her Majesty’s Customs and Excise/Gerhart 
Schindler & Jörg Schindler regarding a lottery, the ECJ has judged that the importation 
and distribution of the lottery tickets (the good) are not ends in themselves. They are 
important to participate in the lottery (the service). The same applies to the toolkit 
with the tube which is used for the performing of DTC genetic tests. People like to 
have the service, the sequencing of their genome and the risk calculations regarding 
disorders and diseases. DTC genetic tests could be compared with urinalysis: contrary 
to DTC genetic tests nobody shall question if urinalysis is a service, even though a good 
is used for taking a urine sample at home.
In part B I concluded that the WBO is at odds with EU law (as argued in chapters 6, 
4 and 8). The prohibition, the licensing or the introduction of a quality mark for DTC 
genetic tests by national States are restrictions because these measures discourage 
and derogate the free movement of services and establishment (chapter 6). Imperative 
requirements of general interest can objectively justify the restriction of the free 
movement of services and establishment. These restrictive measures can be justified 
for public health reasons if they meet the requirements of non-direct discrimination 
on grounds of nationality and proportionality. Before answering the question whether 
the restriction does not go further than necessary for its aim, the suitability of the 
restricted measure has to be verified (chapter 6). The licences requirement of the 
WBO conflicts however with the law of the EU. This is partially the result of the fact 
that the definition of population screening and the licence requirements of the WBO 
are ambiguous. The licences criteria of the WBO are not foreseeable and accessible. 
Furthermore, the WBO conflicts with EU law regarding the free movement of service 
and establishment because of its enforcement problems. It does not pursue its goal 
consistently and systematically (chapter 6).
The existing Dutch legislation can easily be side-stepped by the so-called ‘foreign routes’. 
These deficiencies that affect the protective function of the WBO are increasingly 
becoming an encumbrance with the growing free availability of DTC genetic tests. As I 
pointed out in chapter 8 DTC genetic tests traded via Internet are difficult to supervise. 
Protecting individuals against questionable genetic testing calls for international 
measures by the international community. However, regulation on national and 
European level is not meaningless. Firstly, the WBO provides a basic level of protection 
against (potential) harmful screenings. It effectively prevents individuals from getting 
535 Case C-390/99, Canal Satélite/Administración General del Estado [2002] ECR I-607.
536 Case C-108/09, Ker Optika [2010] ECR I-12113; Case C-390/99, Canal Satélite/Administración General del 




access to unsound screening. Secondly, some DTC genetic test companies respect the 
fact that DTC genetic tests are outlawed in some countries. And lastly, national and 
European quality standards for information help individuals to make decisions based 
on adequate information.
Conclusion part B: 
Within Europe there seems to be a consensus on the fact that genetic screening should 
not be offered without medical supervision, non-directive genetic counselling and 
rigorous informed consent procedures. The test instrument used for genetic screening, 
moreover, should be reliable and valid.
In the Netherlands DTC genetic tests falls under the scope of the WBO. This Act is 
a unique and effective piece of legislation (chapter 5). Despite interpretations and 
enforcement problems it provides a basic level of protection against (potential) harmful 
population screening. Nevertheless, a revision of the WBO in line with the European 
legal standards is necessary. The Act conflicts with the legal standards of the Council of 
Europe and the legislation of the European Union. 
9.4.3. New developments537
New developments on European level
With respect to the relations between the WBO and European legislation, it is significant 
that the European Commission has adopted a proposal that has now been submitted 
to the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers with regard to a Regulation 
concerning in vitro diagnostic medical devices.538 In this proposal a radical change has 
been presented with regard to the legal framework of the EU for DTC genetic tests. 
This Regulation can have far-reaching consequences for Dutch legislation for genetic 
screening and the values underpinning it. It is early days to formulate a comment here 
and now because it is still unclear what the definition of DTC genetic test is or will be 
in the concept Regulation. Also it is not clear when a genetic test should be classified 
as a good (possibly in the future regulated by the ‘new’ IVD Regulation) and when as a 
service (regulated by the free movement regime with regard to services). Furthermore, 
various amendments have been proposed, for instance an amendment regarding the 
freedom of Member States of the EU to restrict supply of such tests due to the ethical 
and social implications.
New developments on a national level
Recently the multidisciplinary Guideline Preventive Medical Examination (PMO-
guideline) was published by the Royal Dutch Medical Association (KNMG).539 This 
537 The last chapter of this thesis have been completed at 18 October 2013. 





Guideline sets quality requirements for DTC (genetic) screening through conditioned 
self-regulation. In conditioned self-regulation the State establishes intrinsic or process 
requirements for the regulation. The aim of this PMO-guideline is to formulate 
quality criteria and to make recommendations for the provision and carrying out 
of PMOs. The guideline includes an information system to inform individuals about 
PMOs. Furthermore, it is intended to design a certification assessment system for the 
supervision and enforcement of the PMO-guideline. The guideline is complementary to 
the already existing legislation. A population screening for which a licence is required 
under the WBO and screening programmes from the NPPS do not fall under the 




Based on the research findings from previous chapters it have to be concluded that 
from a constitutional and European Union Law perspective there are good reasons 
for the Dutch State to regulate the access to and supply of DTC genetic tests. Member 
States of the Council of Europe and the EU have freedom of policy with regard to 
regulatory and enforcement systems to realise the objectives of the treaty provisions 
and EU-directives. It must be kept in mind that if the Dutch State chooses the 
instrument of self-regulation by setting authorisation and quality requirements for DTC 
(genetic) screening, the Dutch State remains fully responsible for the compliance with 
fundamental rights and freedoms.
In my opinion self-regulation is not an effective way for guaranteeing the rights and 
freedoms of others. The strict (licensing) requirements of the current WBO provide 
an effective protection against unjustified infringement of the rights and freedoms of 
others. In the discussion about the WBO and permitting DTC (genetic) screening, for 
that matter in this study too, little attention has been paid to an important subject: 
the position of individuals for whom the self-determination (temporarily) is actually 
exercised by others. Not infrequently this subject is approached from the perspective 
of the representative. 
Care must be taken by States, physicians and suppliers of (genetic) screening that the 
concept self-determination regarding individuals for whom the self-determination is 
exercised by others does not just become ‘a snapshot of irreversible choices’. The way 
in which the fundamental rights and freedoms of unborn, minors and incapable adults 
can be met in relation to DTC (genetic) screening requires further research.
Same normative criteria
In the previous chapters we saw on national and also European level that in the field 




which is used for DNA diagnostics. Which legal regime applies, depends on the context 
in which the genetic examinations take place. Nationally, it can be questioned why 
not all DTC genetic tests are classified as ‘special procedures’ where legal access 
and quality requirements are set on the grounds of the Act ‘Exceptional Medical 
Procedures’ to protect the self-determination of the individual and others. It is difficult 
to see why clinical DNA diagnostic and complex genetic counselling are regarded as 
‘special procedures’ on account of the social and ethical implications, and DTC genetic 
tests are not regarded as such (chapter 2). In principle the techniques which are used 
to examine the DNA and the possible physical, social and psychological implications are 
fundamentally the same. 
The way I see it the same minimal normative quality criteria should apply to individual 
clinical genetic diagnostics, national screening programmes and DTC genetic tests, given 
the fact that many advantages and disadvantages are not just typical of DTC genetic 
tests but also apply to clinical genetic diagnostics at (regular) hospitals and national 
screening programmes. It is hard to see why in practice different quality requirements 
and patient/ consumer rights should apply, depending on the type of testing and the 
person who takes the initiative to do this.
The future of the WBO
Based on the evaluation of the WBO, the recommendations of the Dutch Health 
Council, the advice of the RVZ and the reports of the Healthcare Inspectorate and the 
findings of this research, a revision of the WBO seems inevitable. Since the WBO came 
into force its scope has caused problems due to the unclear definitions and ambiguous 
licensing criteria. It is worrying that these deficiencies of the WBO affect the protective 
function of the Act. A permit system without foreseeable and accessible licence criteria 
is an invitation to arbitrariness. It can be used to avoid sharp ethical discussions or 
decisions and inhibit scientific knowledge. This undermines, in my beliefs unnecessarily, 
the level of support in the Dutch society for the WBO. In the Netherlands protection 
in the framework of (genetic) screening is often directly associated with the inhibitory 
effect of the licence obligation of the WBO. 
I think the basic assumption for genetic screening, such as DTC genetic tests, which is 
not included in the NPPS,540 should be that in principle the provision and carrying out 
of screening is permitted, unless the screening is done according to unsound scientific 
standards or the patient and consumer rights are not complied with. This means in effect 
the withdrawal of the current WBO. Instead it should be replaced by a ‘screening act’ 
with minimal quality criteria for the access to and supply of screening. The ‘screening 
act’ would have to contain a flexible licensing system, in which in a very exceptional 
situation extra quality requirements can be defined for certain types of screening. At 




the national level the use of the term population screening should be reserved for 
national screening programmes. The term population screening in the current WBO 
creates confusion and legal insecurity because the term population screening is in the 
first place associated with large scale screening programmes coordinated by the State. 
National Programme Population Screening should get a legal basis in the ‘Act on Public 
Health’.541 In this way it becomes apparent to citizens that the Minister of Health, Welfare 
and Sports has a large discretionary power in the integration of population screening 
in the NPPS, through which the decision-making process can be influenced by political 
choices, moral and ethical objections and financial considerations. In accordance 
with the thematic evaluation of self-determination legislation, this provision could be 
worded as follows:
‘The Minister of Health bears the responsibility for a national population screening 
programme and for the implementation of national screening programmes which are 
reimbursed under the Health Insurance Act. The Minister lays down requirements by 
or under the law for the implementation of the programme.’
Final remark
As it was formulated in part B effective regulation at a global, European or national level 
should start with a legal framework of authorisation. And it should end with legislation 
on matters concerning the safety and use of health-related goods and services, the 
post-authorisation processes. Therefore only a premarket review and and/or a national 
or European quality mark on the software or the toolkit is not sufficient for setting 
quality requirements for the provision of DTC genetic tests. It does not guard individuals 
against (potential) health hazards. Furthermore, it does not protect others against the 
violation of their right and freedom of others. Given that, the main problem is not the 
fact that DTC genetic testing companies use unreliable equipment or use software of 
an extremely poor quality for drawing up the genetic profile. As a rule the criticism 
focuses primarily on the way in which such businesses interpret the data obtained 
by the sequencing of the genome, and the way this interpretation is conveyed to the 
customer, lacking proper support and counselling. 
541 Kamerstukken II 2007/08, 22894, nr. 179, p. 7.







Consumers have many possibilities to undergo a form of screening to acquire (future) 
health information via the Internet or otherwise by purchasing health checks, medical 
check-ups, total body scans and direct-to-consumer (DTC) genetic tests. More and 
more providers place such screenings on the market before they have been assessed 
properly. In the Netherlands the Act on population screening (in Dutch: ‘Wet op het 
bevolkingsonderzoek’ (WBO)) sets strict quality criteria for screening. In accordance 
with this Act a licence is required for offering and performing screening with ionising 
radiation or for detecting (risk factors of) cancer and untreatable diseases. This system, 
which aims to protect individuals against health damage and also to ensure patients 
(rights), wards off ‘commercial screening’542 of the Dutch market. In society this meets 
with criticism. Individuals increasingly perceive the limited access to screening as an 
unnecessary restriction of their self-determination. However, besides the duty to 
guarantee the right of self-determination the State has a special responsibility regarding 
the health of individuals. This thesis focuses on the following central question: ‘What 
are the normative criteria for the access to and supply of genetic screening from 
constitutional and European law perspectives?’ As a corollary, I will explore what this 
means for the Dutch legal framework regulating genetic screening, particularly DTC 
genetic tests. 
In Chapter 1 the author explains the aim of this thesis and how the central question 
and sub-questions are being examined and answered in the chapters that follow. An 
explanation is given why this study devotes great attention to the legal documents of 
the Council of Europe and the European Union (EU), the case law of European Court 
of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the European Court of Justice (ECJ). The chapter further 
describes the scope of the study and the relevance of the research findings for other 
fields than genetics and genomics.
The central question in Chapter 2 concerns the extent to which a State is obliged 
to respond to the ‘unregulated’ access to and supply of DNA (self)tests to prevent 
individual damage to health and to protect the rights and freedoms of others? The 
answer to this question partly depends on the value accorded to self-determination 
and protection, important human rights and health law principles. The chapter starts 
with an explanation of the way in which DNA (self)diagnostics can play a part in the 
identification of carrier status or (latent) present diseases which can benefit the people 
concerned. Also an overview is given of the benefits and risks of DNA diagnostics, 
particularly DTC genetic tests. 




Based on a academic literature study and in accordance with the case law of the ECtHR 
regarding article 2 (the right to life), article 3 (the prohibition of torture) and article 8 
(private and family life) there are good arguments to set strict (quality) requirements 
for the access to DNA (self)tests. Not only can it be questioned whether there is always 
informed consent by the consumer; also DNA (self)tests can infringe on the rights and 
freedoms of others. Moreover, there is the risk of false concern (or reassurance) and 
rising health costs as a result of the fact that the interpretation of the results of those 
tests is complex.
The principle of informed consent is an expression of self-determination. In the 
implementation of national screening programmes various dimensions of self-
determination play a role: self-determination as the right ‘to be left alone’, self-
determination as ‘freedom to choice’ and self-determination as ‘claim to self-
development’. In order to make use of all these dimensions of self-determination, 
adequate information is of essential importance. Chapter 3 describes the guarantees 
for self-determination within the scope of the national programme of prenatal 
screening for Down syndrome in the Netherlands. The main conclusions in this chapter 
are; that pregnant women have the right to self-determination and thereby have the 
right to decide on whether they want to procreate or not and, if so, whether they want 
to undergo prenatal screening. Information is of great importance for exercising self-
determination in prenatal screening. According to the ECtHR this information must be 
complete, reliable and timely accessible.
In the advisory reports of the Dutch Health Council regarding prenatal screening for 
Down syndrome the dominant dimension of self-determination is freedom of choice. 
In this chapter it turns out that besides factual information pregnant women need help 
from health care workers in order to be able to apply the information to their own 
situation. To support self-determination the professional groups and implementing 
agencies related to prenatal screening should reformulate the principle of non-
directivity. It should be formulated in such a way that it expresses more clearly that 
informing pregnant women about prenatal screening goes beyond providing factual 
information. Furthermore, it is important that the Minister of Health, Welfare and 
Sports reconsiders the age limit for the reimbursement of the costs related to prenatal 
screening for Down syndrome. In this way the procedural and the material norm of 
article 8 ECHR is guaranteed for all pregnant women: actually having and experiencing 
freedom of choice.
In commercial screening it is often difficult to distinguish between the concepts ‘offer’, 
‘invitation’ and ‘advertisement’. Companies target consumers through promotional 
texts on websites or advertising messages in newspapers and magazines to purchase 
forms of screening, for example DTC genetic tests. In this way consumers are invited to 




Chapter 4 includes a study of the EU and constitutional law regarding health services 
advertisement in relation to the freedom of expression. In this chapter one of the 
findings is that licensing or banning of health services advertising on grounds of health 
protection will not quickly be regarded as an unjustified infringement. States Parties of 
the ECHR have a wide margin of appreciation in the regulation of advertising.
EU law provides a more effective protection against violations of the freedom of 
expression in relation to health services advertising than the ECHR. Furthermore, fewer 
conditions are attached to banning advertising than to systems of prior administrative 
permission under EU law. The proportionality of a ban or prior administrative 
authorization for DTC genetic tests and the desired objective is questionable. These 
objectives can also be achieved with measures which encroach less on the fundamental 
rights and freedoms of individuals and providers of such tests.
Chapter 5 contains a report of the regulatory frameworks of seven European countries 
that apply to DTC genetic testing. France, Germany, Portugal and Switzerland have 
specific legislation stating that genetic tests can only be carried out by a medical doctor. 
In these countries the physician can only carry out a DTC genetic test with the consent 
of the patient/ consumer just as in the Netherlands, Belgium and the United Kingdom. 
Physicians have the duty to give adequate information about the character, the meaning 
and the implications of DTC genetic tests before the patient/ consumer is tested. The 
Netherlands has a licence system for screening. This is unique in the world. Belgium 
and the United Kingdom allow the provision of DTC genetic tests without restrictions.
From a human right perspective there are good reasons to regulate the access to and 
the supply of DTC genetic tests. The Netherlands is a Member State of the Council 
of Europe and the European Union. These organisations influence the freedom of 
Member States to regulate the supply of and access to DTC genetic tests. The subject of 
Chapter 6 is the freedom of EU Member States to regulate the access to and the supply 
of commercial genome sequencing within their national borders and the consequences 
of this for the Netherlands. In this chapter the view of the authors is that commercial 
genome sequencing is a service and not a good. As a consequence in cross-border 
situations the Dutch licence system is a barrier to the free movement of services and 
the freedom of establishment. Dutch legislation appears not to be EU-proof. The 
licence system of the WBO regarding access to and the supply of commercial genome 
sequencing conflicts with the E-Commerce Directive and the EU free movement regime 
for establishment. The WBO conflicts with EU law because the restricted measure – 
the licence system – is not proportional to the pursued goal. This is the result of the 
scope problems of the WBO. This can cause problems in situations in which a company 
from another Member State establishes itself in the Netherlands, and wants to offer 




for a revision of the WBO. This revision should focus on clarifying the definition of 
population screening and the licence criteria, in a manner that the licence criteria are 
foreseeable and accessible before the licence is requested and judged.
In Chapter 7 the authors examine whether the WBO can serve as an example for other 
European countries. The following conclusions can be drawn after studying the different 
binding instruments and legal documents adopted by the Council of Europe and the EU. 
There appears to be a common opinion that the validity and utility of genetic tests are 
essential preconditions for allowing them to be offered to the public. Moreover, there 
is widespread support for the idea that genetic tests should be provided only under 
medical supervision. Furthermore genetic tests with risks that can have far reaching 
implications for the person concerned or his or her relatives should not be supplied 
without appropriate non-directive genetic counselling. 
The WBO cannot serve as an example for other countries which are Members States or 
States Parties of the EU or ECHR. In the first place the WBO is too liberal compared to 
the European normative criteria because it does not regulate access to all genetic tests. 
The Act only warrants the European normative criteria for DTC genetic tests aimed at 
detecting the (risk indicators of) cancer and (risk indicators of) untreatable diseases. 
In the second place the WBO conflicts with the EU law as described in the previous 
chapter.
In Chapter 8 the authors compare EU law regarding medicines with EU law applied 
to DTC genetic tests. The aim of this comparison is to examine whether the legal 
framework of the EU for the safety and responsible use of (Internet) medicines could 
be an example for regulating access to and supply of DTC genetic tests. The EU legal 
framework with respect to (internet) medicines could serve as an example for (central) 
authorisation of the marketing of DTC genetic testing services on the internal market. 
However, only a premarket review is not enough to guarantee the quality, clinical 
usefulness, reliability and the safe use of such tests. An effective regulation of DTC 
genetic tests consisting of a premarket review, stipulates medical supervision and sets 
up quality criteria for the information that has to be provided during the genetic testing 
service.
Chapter 9 contains the most important findings of this study and some concluding 
remarks. It is argued that self-determination has not only the meaning of the right to 
be left alone. Self-determination also implies the possibility of organising life as one 
sees fit. This is self-determination in the dimension of freedom to choose how life 
is organised and in the meaning of freedom of self-development. In this view taking 
measures that provide protection against (health) damage or that respect the principle 




this notion in the perspective of freedom of choice and freedom of self-development. 
However, self-determination is not sufficiently warranted by standardised or general 
information about the characteristics. Therefore individual counselling is necessary. 
During counselling the provider/ healthcare worker can tailor the information to the 
needs of the consumer. Just providing information and/or giving better information 
to patients/ consumers is not enough nor an effective way of protecting individuals 
against potential health risks. 
One important recommendation from this study is that the current WBO should be 
withdrawn and should be replaced by a ‘screening act’ with minimal quality criteria 
for the access to and supply of screening. In principle the provision and carrying out 
of screening should be permitted, unless the screening is done according to unsound 
scientific standards or the patient and consumer general rights are not complied with. 
At the national level the use of the term population screening should be reserved for 
national screening programmes. The chapter ends with the take home massage that 
only a premarket review and/or a quality mark does not guard individuals against 
(potential) health hazards nor protects people against the violation of their right 
and freedom by others. The main problem is not the fact that DTC genetic testing 
companies may use unreliable equipment or use software of poor quality for drawing 
up the genetic profile. As a rule the criticism focuses primarily on the way in which 
such businesses interpret the data obtained by the sequencing of the genome, and 
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Consumenten hebben via internet en anderszins tal van mogelijkheden om via health 
checks, medische check ups, total bodyscans en direct-to-consumer (DTC) genetische 
testen informatie te verkrijgen over hun (toekomstige) gezondheid. Aanbieders plaatsen 
dergelijke vormen van screening steeds vaker op de markt zonder dat de veiligheid, de 
betrouwbaarheid en het (klinisch) nut hiervan vaststaan. In Nederland gelden vanwege 
de potentiële gezondheidsrisico’s voor het aanbieden en verrichten van bepaalde vormen 
van screening strikte voorwaarden op grond van de Wet op het bevolkingsonderzoek 
(WBO). De (kwaliteits)waarborgen die de Nederlandse wet- en regelgeving beogen 
te bieden ten aanzien van screening, niet in de laatste plaats ter bescherming van 
patiënten(rechten), weren in de praktijk de zogenaamde ‘commerciële’543 screening van 
de Nederlandse markt. Steeds meer mensen ervaren dit als een inbreuk op hun recht 
op zelfbeschikking. Echter, op de Staat rust, naast de plicht tot het waarborgen van het 
recht op zelfbeschikking, ook een bijzondere verantwoordelijkheid met betrekking tot 
de bescherming van de gezondheid. In dit proefschrift staat de vraag centraal welke 
normatieve criteria vanuit EU- en grondrechtelijk perspectief gelden voor de toegang 
tot en de verrichting van genetische screening, in het bijzonder DTC genetische testen 
en wat dit betekent voor de Nederlandse wet- en regelgeving.
Hoofdstuk 1 bevat een algemene inleiding en een beschrijving van het doel van het 
proefschrift. In de inleiding wordt uitgelegd op welke wijze de centrale vraag en de 
deelvragen in de afzonderlijke hoofdstukken worden onderzocht en beantwoord. 
Hierna volgt een verklaring waarom er in het proefschrift veel aandacht uitgaat naar de 
juridisch bindende instrumenten van de Europese Unie (EU) en de Raad van Europa en 
de jurisprudentie van het Europees Hof voor de Rechten van de Mens (EHRM). Tot slot 
beschrijft de auteur de beperkingen van de studie en de relevantie van dit onderzoek 
voor andere terreinen dan de genetica (de leer van de erfelijkheid) en genomics (het 
samenspel tussen de genen).
Hoofdstuk 2 formuleert een antwoord op de vraag in hoeverre de overheid is gehouden 
het ongereguleerde aanbod van DNA-(zelf)testen aan banden te leggen ter voorkoming 
van individuele gezondheidsschade en ter bescherming van de rechten en vrijheden 
van anderen. Het antwoord op die vraag is mede afhankelijk van de betekenis die wordt 
toegekend aan de belangrijke mensenrechtelijke en gezondheidsrechtelijke beginselen 
autonomie en bescherming. Het hoofdstuk begint met een uitgebreide beschrijving 
over de wijze waarop DNA-diagnostiek kan bijdragen aan het opsporen van dragerschap 
of (latent) aanwezige ziekten waarbij de betrokkenen voordeel kunnen hebben. Ook 
543 Screening buiten het zogenaamde ‘reguliere’ circuit.
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wordt stil gestaan bij de nadelen en risico’s van DNA-diagnostiek en in het bijzonder van 
DNA-(zelf)testen. De belangrijkste conclusie in dit hoofdstuk is dat op er grond van de 
literatuurstudie en de jurisprudentie van het EHRM over de artikelen 2 (recht op leven), 
3 (folterverbod) en 8 (recht op privacy en familie- en gezinsleven) van het Verdrag tot 
bescherming van de rechten van de mens en de fundamentele vrijheden (EVRM) er 
vanuit algemeen mensenrechtelijk oogpunt goede redenen zijn om aan het aanbod 
van DNA-(zelf)testen strikte (kwaliteits)eisen te stellen. Het risico bestaat bijvoorbeeld 
van onterechte zorg (of geruststelling) en stijgende gezondheidskosten door 
overdiagnostiek en overbehandeling als gevolg van dergelijk (niet altijd betrouwbaar) 
onderzoek waarvan het (klinisch) nut twijfelachtig is. Bovendien kunnen DNA-(zelf)
testen ook inbreuk maken op de rechten en vrijheden van anderen. En voorts zijn er 
twijfels of wel altijd sprake is van geïnformeerde toestemming van de consument.
Geïnformeerde toestemming – het beginsel van informed consent - vormt een uitdrukking 
van zelfbeschikking. Bij de uitvoering van landelijke screeningprogramma’s, maar 
ook ten aanzien van de toegang tot DTC genetisch testen spelen verschillende noties 
van zelfbeschikking een rol. Zelfbeschikking in de betekenis van afweerrecht tot 
zelfbeschikking in de notie van keuzevrijheid en als aanspraak op zelfontplooiing. Om 
gebruik te kunnen maken van al deze noties is adequate informatie van essentieel belang. 
Hoofdstuk 3 beschrijft de waarborgen voor zelfbeschikking in het kader van het landelijk 
programma voor prenatale screening op het syndroom van Down. De belangrijkste 
bevindingen zijn; dat zwangeren recht hebben op zelfbeschikking en daarmee op keuzen 
aangaande hun zwangerschap en het ondergaan van prenatale screening. Dat informatie 
van groot belang is voor de uitoefening van zelfbeschikking. Deze informatie moet, aldus 
het EHRM, volledig, betrouwbaar en tijdig toegankelijk zijn.
In de adviezen van de Gezondheidsraad over prenatale screening op Downsyndroom 
voert zelfbeschikking in de vorm van het bieden van mogelijkheden voor het maken 
van geïnformeerde keuzen de boventoon. In dit hoofdstuk blijkt dat zwangeren naast 
vooral feitelijke informatie in de praktijk vooral behoefte hebben aan professionele 
begeleiding door hulpverleners bij het toepassen van de informatie op de eigen 
situatie. Om die reden zouden de beroepsgroepen en uitvoeringsinstanties het principe 
van non-directiviteit bij de informatieverstrekking over prenatale screening moeten 
herformuleren in het kader van zelfbeschikking. Herformuleren op zodanige wijze 
dat (beter) tot uitdrukking komt dat het informeren van zwangeren over prenatale 
screening verder reikt dan het enkel geven van feitelijke informatie. Daarnaast is het 
belangrijk dat de Minister van Volksgezondheid Welzijn en Sport de leeftijdsgrens 
voor de vergoeding uit het basispakket van de prenatale screening op Downsyndroom 
heroverweegt, opdat niet alleen de procedurele norm van artikel 8 EVRM is gewaarborgd 
– de toegang tot prenatale screening en het krijgen van informatie daarover – maar dat 




Bij commerciële screening is er zelden een onderscheid tussen de begrippen aanbieden, 
uitnodigen en reclame. Dit komt doordat aanbieders met openbare verkoopbevorderende 
teksten op betaalde websites of met reclameboodschappen in kranten en tijdschriften 
screening rechtstreeks aanbieden aan consumenten. Ze nodigen consumenten met 
dergelijke teksten uit om een gezondheidsdienst - screening - te kopen. Hoofdstuk 4 
omvat een studie naar de EU- en grondrechtelijke aspecten van reclame voor (internet)
gezondheidsdiensten en de toelaatbaarheid van het beperken van deze wijze van 
meningsuiting. Een bevinding in dit hoofdstuk is dat het EHRM het vergunnen of het 
verbieden van reclame voor gezondheidsdiensten op gezondheidsbeschermende 
gronden niet snel zal aanmerken als een ongerechtvaardigde inbreuk op de vrijheid 
van meningsuiting. Verdragstaten hebben een ruime margin of appreciation bij het 
reguleren van reclame voor gezondheidsdoeleinden. Het blijkt dat het EU-recht met 
betrekking tot grensoverschrijdende ‘pure’ reclame voor gezondheidsdiensten een 
effectievere bescherming biedt tegen inbreuken op de vrijheid van meningsuiting 
dan het EVRM. Voorts is een conclusie in hoofdstuk 4 dat er op grond van het EU-
recht minder voorwaarden aan reclameverboden zijn verbonden dan aan systemen 
van voorafgaande administratieve toestemming. Specifiek voor DTC genetische testen 
geldt dat vraagtekens kunnen worden geplaatst bij de evenredigheid tussen een 
reclameverbod of een vergunningstelsel voor dergelijke testen en het nagestreefde 
doel. De Staat kan immers ook met minder ver ingrijpende maatregelen op de rechten 
en vrijheden van consumenten en aanbieders de denkbare doelen voor het beperken 
van reclame voor DTC genetische testen behalen.
Hoofdstuk 5 bevat een studie naar de wet- en regelgeving van zeven Europese landen 
die van toepassing is op DTC genetische testen. In Frankrijk, Duitsland, Portugal en 
Zwitserland zijn op grond van de huidige wetgeving alleen artsen bevoegd om genetische 
testen te verrichten. Een arts mag in deze landen net als in Nederland, België en het 
Verenigd Koninkrijk alleen een DTC test verrichten na toestemming van de patiënt/ 
consument. Op de arts rust de plicht om voorafgaand aan de DTC genetische test de 
patiënt/ consument zo volledig mogelijk voor te lichten over de aard, de betekenis 
en de gevolgen van de test(uitslagen). Nederland heeft op grond van de WBO een 
vergunningensysteem voor bepaalde vormen van screening. Dit vergunningensysteem 
is uniek in de wereld. In België en het Verenigd Koningrijk gelden geen beperkingen ten 
aanzien van de toegang en de verstrekking van DTC genetische testen.
Vanuit mensenrechtelijk oogpunt zijn er voor Nederland, zoals we eerder zagen, goede 
redenen om de toegang tot DTC genetische testen te reguleren. Nederland is lid van 
de EU en de Raad van Europa. Beide organisaties beperken ieder op hun manier de 
Nederlandse (beleids)vrijheid ten aanzien van het reguleren van het aanbod van DTC 
genetische testen. Hoofdstuk 6 gaat over de vrijheid van lidstaten van de EU om het 
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aanbod van commerciële genoomanalyse binnen hun landsgrenzen te reguleren en de 
betekenis hiervan voor Nederland. In dit hoofdstuk wordt betoogd dat commerciële 
genoomanalyses juridisch gekwalificeerd moeten worden als een dienst en niet als een 
goed. Het Nederlandse vergunningssysteem is aldus een beperking van het vrije verkeer 
voor diensten en vestiging, althans voor zover sprake is van grensoverschrijdende 
situaties. De belangrijkste conclusie uit dit hoofdstuk is dat de wijze waarop Nederland 
de toelating van commerciële genoomanalyses reguleert op gespannen voet staat met 
het EU-recht. Het op grond van de WBO vergunnen van het aanbod en de verrichting 
van commerciële genoomanalye is in strijd met de Richtlijn Elektronische handel 
en met het vrije verkeersregime voor vestiging omdat het niet evenredig is aan het 
nagestreefde doel vanwege de reikwijdteproblemen van deze wet. Dit kan problemen 
opleveren in situaties waarbij een bedrijf uit een andere lidstaat zich in Nederland 
vestigt en/ of alhier commerciële genoomanalyse wil aanbieden en verrichten. In dit 
hoofdstuk pleiten de auteurs voor herziening van de WBO. Deze herziening zou zich 
moeten richten op het aanpassen van de definitie van bevolkingsonderzoek en de 
vergunningcriteria, zodat de wet heldere en vooraf kenbare vergunningcriteria krijgt.
Hoofdstuk 7 is een overzichtsartikel. De auteurs onderzoeken in dit hoofdstuk 
of de WBO een voorbeeld kan zijn voor andere landen als het gaat om het stellen 
van kwaliteitseisen aan DTC genetische testen. De bestudeerde relevante juridische 
bindende instrumenten met betrekking tot DTC genetische testen van de Raad van 
Europa en de EU hebben met elkaar gemeen dat validiteit en utiliteit belangrijke 
voorwaarden zijn voor het toestaan van het gebruik van deze testen door het grote 
publiek. Daarnaast lijkt er brede steun te bestaan voor het standpunt dat DTC 
genetische testen alleen mogen worden verricht onder supervisie van een arts. De 
bestudeerde juridische instrumenten bevatten allen een bepaling over het gebruik van 
DTC genetische testen met vergaande consequenties voor de geteste persoon of zijn 
bloedverwanten. Op grond van deze bepalingen zouden Staten dergelijke testen alleen 
mogen toestaan met non-directieve counseling. 
Het antwoord op de centrale vraag in dit hoofdstuk luidt dat de WBO in zijn huidige 
vorm niet als voorbeeld kan dienen voor andere landen van de EU of verdragstaat zijn 
van het EVRM en het Verdrag inzake de rechten van de mens en de biogeneeskunde 
en het aanvullend Protocol genetisch testen voor medische doeleinden. Op de eerste 
plaats is de WBO te liberaal omdat het geen kwaliteitwaarborgen biedt ten aanzien van 
alle genetisch testen maar alleen aan genetische testen naar kanker en onbehandelbare 
ziekten. Op de tweede plaats conflicteert de WBO, zoals beschreven in hoofdstuk 6, 
met het EU-recht.
In hoofdstuk 8 vergelijken de auteurs het EU-recht ten aanzien van medicijnen met het 
EU-recht voor DTC genetische testen. Het doel hiervan is te onderzoeken of de wijze 
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waarop de EU de toegang tot, de vervaardiging van en verstrekking van medicijnen 
reguleert kan dienen als een voorbeeld voor de regulering van DTC genetische testen. 
Dit blijkt inderdaad zo te zijn, vooral ten aanzien van het systeem van (centrale) 
autorisatie door middel van ‘een premarket review’ dat geldt voor medicijnen. Echter, 
‘een premarket review’ is niet voldoende om de kwaliteit, de betrouwbaarheid, het 
(klinisch) nut en het veilig gebruik van DTC genetische testen te waarborgen. Effectieve 
regulering van DTC genetische testen start met ‘premarket review’ maar stelt ook 
(kwaliteits)eisen aan de medische begeleiding tijdens het testen en aan het informeren 
van personen die zich willen laten testen.
Hoofdstuk 9 bevat een beschrijving van de belangrijkste onderzoeksbevindingen en 
enkele concluderende opmerkingen. Zelfbeschikking heeft niet alleen de betekenis 
van afweerrecht. Zelfbeschikking betekent ook de vrijheid om te kiezen en de vrijheid 
tot zelfontplooiing. Vanuit deze visie bezien zijn maatregelen die beschermen tegen 
gezondheidsschade of interventies die tot doel hebben een geïnformeerde keuze te 
bevorderen geen inbreuk op de zelfbeschikking. Dergelijke maatregelen waarborgen de 
zelfbeschikking in de dimensies van keuzevrijheid en zelfontplooiing, de mogelijkheid 
het leven naar eigen inzichten in te richten. Echter, alleen gestandaardiseerde, globale 
informatie over DTC genetische testen waarborgt de zelfbeschikking niet. Daarom 
is counseling gedurende het (DTC) genetische testproces noodzakelijk. Tijdens de 
counseling kan de dienstverlener/ hulpverlener de informatie afstemmen op de 
individuele behoefte van de patiënt/ consument.
Alleen beter informeren of voorlichten van (potentiële) consumenten is niet voldoende 
om individuen te beschermen tegen gezondheidschade als gevolg van ondeugdelijke 
screening. 
Een belangrijke aanbeveling in dit hoofdstuk is het transformeren van de WBO naar 
een screeningswet waarbij het aanbieden en verrichten van screening in beginsel 
is toegestaan, mits de screening wetenschappelijk deugdelijk is en de patiënten- en 
consumtenrechten zijn geëerbiedigd. De auteur stelt voor de term bevolkingsonderzoek 
alleen te reserveren voor grootschalige screeningprogramma’s .
Het hoofdstuk eindigt met de take home message dat een premarket review of een 
kwaliteitskeurmerk niet voldoende is voor het beschermen van individuen tegen 
gezondheidsschade en het borgen van de rechten en vrijheden van anderen. Het 
grootste probleem is niet dat aanbieders van bedrijven ondeugdelijk apparatuur 
of software gebruiken voor het opmaken van het genetisch profiel. In de regel richt 
de kritiek zich vooral op het werkelijke probleem. Dit betreft de wijze waarop de 
aanbieders de verzamelde data interpreteren en de manier waarop zij de testuitslagen 
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